“Optimal” Behavior in International Negotiation:

an interdisciplinary study of Camp David

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Introduction

The 1978 Camp David accords were the end result of a 13 day series of American mediated talks between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and have been heralded as the longest lasting and most effectively negotiated agreement between any Arab nation and Israel. Many credit the success of the accords to Begin’s effective bargaining tactics, widely acclaimed as “optimal” by current foreign policy scholars. Yet if asked, scholars of other disciplines might have quite a different slant on the success of the accords. Some political historians have commented that the accords did not merely fail to improve Arab-Israeli relations, but have also exacerbated the already existing enmity between nations. Others, sociologists and psychologists, might focus upon the role of individual power in the negotiation process. Others might even question the most fundamental premise upon which the current “optimal bargaining” behavior is based, concerning effective interpersonal organization both in and out of the international negotiation arena. And yet still others might celebrate, as indeed most do, the more tangible successes of the accords: Israel agreed to trade the Sinai Peninsula for peaceful relations with Cairo, and both Egypt and Israel finished with larger US financial aid packets than any other international body currently receives. The possibility, however, of a divergent opinion is intriguing: in consideration of new interdisciplinary research, not limited specifically to political science but inclusive of psychological, sociological, even biological studies, how and why was the Camp David negotiation a specific “success”? After reviewing the background to the Camp David accords, evaluating the applied bargaining tactics and gains and losses accrued therein, the concluding sections of this analysis will challenge the supposed effectiveness of “optimal” behavior in negotiation and tentatively suggest divergent views on sustainable organizational systems – whether at the bargaining table or otherwise.

1 A more specific definition of the term “negotiation” will follow in Part One, Background.
Part One: Background

Negotiation occurs when two or more interdependent parties apply diplomatic rather than military means to the settlement of a shared problem or conflict of interest. Though negotiation should not be confused with reconciliation - the former pertaining to an immediate game of gains and losses and the latter to the aftermath of such a process - and while an applied negotiation strategy cannot be held wholly responsible for the lasting repercussions of any agreement resulting therein, a definite correlation between means and end must, nonetheless, be acknowledged. Because bargaining tools are not intrinsically independent from their purpose, an evaluation of bargaining success might do well to include an analysis of both the negotiation strategy and the results accrued therein – whether the latter include tangible economic and territorial gains or those more indefinite in character, such as a possible reconciliation or mollification of hostility between parties. The first half of this analysis will therefore review why each party initially sought to participate in the bargaining game, evaluate the tactics of each game player, and follow by weighing the applied bargaining approach and ensuing results against a set criteria for “success.” We will take each step in its own time. Firstly, in terms of Camp David, what were both nations seeking?

Egyptian Objectives

Mohammed Kamel, Foreign Minister under Egyptian President Sadat during the making of the accords, writes in his memoirs “The Camp David Accords: A Testimony” that Egypt was in desperate need of financial aid after the war of 1967 and the October War of 1973. He recalls that “the 1967 War had ended catastrophically for the Arabs with Israel’s occupation of the whole Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and the West Bank, including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip – or all that then remained of Palestine.” Egyptians were frustrated and bitter, having been lulled into the illusion by the previous president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and his propaganda that Egypt had the

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mightiest army of the Middle East. Besides fiscal recovery, a public reaffirmation of
their nation’s honor had become crucial for the Egyptian people.

On the 13th of September, 1970, Nasser died and Anwar Sadat took his place as
President of the United Arab Republic. Though seen as “nondescript in comparison with
Nasser’s forceful and dynamic personality” and shy in the spotlight, the new president
nonetheless was forcefully in tune with his peoples’ internal concerns. He understood
that Egyptian unrest sprung from an acute sense of hurt honor, remedied perhaps by a
renewed control of land that had fallen under Israeli occupation after the War of 1967. In
his own words, Sadat “knew full well that he could not long remain President of Egypt
while Israeli forces occupied an important part of Egyptian territory, with their troops
camped in full view on the East Bank of the Suez Canal, entrenched in their positions of
the Bar-lev Line.” The Sinai Peninsula was considered to be part of sovereign Egyptian
territory: its return would justifiably signify a renewal of Egyptian territorial integrity, as
well as of the honor lost during the previous years of war.

After the devastation of the October War, President Sadat recorded in his memoirs
Those I Have Known several calculations pertaining to “how much war had cost Egypt
and the Arab world since 1948,” though these “costs” were to pertain less to land and
honor than those more financial in nature: “Until the October War,” he wrote, “when the
entire Arab world made a lot of money out of oil and added to their wealth, Egypt by
contrast was drained of its resources. So whenever the Israelis created problems during
the peace negotiations, my thoughts would go back to the burden we had to bear, and I
would opt for peace.” Though the October War permitted “the Arab nation to breathe
again, regaining some of its confidence” in face of a seemingly invincible Israeli giant, it
extorted 14 billion pounds, as well as enormous numbers of lives and equipment, from
Egypt. “Why did I always think we could achieve so much through peace? We could,”

4 Hopmann
6 Kamel, 10
concludes Sadat, “gain less by war than by our peace initiative.” This “gain” would come primarily from American financial aid, writes Raphel Israeli in his book “Man of Defiance.” Previous alliances, financial and otherwise, with the Soviet Union had proved unreliable; Sadat thought that the United States would be a more consistent ally, and so was willing to negotiate, and even make some concessions in line with American interest, in order to gain a “Carter Plan” similar to the Marshall Plan after World War II.8

On the 16th of October, in the middle of the 1973 October war, Sadat made a speech to the People’s Assembly in which he called for an international conference to be held at the United Nations for the establishment of peace in the Middle East: a sustainable resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was urgent. By the 20th day of November, 1978, Sadat had traveled across the Israeli-Egyptian border to arrive at the Knesset; he there extended his initiative for peace to the people of Israel themselves. Though the astonishment at the audacity of Sadat “could scarcely have been greater all over the world,” according to Kamel, the trip was nonetheless the first substantial move toward an eventual peace accord between the two feuding nations.9 Sadat would have economic and territorial-political objectives during the coming negotiations: he planned to insist that Begin withdraw to the Nitla and Giddi passes in order for Egypt to regain control of the Sinai, all the while coaxing his American friend – and mediator to the conflict – President James Carter into offering the Arab nation an extended financial aid packet for economic damage encountered during the previous decades of war.10

**Israeli Objectives**

According to Darrant and Hakim’s article, *Winners and Losers in the Middle East*, “the grand thinking of the architects of the peace process” centered upon the idea that “economic benefits would [become] the driving force of a ‘new Middle East.’” Both countries saw the negotiations as a chance to boost their economic environment by

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7 Sadat, 108
9 Kamel, 14
decreasing defense expenditures and release those resources for productive uses; by increasing direct investment and reduce the region’s cost of capital; by boosting the development of “intra-regional trade specialization and trade based upon comparative advantages;” and by furthering “cooperation in joint economic projects”

And yet, similar to its Arab neighbor, Israel had not only financial but also territorial aspirations for the upcoming negotiations. Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister under Begin’s leadership, proposed that Israeli goals include a “buffer zone” in Sinai, certain “boundary changes” with Egypt, and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Eilat. The “military possibilities” of a buffer zone were demilitarization, reduction of forces, or control by UN troops. The boundary changes should leave to Israel control of both Eitan and Etzion airfields near the Negev-Sinai frontier, with an “appropriate” area around them, as well as of the Jewish settlements within the approaches to Rafah. In other words, Dayan’s public proposition -- officially supported then by Begin -- was that an Israeli-controlled territorial strip from the Mediterranean to Eilat, west of the international boundary, be secured through the course of negotiations with Egypt.

Weizman, Israeli Minister of Defense during the Camp David accords, characterizes the latter territorial measures as an equal if not greater instigation to participate in negotiations than economic measures. He describes the Israeli peoples as having “difficulties” in conceptualizing a peaceful relationship with their Arab neighbors. The conflict with Egypt was of an ongoing, deeply rooted nature in which “one nation had always threatened to completely annihilate another nation ... to utterly destroy the inhabitants of that country.” The surrounding countries to Israel, again according to the Minister, had the stated purpose of wiping out the entire Israeli people and were closed to any Israeli-led option for peace. After thirty years of trying to communicate with the Arabs, Weizman recalls that the response of the leaders of the Labor party had been that “there’s no one to talk to.” The Camp David accords, then, were a desperate yet necessary attempt at securing Israel’s existence among the Arab predators: Israel’s safety

was menaced each day by the Arab presence; if that threat could be quelled then the state of Israel would have a chance of being more than a mere “passing episode.”

Begin’s “geo-strategic perception” of the Middle East, echoing that of Weizman, envisioned many Arab countries, occupying domains that stretched from the Atlantic coast to the Persian Gulf, who uniformly desired the destruction of the one, small state of Israel; in the prime minister’s 1977 speech to the Israeli Knesset, he claimed that “over all the years of this generation we have never stopped being attacked by might of the strong arm stretched out to exterminate our people, to destroy our independence, to deny our rights.” It follows that Begin’s primary goal was also, recalling once more the words of his minister of defense, to secure the appropriate territory for the Land of Israel to adequately protect and solidify its presence in the Middle East. Most fundamentally, this land included the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as the holy land of Jerusalem, which was seen as the Israeli “nation’s heart.” “No notion,” writes Sofer, “was detested by Begin more than ‘partition,’ and later, ‘territorial compromise.’” The loss of any Israeli territory was considered “a historic national catastrophe.” Israel’s future lay in the protection of its land; any threat to Israeli territorial claims was a threat to the security of the nation. Territorial (re)acquisition and control, as in the Egyptian case, tacitly served to signify a greater national security; economic gain was the more falsifiable correlative of the latter; and peace negotiations came to be seen as the necessary means to this end.

**Part Two: Bargaining Behavior**

What is the import of bargaining strategy vis-à-vis the final outcome of a negotiation? Is there a particular way to bargain in order to assure preferable results? Many political scholars have described the Camp David accords as a prime example of successful, or

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14 from *The Camp David Accords and Related Documents*, gathered by the Chain Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy (1998).
“optimal,” bargaining that in turn led to the only long lasting Arab-Israeli peace initiative. Firstly we should review the theoretical foundations of this “optimal bargaining strategy,” as outlined primarily by those of the realist school of thought.

“Realism” may be characterized as a system of conflict deterrence through the use of hegemonic power by one or two states situated in an anarchical international arena. Peace is to be attained through the maintenance of these international hierarchies, which facilitate the effectiveness of interstate threats and coercion. The aggressive acquisition of power - economic or military - is key in the realist game, and necessarily obtained at the detriment of the other.16 “Aggression,” as defined by the sociologist Talcott Parsons, can be defined as “the disposition of the part of an individual or a collectivity to orient its action to goals which include a conscious or unconscious intention illegitimately to injure the interests of other individuals or collectivities in the same system.” Foremost in this strategic game is the tactical manipulation of aggression, as well as an attentive mistrust of the other – for the other is sure to comport himself likewise.17

**Principal Theories: Realism and Optimal Bargaining**

Shibley Telhami, in his *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining*, views secrecy and the appearance of strength as essential also on the smaller field of the bargaining arena. If each actor seeks to maximize his own gains, and knows that the opponent is better off with an agreement than without, “it can make sense to project a tougher stance than the actor actually holds.” Honesty and open communication is not ideal. One’s real position should remain hidden as long as possible: exaggerate minimally acceptable positions in order to assure preferable results. An actor should not give his opponent any certainty about what is truly desired, not only about his “actual position, but even about [his] rationality.”18 Exaggeration, miscommunication, and even deception, then, are necessary elements to successful bargaining.

According to political theorist William B. Quandt, bargaining occurs in the “space within the range of possible agreements where one actor’s gain becomes the other’s loss”: each actor must accrue as much gain as possible, which is necessarily to the detriment of the other, and be in continual suspicion that the other is attempting to do the same. It is a war of the wills: project a tough appearance to encourage the opposition to concede to your demands and mislead your opposition with “issue displacement,” or the conscious dissemination of primary objectives, in order to shield your true concerns from possible attack. Charles Lockhart adds to this analysis of bargaining strategy the productive use of threats and coercion, holding the latter to be an “unquestionably crucial strategy for international conflicts.”

One must respect certain limitations, however, in the implementation of coercion: the primary consideration here is the perception of the coercer’s goals. While Quandt thought preferable that “the decision-making unit” question even the rationality itself of the coercer, Lockhart is more subtle in his analysis of beneficial coercion. The target of coercion, he writes, must not perceive the coercer as using excessive coercion in order to attain excessive goals, as needlessly humiliating, and as acting capriciously or vindictively. Yet, despite its possible restrictions in use, coercion is deemed by both Lockhart and Quandt to be “an appropriate response to the mutual suspicion” present between negotiating parties, for it signals “the statesman’s own determination to rise above his adversary.”

The apparent objective of optimal bargaining, or “position-based bargaining” in the words of negotiation guides Fisher and Ury, is precisely to achieve a dominant position over the opposing party such that ultimatums and threats might coerce the other into a final position of supplication and eventual submission. These tactics are by no means new, neither to the previously discussed national defense policies nor to the Middle Eastern bargaining table: in the negotiations leading up to the Camp David accords, American mediator Henry Kissinger “was clearly interested in maintaining his own

19 Quandt, 631
21 Lockhart, 182
personal control over the timing of the negotiations,” and “he resorted to more threatening tactics in order to pressure the Syrians into making appropriate concessions.”23 Indeed, at the core of Kissinger’s methods was this aggressive incitement of *concessions* rather than options for mutual gain to take from one party to the other. The essence of the secretary’s view of international relations was “that it is a dog-eat-dog world in which principles, law, morality, and ethical standards do not count. It is a contest of wills to be determined by force, threats of force, hard bargaining, linkage, and pressure of all kinds. One prevails by exerting more pressure, having the courage to take great risks, and the guts to use brutal force as in the bombing of Cambodia and the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam.”24 Israeli position-based bargaining tactics are described by Middle East scholar A. Sabet, in his article “The Peace Process”; he states the former chief of Israeli military intelligence Yehoshafata Harkabi as to have declared that “making the opponent uneasy and apologetic about his objective is a first small step in the process of erosion, inducing him to start discarding it.”25

In so far as negotiation consists of the “art of the dialectics of wills [that] use force to resolve their conflict,” with the overriding principle of taking “advantage to the greatest extent possible of the adversary’s weaknesses and oversights,” the following section will analyze how these tactics were implemented in the Camp David accords, by whom, and to what end. 26

**The Game Players: Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat**

Begin was adept in Telhami’s strategy of issue displacement: he insisted heavily and publicly on keeping hold of the Sinai in order to draw focus from issues more dear to him, such as the Palestinian question and the control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to the Israeli Prime Minister, “historically the Golan Heights (which

24 Rubin,112-113.
26 Sabet, 6
comprised the latter occupied territories) was and will remain an inseparable part of the Land of Israel.”

27 By appearing adamant about the Sinai, rather than about those more cherished territories, he appeared to his Egyptian opponent as conceding on issues more important than they were in actuality, avoiding thereby compromise on those fundamentally beyond discussion. 28 “All Begin needed,” writes Kamel in his memoirs, “was sufficient time to confuse the issue and drain the initiative of its magnificent content by drawing Egypt into a labyrinth of detail by unending discussions on secondary matters or side-issues.”

29 Yet not only did he place exaggerated focus upon one issue or detail while downplaying the greater importance of another, he also used his decentralized governmental structure to excuse himself from unwanted concessions. Any agreement not preferable to Begin could be refused on the grounds – whether in truth or not – that it would not be accepted among his domestic constituency.

Having developed his political career in a nascent state that had experienced only adversarial relations with its Arab elders, Begin was prepared for “playing hardball” at Camp David. His personal style “was generally conducive to effective bargaining”: he felt confident to threaten and “counter-threaten” his negotiation partners, and used their weaknesses to his advantage. 30 Refusing to negotiate on the issue of settlements at all until the very last day of negotiations, “when he was still shouting worlds like ‘ultimatum,’ ‘excessive demands,’ and ‘political suicide,’ Begin was an aggressive opponent and “formidable negotiator.”

31 Knowing that it was politically imperative for Carter to reach an eventual resolution to the conflict, Begin stayed close to Telhami’s advice of projecting a tougher stance than he actually held by voicing numerous ultimatums to threaten the negotiation’s progression. In this way he managed to manipulate the American mediator to adhere to many Israeli demands, such as increased financial support from the western states. Begin also knew that Egyptian President Sadat needed most to regain control of the Sinai Peninsula; he therefore threatened continued

27 Sofer, 126
29 Kamel, 31
30 Telhami, 164-165
31 Telhami, 165
occupation of the Sinai in order to draw focus away from the more cherished territories of
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the city of Jerusalem – the Israeli “nation’s heart.”
Lastly, Begin was quick to maintain that the other parties to the negotiation would act
likewise toward himself, and so sustained a high level of suspicion throughout even the
final signing of the accords. Carter recalls that “Begin did not display the optimism and
trust of the opponent that are entailed in [Sadat’s] wishful thinking”; the Egyptian
president was quick as well to acknowledge and resent his partner’s stubborn demeanor
of superiority and coercive command.

While Sadat was no lamb either at the negotiation table – he too was versed in optimal
bargaining techniques and prone to storm from the negotiation table when tensions were
high or the threat of stalemate could play to his advantage – his overall bargaining
approach was more amateurish and seemingly destined for failure than that of his Israeli
bargaining partner. This was not due entirely, however, to a poor application of optimal
bargaining techniques: the Egyptian honor, territory, and economy had taken several
painful knocks by the end of the 1967 and 1973 wars, and the sheer need for a speedy
resolution forced Sadat to assume a less aggressive role in the negotiation process. By
voyaging to Israel to deliver his speech at the Knesset, Sadat not only lent unrequited
respect to the Israeli nation but also unilaterally declared that there would be no more
Arab violence waged against Israel. In hindsight Sadat might have acted more
“optimally” by reserving both carrots, that of recognition and ceasefire, as bargaining
leverage for later sessions at the negotiating table. Though the words might have been a
bit sweetened in light of their friendship, Sadat’s Minister of Defense is nonetheless
recorded as saying that his president was too eager to use his adversary’s wording in his
own speeches, to exercise “considerate and courteous treatment” of his opponents, and to
maintain “faith in people until such faith was shown to have been misplaced.”

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33 Jonathan Oakman, The Camp David Accords: A Case Study on International Negotiation. Woodrow
34 Kamel, 43-44
the greater Egyptian belief that the accords would be the first sure step to a wider Arab-Israeli peace; the Israelis, however, were more realistic in their expectations, and saw the accords as a means of neutralizing Egypt while holding on to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. In Begin’s eyes as well, the agreement was to foster not peace but the absence of violence – such that the Israelis might with greater facility maintain control of previously occupied territory.\(^\text{35}\)

In his own memoirs *Keeping the Faith*, Carter comments on his surprise that Sadat was so loyal to their friendship and willing to reveal his positions to the American mediator: “It was soon obvious,” wrote Carter, “that Sadat seemed to trust me too much.”\(^\text{36}\) The mediator was not without position himself: the American elections were approaching, and Carter “had sunk a large amount of political capital into the peace process, and he needed to demonstrate results to save his presidency.” American national interest depended upon Middle East stability in order to secure both favorable western relations with Israel and Egypt and a continued American access to oil reserves. “Any treaty that addressed even the least controversial topics at Camp David would have helped to achieve these goals”: Sadat’s openness about his positions and conceivable concessions only made the process go faster, for they allowed Carter to know specifically which issues to push in order to reach a speedy, and desirable to the US, resolution – whether favorable or not to his Egyptian friend.

Sadat could not succeed at “optimal” deception due as well to his centralized government and strong domestic support. President Sadat had taken a series of steps during the years preceding the accords that strengthened his position internally. His first move was to eliminate Nasser’s outdated “power centers” – a group of powerful, autocratic men that had assumed key positions throughout Egyptian land. Sadat then turned his focus to the Egyptian prisons, and took steps to release all political detainees; to close detention camps; end sequestration; bring to trial violators of human rights; and declare the reinstatement of Egyptian Rule of Law. “The word ‘Democracy,’” records


Minister of Defense Kamel, “began to be heard frequently. Sadat’s success won him a great deal of popularity among the people, who from then on pinned their hopes on him.”

In centralized Egypt there were not nearly as many different political factions and parties as in Israel: there was but one leader, Sadat, whose reforms earned him the unified support of his people. In a time of negotiation, however, this is not always a boon to the bargainer. While the divided Israeli public allowed Begin to rationalize the rejection of undesirable concessions, Sadat could not excuse himself from a compromise on the same grounds. There were no feuding political factions that had power to significantly sway the making of Egyptian policy; Sadat was the sole accountable agent. This unilateral support, common within centralized governments, forced the Egyptian president to be more candid than his democratic colleague about what his constituency would permit him to concede.

Sadat’s aide Butus Ghali helps summarize his president’s behavior. “Sadat was a real amateur,” he has said: secrecy was not his talent, he revealed his true interests far too early in the game, and he lacked adequate suspicion of his bargaining partners. His nation’s unconditional need for a peace agreement obliged him to play a more complacent role in the bargaining process and his centralized government gave him little opportunity to give the false reasoning required to avoid certain undesirable concessions. We have seen as well why Israeli behavior, on the other hand, has been praised for its adherence to the “optimal bargaining strategy”: not only did Israel refuse to communicate clearly its true interests in the conflict, but “the Israeli delegation seemed capable of exaggerating,” and otherwise dissembling its position, so effectively that it “gave Israel a decided advantage.”

Yet did this discrepancy between Sadat and Begin’s behavior markedly affect the final outcome of the negotiations?

37 Kamel, 12
39 Telhami, 164-165
Part Three: Success?

“In general,” writes negotiation scholar P. Terrence Hopmann in his article *Bargaining and Problem-Solving: Two Perspectives on International Negotiation*, “negotiation outcomes may be evaluated according to four criteria”: there must be an element of “agreement,” the final realization of a mutually acceptable decision; an “efficiency” in improving the situations of all involved parties; an “equity” in bargaining terms and resulting profit; and finally a “stability,” or durability, over time. In terms of Camp David, at the end of the accords the criteria of “agreement” and “efficiency” seem to have been met. There was a mutually agreed upon decision that managed to improve the situations of both nations: the bargaining resulted in a reasonably safe border along the shared Israeli-Egyptian dividing line, and the Sinai Peninsula was traded for a promise from Cairo to increase anti-terrorist efforts at home.

More debatable is just how “equitable” the trade was. Because Begin was more adept at implementing realist principals into his bargaining strategy, he succeeded at two primary goals: he maintained indefinite control of the cherished Jerusalem and Golan Heights, and suspended decision on the Palestinian question and the continued construction of settlements. These, however, are all Israeli territorial successes to the detriment of Egypt. Though both countries managed to finish with a large promise of financial aid from the United States – Egypt collects close to two billion dollars annually, and Israel is the receiver of more US monetary and military currency than any other country – Israel is the winner in the economic game as well.

Ali Darrant and Sam Hakim, authors of *Winners and Losers in the Middle East*, write that Israel’s main growth period occurred during the 12 years following the Camp David accords; its GDP grew four times faster than that of the Arab countries. Looking more specifically at the exports for the region as a percentage of GDP, still post-accords, Israel led the Arab region with an annual average growth rate of 32 percent between 1996 and 2000. Egypt, however, was left with negative economic growth.

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40 Hopmann, 449
41 *Egyptian TV Fuels Hate*, The Los Angelos Times, LA, Calif., 11/09/02. page 1. author unknown.
42 Darrant and Hakim, 3
While Israel’s swelling pocket of financial aid was not comprised of winnings reaped solely from the accords, the discrepancy between the two nations’ situations – financial or otherwise – deserves consideration: in relation to the other, were the Egyptian and Israeli situations equally improved after the agreement? Does an initially inferior position rationalize or excuse the reaping of unequal gains? Perhaps not. One might even go so far as to propose that the element of equity was missing not only in the final outcome of the accords but in procedure as well. Hopmann considers “equity” in an agreement to represent not only mutually beneficial results but “reciprocal fairness, in which all parties perceive that mutually beneficially steps taken by one party were reciprocated by the other parties.” Yet how, while working within the confines of a strategy that advocates the aggressive use of threats and deception, might a participant feel assured of fair treatment from his bargaining partners? Begin’s fluency in the language of coercion and issue displacement assured him results that rose above and beyond those of his Egyptian colleague, and could have assured a lack of “equity” in both means and ends of the accords.

This bodes poorly for the stability of the accords, as that criterion for success seems to be at least partially dependent upon the initial justice of the agreement: if equity in result and fair play in procedure are lacking, long-term stability might be threatened as well. An article entitled Israel’s Cold Peace with Egypt, printed by The Economist in August of 1991, states that more than a decade after the accords were signed hostility toward Israel on the Egyptian front persisted, which had been steadily increasing in proportion to Israel’s growing slant toward the right. In the early 1990’s, Egyptian President Mubarak refused on several occasions to meet the Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, and two years passed without any communication between an Israeli minister and Cairo. It had been nine years since an Egyptian of similar rank made the trip to Jerusalem. As of 1991, few Egyptian tourists had set foot in Jerusalem. Egypt, according to the article, saw Israel as increasingly aggressive in its occupations of Arab land, and violent in its treatment of the

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43 Hopmann, 449
44 this point will be furthered in Part Four, under Coercion and Conflict Reproduction Theory
Palestinians; the Egyptian people were responding with anti-Israeli propaganda, frigid diplomacy, and radical terrorist attacks on Israeli tourists and statesmen.⁴⁵

By September of the year 2002, more than two decades after the accords, Egypt began a 41-part series called “Horseman without a Horse,” based on “vicious lies about the birth of the Zionist movement,” according to the Los Angeles Times. Egyptian television said to be featuring anti-Semitic propaganda, such as “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” in which a small group of Jews plot to take over the world. The propaganda is seen to “flout the ... Camp David accords” and “strengthen the case of nationalist Israelis who seize such propaganda to declare that real peace will never be possible with any Arab country.” Egypt has so far restrained from abrogating the peace accords of 1978, and has abstained from any nationally-endorsed violent manifestation of her anti-Israeli sentiment. In June 1981, however, barely two days after Begin had met with Sadat, Israel bombed an Iraqi nuclear plant. Though hostility erupted, Egypt kept the agreements of the treaty and refused retaliation. Exactly one year later, Israel launched a war against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon.⁴⁶ Despite Egypt’s second refusal of retaliation for this attack, there is still hostility between the two neighboring countries and from both parties. In this light, the accords cannot be seen as successful in terms of improving relations between Egyptian and Israeli peoples, or for that matter in assuring a stable peace. How important was the failure to assure “equity” and “stability,” the last two criteria for a successful negotiation, compared to the “efficiency” of the initial “agreement”?

Part Four: Theoretical Criticism Across the Disciplines

We have reviewed the Camp David accords within the realist framework: we have analyzed the initial preferences of both actors, which were shown to include economic, political, and territorial elements; the strategies implemented by each to attain these goals; and some of the outcomes of the interstate bargaining game. We have seen that

⁴⁶ Haas, 46
Begin was the most effective in his application of optimal bargaining strategy: he used tactics that assured the preservation of the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, Gaza Strip and the West Bank, a forestalled decision upon the fate of the Palestinian Diaspora and settlement construction, and further, the cultivation Israel’s burgeoning financial relationship with America. The realist speaks in terms of economy, territory, and politics, and while it seems the analysis has been framed with such elements in mind, it has been to the neglect of the other significant psychological variables. At the negotiation’s end, territory and economics were decided upon: Egypt regained control of the Sinai, Israel kept the territory dearest to its people, and both nations received promises of continued financial aid from the United States. And yet there remained hostility.

Telhami has deemed these territorial and economic preferences of both countries to be the primary driving forces of reaching agreement, disregarding and even criticizing the introduction of “ideology, attitudes, cooperative spirit, and the love of peace” into the bargaining arena. Yet while Neil J. Kressel, who has written a book review of Telhami’s *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining* for the journal *Political Psychology*, admits that the study of international conflict must go beyond “the psychology of attitudes, perceptions, and group dynamics,” he also discusses how these latter components must nonetheless be included in the analysis and balanced equally among the economic, military, and political variables – something which realist scholar Telhami fails to do. Political science must be at least partially inclusive of psychological exploration, for “all social behavior,” Talcott Parsons writes, “including the ‘policies’ of the most complex collectivities like nation-states, is ultimately the behavior of human beings.” The fundamentals of basic human relations provide initial footing to those international, which can then be understandable in terms of the motivation of “unique individuals, albeit perhaps millions of them, in the situations in which they are placed.”

48 Kressel, 808
49 Parsons, 299
Because the study of political science could be so laden with human complexity, it both stymies and intrigues scholars of all disciplines.\textsuperscript{50} In terms of the Camp David accords, we have seen how the economic, territorial, and political, or “administrative,” variables were handled with reasonable success; but in view of the residual hostility in the Middle East, how could the bargaining have been more effective? Could psychology enrich the study?

\textbf{Coercion and Conflict Reproduction Theory in Political Science and Psychology}

In a letter by Sigmund Freud responding to Albert Einstein’s reflections on war, the psychoanalyst warns that when “the justice of the community becomes an expression of the unequal degrees of power obtained within it ... the oppressed members of the group make constant efforts to obtain more power ... Rebellion and civil war follow.”\textsuperscript{51} From the psychoanalyst’s words it might be inferred that it is from the realist quest itself for hegemonic power that the continuation of belligerent enmity between peoples ensues. In hierarchical, position-based negotiations, or Telhami’s “optimal bargaining behavior,” each side tries through sheer force to obtain more power than the other, inciting not peaceful relations but anger, embarrassment, and resentment as one side sees itself bending to the rigid will of the other while its own legitimate concerns go un-addressed. The fight over survival has become equated to a competition over individual power. If the adversary capitulates under duress, the negotiations will have only “fuel[ed] bitterness, resentment, and ultimately, the mobilization of ... resistance.”\textsuperscript{52} Each party sees the other as a personal offense to its self, which translates into insecurity; soon the aggressive actions will be repeated and justified under the auspices of defense, for “there

\textsuperscript{50} When asked by the League of Nations in 1932 to explore an area of personal interest, physicist Albert Einstein proposed the subject of international conflict. He developed the idea of a supranational organization with the authority to settle disputes between nations and the power to enforce its decisions. He then called upon the opinion of psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud; his own solution dealt only with the administrative aspect of the problem, Einstein explained to Freud, such as might be concerned with superficial border disputes or an economic downturn. The physical scientist drew attention to psychology in his, and the greater global community’s, search for international security because he saw the latter as impossible to achieve until more was known about the human psyche. \textit{Introduction to Great Books}, The Great Books Foundation, 1st series (Illinois, 1990). page 6.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Great Books}, 11

\textsuperscript{52} Sabet, 14
is an immense accumulation of evidence that aggressive patterns develop when security in some form, mostly in human relationships, is threatened.”

It is a simple concept, really, and perhaps could lend insight as to why hostility might increase – threatening the stability of any agreement – if there is a lack of equity among gains: as one people feel cheated or neglected, hostility against the established order becomes manifest in violent shows of aggression – all under a banner of defense.

The threat of high priority goals of “the decision-making unit,” or in Lockhart’s words “the target of coercion,” is seen by Raymond Cohen to be intrinsically linked with international conflict provocation. It is the perception of these threats, which he defines as “an anticipation of the part of an observer, the decision-maker, of impending harm – usually of a military, strategic, or economic kind – to the state,” which “is central to the whole phenomenon” of conflict provocation. The “military, strategic, or economic” threat is precisely in the domain of the realist paradigm, which, neatly coinciding with Parson’s previously stated definition of aggression, “orients its actions to goals which include [an] intention illegitimately to injure the interests of other individuals or collectivities in the same system.”

While the realist views tactical coercion as fundamental to a negotiation’s success, exemplified in Begin’s tactics of menacing both the continuation of the peace talks and a renewed Arab control of the Sinai, Cohen sees the threat as an incendiary action which leads not to the surcease of hostility but to its prolongation; each major international crisis, according to the political theorist, has had at its root an underlying threat from an oppositional party, which then became interpreted by the former as a call to arms.

**Material versus Symbolic Valence**

From a psychological perspective, it seems as if the philosophies underlining realist bargaining strategy, which encourage both hierarchal power and divisive conduct, could

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53 Parsons, 300
55 Parsons, 299
be a contributor to the lasting hostility between the Egyptian and Israeli nations. The value of “military, strategic, or economic” objectives go deeper than the material goals associated with each, and so must be addressed in kind. One people might desire territorial acquisition in order to ease certain insecurities about their long-term stability in the world; therefore to treat territory as only a material objective is perhaps confusing or neglecting the true issue at hand. Cohen notes that at each deadlock between Begin and Sadat lay “cultural preoccupations which were as mutually unintelligible as they were antithetical.” So much more is implied, for example, in the “land for peace” bargaining tactic than literal border changes and economic loss or gain: the conflict in the Middle East was not about – nor should it be addressed in terms of – mere pieces of land or sums of money; it was indeed what the material objectives came to represent for each people. “On the Israeli side [the conflict arose from] a profound sense of insecurity; on the Egyptian side an overriding concern with face.”

Recalling the memoirs of Ezer Weizman, the “basic Jewish problem ... is the idea that we are hated, that everyone’s out to trick us,” for Israel suffered from a “total mistrust in everything, bordering on the paranoid.” On the Egyptian side there were the “dictates of honors” that played the largest role in obstructing more effective negotiations. Kamel described how the war of 1967 had left the Egyptians resentful and bitter toward the Israeli army, for Israel had challenged the Egyptian prowess at keeping secure her own territory from enemy occupation: every peace of land that became occupied was symbolically interpreted as an audacious ruse to flout her honor as a nation. Measures that Israel deemed vital for its safety, Egypt saw as humiliating; and, since the legitimacy and security of Israel depended upon the literal acquisition and governance of land, each Arab move to regain territory lost could be interpreted by Israel as a call to arms.

And so while we find an Israel who declared a formal interest in maintaining control of Jerusalem and of the occupied territories, as well as in receiving continued monetary aid from the United States, and an Egypt who had the stated desire to regain stability in its own economic and territorial affairs, the objectives of each lay deeper, as the words of

56 Richard Cohen, Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations (Indiana, 1990), pages 111-112.
57 Weizman, 236
Kamel and Weizman have implied, than superficial border disputes and an increased financial support from the West. The latter interpretation of conflict preferences has a purely literal resonance; the symbolic valence of the material, whether territorial or economic, conditions for resolution are disregarded. Ceding land is on the literal plane; ceding prestige or “honor” or “face” are perhaps its virtual equivalencies. Realist and literal playing cards neither address nor explain the abstract and symbolic valence of material assets; yet, ironically enough, the hierarchical nature of realist strategy could be seen to exacerbate those same abstract, identity-based issues that they have chosen to disregard in theory. This could be a primary problematic of realist political thought. Indeed one might make the conclusion that a better tactic in negotiation would be to embrace an opposite strategy: the subtle needs of personhood, and by analogy statehood, such as identity, self-esteem, as well as recognition and respect, must not only be acknowledged, firstly, but then adamantly supported and addressed in order to begin any development of individual “health” -- or, to stretch the psychological terminology into one more political in scope, collective “peace.”

**Threatening Interdependency**

By stripping the psychological significance from political variables and focusing not upon the symbolic valence of territorial acquisition but upon its material, financial, and political worth, the retaliatory repercussions of aggressive acts can be overlooked. Threats, then, are still seen as legitimate practice. To threaten the other presupposes faith in the realist belief that we are all separate beings, and that the other’s loss is one’s own gain. This “practice of separateness,” according to sociologist Richard Schmitt, invites a uniquely individualistic definition of power: “it transforms power into power-over, power to ward off the threats of domination by threatening and seeking domination for oneself”; and it is precisely the type of power to which one aspires in optimal bargaining. Psychologist Louis Aaron Reitmeister also views power as an important element to

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intrasocial relations, but, rather than the focal point, considers it a productive force only when it is activated by all peoples, and not only by a select few. Perhaps, the psychologist might suggest, the realist has it all wrong: it is only within a network of mutuality that security lies. Both our loss and gain might be in direct correlation to our neighbor’s. This necessitates that a person’s greatness is determined not only by the strength of his influence upon mankind but by the coordinative actions of that person with his fellow peers. Not every benefit for oneself must be accrued at the detriment of the other, according to Reitmeister: more communicative and group-oriented strategies might indeed further the possibilities for even “greater forces of happiness, equity, and integrity – the makers of peace” – than those more individualistic or coercive in nature.60 We are social beings and our ties to the group aid us to achieve more than we could alone. “The child’s love,” seconds individual psychologist Alfred Adler, “is always directed towards others, not on his own body... only under the stress of the most severe psycho-pathological degeneration does the social feeling, which has become firmly based in the soul of every child at this time, forsake him.” It is misguided to claim as “human nature” the continual search for the protection, and thereby defensive separation, of one’s own person from the greater community. According to the psychologists, hierarchies maintained by force or the threat of force require the same defensive habits of mind that ensure the continuation of conflict, toxify any “greater power” that might be achieved communally, and deny any “shared social bond” initially inborn.61

Here we find Cohen’s political theories supported by those of individual psychology: the aggressive and individualistic tactics involved in optimal bargaining would be seen by the psychologists as not only counter-intuitive but even counter-productive to any solid gain that might have been reaped from the negotiation process. If asked to review the accords, the psychologists might focus upon both nations’ (mis)perception that each peoples’ identities, under the guise of national interests, would be compromised if stronger bonds were forged with the opponent. Perhaps the lasting hostility might have been better alleviated if each side had considered its own individual value and security to

be interdependent with, even contingent upon, the other’s. Sadat was reprimanded by both realist scholars of today and his own administration at the time for acknowledging the legitimacy of Israel in his initial voyage to the Knesset, and thus lending undue power to the oppositional team. Reitmeister might have seen Sadat’s behavior in a different light. If Sadat had been seeking to forge a stronger bond with his opponent, he could be viewed in search not of power upon, in Reitmeister’s terms, but power with: as is detailed in his memoirs, more would be won by working with his Israeli neighbors than against.⁶²

An individual psychologist might comment that the hostile actions of an aggressor show disregard for the distinctly human actualization needs of secure identities and respect; they incite feelings of insecurity that Parsons and Cohen have linked to continued aggression; and have been decried by Reitmeister and Adler as contrary to the human penchant toward sustaining “shared social bonds” – as well as counter-productive to any substantial gains that might have been accrued in the process. Indeed, in spite of Begin’s attempts at maintaining an appearance of individual control during the negotiations, how secure is his nation when Arab terrorists threaten Israeli civilians in the streets of Jerusalem? As we have previously explored, if a people feel powerless, abused, or otherwise mistreated, they will lash out at those whom they see to have inflicted the pain. Both aggressor and victim are caught in an interminable search for individual survival – and yet one which ensures, by its very volatile nature, just the contrary.

Emergent Theories in Science: Redefining a New Order

“But why,” microbiologist Evelyn Fox Keller asks, “is it so difficult for people to think in terms of the collective [survival]?⁶³ We have heretofore ignored the scientific approach to our evaluation. Let us then, for the sake of interdisciplinary argument, equate a negotiation with a living organism with the goal of “resolution,” or success, and its cells

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⁶² Sadat, 107
with the bargaining figure heads: how might this organism best survive? Might there be
leader cells within each living body that direct the functions of others? Or is each cell
part of a more communicative process, characterized by a unique sense of cooperative
order and purpose to the whole, such that it might act without the influence of a separate
organizing force? Keller, with a Harvard Ph.D. in physics and a final dissertation in
molecular biology, spent time exploring the possibilities of incorporating such
philosophical issues into her biological studies.

In 1962, Keller’s predecessor B.M. Shafer theorized that certain leader – or
“pacemaker” – cells assume the role of generals who must “rally the troops” in order to
ensure the successful functioning of the organism: the game of survival was “a giant
game of Telephone,” according to biologist Shafer, “but only a few elite cells placed the
original call.” Traditional belief is that the most effective method of organization is that
of leader and follower, whether we’re talking about fungi, political systems, or our own
bodies. Our actions seem directed for the most part by the pacemaker cells in our brains,
and for thousands of years humans have built elaborate pacemaker cells into our social
organizations as well, whether they come in the form of kings, dictators, or city
councilmen. Our systems of social interaction seem founded upon the supposed
effectiveness of an individualistic ranking of power, whose accepted effectiveness is
illustrated in the general approval of Telhami and Quandt’s optimal bargaining strategy;
and much of the world around us can be explained in similar terms of command systems
and individual leadership, just as some have credited the aggressive Israeli leadership
with effecting tangible success at Camp David. “Why should,” Shafer research seemed to
ask, “it be any different for natural organizations?”

But one problem with Shafer’s theory of hierarchical organization was difficult to
overlook and, at the same time, finally come to accept: contrary to primary belief, there
were no pacemaker cells to be found in the organisms studied. Shafer’s theory had
presumed the existence of a cellular monarchy commanding the masses, while Keller’s
ensuing research disproved the theory of top-down, “power-over” conduct between cells:
they were organizing from below. Certain psychological studies suggest that health, or
the driving force of sustainable life, comes from collectively, not individually, focused action; and nascent biological findings are quick to support the theory that the most stable form of organization is not hierarchical but communitarian, or “emergent,” in character. Yet the initial response to emergence was perplexing: “For anyone who understood applied mathematics, or had any experience in fluid dynamics, this was old hat to them,” states Keller. “But to biologists [or to realist political scholars, we might add], it didn’t make any sense. I would give seminars to biologists, and they’d say, ‘So? Where’s the founder cell? Where’s the pacemaker?’ It didn’t provide any satisfaction to them whatsoever.” Indeed, it took another decade for the pacemaker hypothesis to be replaced by a convincingly exact series of experiments that proved that the cells were cooperatively organizing without any hierarchical leadership.

Author Steven Johnson describes Keller’s breakthrough as “one of the first few stones to start tumbling at the outset of a landslide.” Thirty years after Keller challenged the pacemaker hypothesis, students now take courses in “self-organization studies,” and bottom-up software helps organize the Web’s most active virtual communities. Now is perhaps the time “we stopped analyzing emergence and started creating it,” Johnson writes – for speaking in the more general terms of intelligence and productivity, the import of emergence theory is not limited to scientific development and explanation. It seems that not only a new wave of biological and technological but psychological, political, and sociological research has begun to lean toward a more expansive view of organization, dispelling the traditional ranking of power in favor of one more communicative and reciprocal. In the earlier sections of Part Four we have explored how a more interconnected mode of behavior, in which individual command is decentralized rather than ranked, might arrest the escalation of devastating threats to survival incited by violence and hostility while encouraging positive growth for all participants. Emergence, illustrated through psychological and sociological theory, yet strikingly – with a slight change of words – similar to the findings of Keller, may suggest a new mode of diplomacy.

64 Johnson, 232
This point is a curious one: how much more effective would the Camp David accords have been if the participants had incorporated an understanding of emergent theory into their behaviors and had worked in tandem, not contest, with the other? To challenge traditional theory might necessitate an intimidating – and oftentimes rather unwelcome – revision in practice. Yet fresh ideas must be made welcome: if non-hierarchical, emergent and communicative systems of power have been shown effective in the development of ant colonies, human cities and global networks; in the world of political thought and strategy; in the functioning of sustainable cellular organization; even in the most fundamental psychological aspects of interpersonal behavior, how would a decentralized system of power have benefited the Camp David inter-state negotiations?

**Part Five: Conclusion**

The aim of this analysis has been less to provide definite answers than to introduce an intellectual scaffolding with which to challenge those solutions already presumed “optimal.” With the addition of critical interdisciplinary research, perhaps we might expand the scope of findings in computer intelligence and psychology and begin incorporating them into studies of international theory and tactical negotiation. We are in an age when disparate disciplines combine, and at this time we might do well to learn from our neighboring academic fellows. There has already been an initial effort to do so: scientist Anatol Rapoport applied the mathematical field of game theory to international conflict resolution as early as 1960, concluding that there must be a cooperative search for “empathetic understanding” among individuals and for a “domain of validity” in which mutually acceptable solutions might be found in order for there to be any sustainable resolution to conflict. No longer is the individualistic struggle for survival viewed to be the most preferable for a species; indeed, “joint security can be ensured only by cooperative efforts to advance their common interests.”65 During the 1980’s, John H. Holland, researcher in the newly established field of Emergent Studies at the Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico, continued the search: why, in a competitive world,

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65 Hopmann, 447
do organisms cooperate at all? He examined the traditional Prisoners’ Dilemma, originally proposed by game theorists, and found himself facing the same conclusions as his predecessor Rapoport: the best outcome for all occurs only when the prisoners trust and cooperate with each other. Unfortunate complications arise when the prisoners yield to the Dilemma, become too greedy, and “are led by ruthless logic to the least desirable outcome” – an interminable jail sentence.66

Holland is excited by the theoretical correlations among disciplines: “If we do this right,” he explains, “people who are not scientists – people in Washington, for example – will be able to create models that can give them some feeling for the implications of various policy options.” Yet by the 1990’s new frameworks for international negotiation had already spread to the outer edges of political thought: the problem solving approach, developed in the work of aforementioned scholars Roger Fisher, Raymond Cohen, and P. Terrence Hopmann, lends greater emphasis to the psychological roots to conflict, defining the latter as a “function of different perceptions or understandings of the issues with which [the actors] are grappling.”67 The A.R.I.A. (Antagonism, Resonance, Invention, Action) framework, designed by bargaining tactician Jay Rothman, fosters cooperative harmony among adversaries through the full and honest expression of any human motivations that lie beneath conflict: the participants openly voice their antagonism, develop resonance in goals, invent fresh and equally beneficial solutions, and act cooperatively to meet these goals and to reach sustainable agreement upon primary issues.68 The previously “optimal” use of aggression, deception and coercion, all means to impose individual will upon the group, are now considered detrimental to the end of any lasting success in resolution, a finding that psychologists Reitmeister, Adler, or Schmitt might support in their own work; and hierarchical organization is in effect beginning to be replaced by a system of negotiation more empathetic, open, and

communitarian. The new frameworks are problem solving in approach – and remarkably emergent in character.

Due to the relative newness of the developments in conflict resolution theory, this analysis can only begin to challenge – and tentatively challenge at that – the widespread acceptance of those organizational principles underlining optimal bargaining theory. Nor by any means is this a condemnation. Surely the tactics used in the accords helped each nation to acquire the most basic objectives, as was described in the beginning of Part Three, and strategy alone cannot be in and of itself a primary cause of continued conflict. It is instead the acceptance of such tactics as “optimal” and the neglect other divergent ones that might suggest a more fundamental problem in how we view effective interpersonal relations – whether at the bargaining table or elsewhere. The point of this analysis has been to evaluate the overall success of negotiation, and specifically those accords at Camp David. Perhaps the only reasonable hope for the result of bargaining is to resolve tangible disputes over material objectives. Yet that attempt, as is hopefully illustrated here, is a vain one in view of the more vague – and yet acutely persistent in the hearts and minds of each people – causes of conflict continuation. The principal ideas behind the optimal bargaining strategy, such as faith in the hierarchical organization of individual influence, might be seen by psychologists as fearfully volatile in face of preexistent hostilities; by natural scientists as outdated and deficient in comparison to more decentralized and communicative systems of power; and by scholars at the radical fringe of political science as contrary to aspirations toward equally-beneficial and sustainable resolutions.

Whereas realist scholars testify to the immutability of certain principles, an introduction of fresh thought allows hope for a brighter future. Just how much we can actually apply scientific discovery and mathematical models to political theory, or psychological studies to international relations, is not clear. But if there is a chance for a more stable and equitable state of affairs in the Middle East, which may prove first manifest in a redefinition of our current bargaining strategy, scholars should jump at the occasion to explore its possibilities. Critical thinking and interdisciplinary research can
be helpful in the development of new frameworks for international bargaining to promote lasting success. Albeit a touch optimistic, continued improvement in the practice of conflict resolution must always be sought. We would do well not to close the door in face of the unfamiliar; let us embrace it instead as the fresh hope, instilled in a seemingly hopeless situation, that permits a possibility for change.