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HOW LEGACIES OF THE PAST AND WEAKNESS OF THE STATE BROUGHT VIOLENT DISSOLUTION AND DISORDER TO THE WESTERN BALKAN¹ STATES*

INTRODUCTION

The fall of communism in the 1990s preceded the break-up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The dissolution process not only resulted in disorder for the entire region but was also accompanied by violent conflicts starting with the cessation of Slovenia in 1991, the so-called Ten-Day War, and culminating with the Macedonian interethnic conflict in 2001. These conflicts caused many human victims, traumas and dislocation of civilians, not to mention the enormous economic cost² it brought to the entire region. To give an idea to the dimensions of the problem, not only *qualitatively* but also *quantitatively*, some estimation can be suggested.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, the number of war-related deaths were estimated at 102,622 individuals, of which about 55,261 (54%) were civilian war-related deaths; the refugees and internally displaced persons according to UNHCR estimate around 1.2 million persons³; the number of rape victims range as high as 20,000 (European Community figures) to 50,000 (the Sarajevo State Commission for Investigation of War Crimes)⁴ while the Albanian anarchy in 1997 left some 2000 people dead⁵. Besides the probable disputes on the exact estimations it can be said that these civilian disasters are considerable numbers taking into account also the region's small population (approximately 25 million).

Furthermore, the process of disintegration in ex-Yugoslavia not only regards the immediate aftermath period of the collapse of communism. It still is an unfinished business, lately revealed through the independence of Montenegro (in May 2006) and that of Kosovo (in February 2008). Unlike the first 'rapid' disintegrations, the later 'slow' dissolution is marked by a more

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peaceful manner where we have the independence of Montenegro gained through democratic referendum without any violent confrontation and in the case of Kosovo, although strong divergences exist between the two parties, they publicly have ruled out the use of military action or any use of force.

Apart from the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Albanian state also underwent hard times. In the spring of 1997 the Albanian state collapsed, “representing a classic case of state failure where the structures that should have guaranteed the rule of law failed completely”⁶ and as a consequence resulted in many civilian victims.

This entire chaotic situation has exposed the Western Balkan region to violent conflicts for almost a decade (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993-1995⁷, Albania 1997, Kosovo 1997-1999, Macedonia 2001) and its future sometimes is still questionable since this conflict may reappear primarily because of the independence of Kosovo. The main question and the major challenge for the entire region is (and always has been) how to prevent such events occurring in the future? But before discussing any solution or precise set of policies targeted at conflict resolution or at least at conflict transformation in the region, it is crucial that we first examine the roots causing such conflicts and try to understand how the conflicts emerged and escalated in the Balkan region and the motives behind them.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

From a theoretical point of view there seem to be two mainstream arguments on the conditions that generate and favour violent conflicts. On the one hand there is the primordialist approach⁸ which puts the emphasis on the role of ethnicity as being a primary cause generating violent conflicts. On the other hand there is the modernist approach⁹ which tries to search for causes based on the economic, political, and ideological divergences (such as level of poverty, social class belonging etc) rather than stressing the ethnicity issue. The primordialist versus modernist model embeds a number of characteristics that rests, if not opposite, at least apart from each other.

If the primordialist arguments are subjective (as ethnicity is a subjective sense of belonging), the modernist arguments are more of an objective character as they relate to the concrete situation of the citizens. In the primordialist model the idea of nation as ethnicity precedes that of the state as polity that may include various ethnic groups, whereas the contrary is observed in the modernist's model. As of such logic the primordialist model is usually based on ethnic conditionality and primordial ties (such as blood, kinship, and ethnicity) which when different bring up intolerance and exclusion of others and may end up in violent conflict. Opposed to an ethnic logic of violence, the modernists accept ethnic pluralism. All individuals composing the boundaries of the state, irrespectively of their ethnic background, can harmoniously coexist. There is no superiority of one ethnic group over the other in the modernist model, rather "the core argument is that economic modernisation and the development of the modern state make upward social mobility possible"¹⁰.

While "primordial perspectives furnish very useful frameworks for studying biological, socio-cultural and systemic change and transformation over relatively long periods of time and they are receiving serious treatment in the fields of international relations and world politics"¹¹ they do not provide the entire picture. The other arguments of 'modernisation' theories are also important to be taken into account. Primarily, because they move our analysis a step further (from ethnic to civic notion), focusing on the civil conflict where the (violent ethnic) conflict is a response to discrimination along cultural lines. And secondly, because we add to primordial reasons other more structural causes of violent conflict.

The violent conflicts in the Balkan region often have been explained only through ethnically-driven characteristics. That is, the primary cause of the conflict is the diversity of ethnic composition of the region. This has its part in the explanations of the conflicts but this is very superficial and truncated analysis. The ethnicity argument can be considered as part of the reason, a path dependence problem linked with the unfinished nation-state building process¹² in the region. In analysing the conditions of conflicts generated in the Western Balkans it is important to add, where relevant, any continuing legacy problems

resulting from previous historical experience and the situations they experienced. But stressing only these arguments we risk neglecting other equally influential and important conditions. We have to acknowledge that the entire region, beside the nation-state building process, also underwent a process of democracy-building, a new form of regime promoting pluralism. As of the liberal democracy model the citizens are all equal irrespective of their ethnic background or their political views. In trying to understand the violent conflicts in the Balkans one has to consider also the level of democracy these countries achieved. The question we need to ask is if the nature of the relation between the state and its citizens was democratic enough to respect the pluralities of its society.

In dealing with the Western Balkans the region's peculiarity and particularity has to be considered. But although there are different reasons and specificity of all the cases, if taking them in a comparative analysis it can be said that all the cases share some common elements. And as I will argue these common causes can be found if we approach from a modernist perspective and see the state-citizen relations. Contrary to "widespread acceptance in academic and policy communities that primordial explanations are sufficient to account for the violence"¹³ I argue that primordialist explanations are not sufficient to count as causes of violent conflicts. The role of ethnicity (the major argument of primordialists) as a cause generating conflict is not enough to capture all violent conflicts in the broad region. The ethnicity argument fails to explain not only why an ethnically homogenous country, such as Albania, had violent conflicts¹⁴ but mostly why other heterogeneous countries such as Czechoslovakia did not evolve into violent conflicts after its dissolution.

The point put forward here is that primordialism and its argument of ethnicity may favour conflicts but alone it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for starting up a violent conflict. In order to have a full picture that can capture and explain all the cases it is crucial that we take into consideration the modernist approach and investigate further the link between the state and its citizens.

THE QUESTION OF ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY AND LEGACIES OF THE PAST

As of the primordialist argument, the aspect related to violent conflicts could be the correlation between the homogeneity and acceptance of difference. That is to ask whether the states in the Western Balkan region were (relatively) ethnic homogeneous. If not, to what extent was diversity accepted?

The first thing to be noted is that the Western Balkans as a region is “a rich conglomerate of cultures and religions”¹⁵. It is a region of very diverse cultures and many religions, where you find the Orthodox and the Catholic as well as Sunni and Bektashi or even Jews. Rupnik argues that Western “Balkans were much heterogeneous than before and also than the countries of Central Eastern Europe”¹⁶. There were these ethnic-cultural differences characterizing ex-Yugoslavia that became major disputes for the Western Balkans. And this was because ethnic “differences become a synonym for the ingovernability whereas homogeneity has become a pre-requisite for future security”¹⁷ in the region. The many different ethnicities in the Balkans meant that “political and ethnic boundaries could not be easily made to coincide”¹⁸. The boundaries of nations and states do not overlap instead states can include diverse ethnic groups. The presence of different ethnic communities¹⁹ at least partly accounts for the relative strength of nationalist feelings and for the occurrence of conflict among the different communities within a state. It is the nationalistic feelings of the ethnic groups that are being promoted for political purposes. This emotional sociological reaction was so strong and deeply rooted into the region. It not only created conflict among ethnicities but it engaged states and societies in tremendous violence. At the extreme, some authors use “the myth of mob violence as an attempt to explain ethnic violence as a respond to the barbaric and primitive urges”²⁰ of certain ethnic groups.

In a more sophisticated version these arguments include a ‘path dependency’ logic arguing that the latest Balkan conflicts are nothing but the continuation of the past Balkan wars. The inter and intra state tensions and their violence as a consequence have deep roots in the past. A past which renders the Balkans to a region dominated by “not only the parcelization of

large and viable political units but also a place for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive and the barbarian”²¹. During the communist period conflicts accumulated but did not develop fully until the fall of communism in the 1990s. It has been argued that the fall of the rigid communism, especially in the former Yugoslavia, “led to a ‘rediscovery’ of the ‘powder keg’ legacy in the Balkans”²².

The primordialist explanations of past and current conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are all derived from the same basic premise: ethnic hatreds and fears of the ‘other’.²³ Most of the countries of Western Balkans were seen as “fertile ground for the politics of ethnicity owing precisely to the traditional ability of nationalism to shape their political cultures”²⁴. It is all these pejorative, traditional characteristics that the region is inheriting from the past that can explain the latest conflicts.

STATE WEAKNESS: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

Beside the problems of the past and ethnicity, a growing debate has been raised regarding the weakness of states in the region. It has been accepted that state weakness is a common feature present throughout the Western Balkans.²⁵ As a consequence of the state weakness in the Western Balkans, a number of problems can be observed. Above all, the incapability of the Western Balkan state brought about the issue of *state legitimacy* in citizens’ perceptions. The Western Balkan states become illegitimate in the eyes of many of their citizens. This was so because the latter saw the state not only dominated by a certain ethnic or political group but more importantly, as serving only that group’s particular interests.²⁶ It was this lack of trust in the institutions of the Western Balkans that made the governments seem un-representative and disloyal. Such a weakness, primarily related to non-representation of all its citizens, resulted into the collapse of the state itself (the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Albanian anarchy in 1997²⁷).

Drawing from the analysis of Bianchini²⁸ on the collapse of Yugoslavia it can be suggested that the incapability and the failure of all Western Balkan states to govern the differences had resulted in a crisis of the system representation and of legitimacy of power. This lack of legitimacy was also a danger for the Western Balkans' new democracy where "a gradual process of erosion and delegitimation may destroy democratic regimes even if their surface institutions remain in place"²⁹.

In describing the situation and in trying to find the reasons that led the region towards chaos and violent conflicts it can be suggested that one needs to look also at the political cultures of these countries. Taking a political culture approach, one should examine whether democratic norms are widely held in a given society.³⁰ The Western Balkans, contrary to the Central European countries, "differs with regard to the extent their political culture resonates with the western liberal values and the extent to which state elites were responsive to their societies"³¹. If in the CEE countries a pre-democratic political culture preceded transition (good examples were Poland and Hungary)³² easing the way to develop a true pluralist society, that was not the case for the Western Balkans. In the post-communist Western Balkans the institutions were distrusted because they fail[ed] to deliver to citizens.³³ Such a situation "undoubtedly was not a very fertile ground for the introduction of the political culture characteristic of the contemporary democratic age"³⁴. In other words, the *political culture*³⁵ of the Western Balkans — the values, beliefs, and orientations — has been far from the democratic and liberal norms.

This is even because of its legacies of the past where "the more recent communist experience had a common impact in the political culture of the Balkan countries"³⁶. Such negative circumstances where "a political culture of dialogue, tolerance, and compromise has shallow roots in much of the Balkans"³⁷ will be reflected in their future political systems. The political nature of the state that has been developed in the Western Balkans countries was that of authoritarianism and/or nationalism. Though such politics intended to bring 'stability' and save the state from disintegrating, it often appeared unable to avoid strong confrontation with its citizens and most notably with the ethnic groups. In the middle of the 1990s, the "centralized State of the

sovereign Nation” started to promote a new distortion of democratic ideas³⁸ “unable to function according to demands of modern political institutions: as communities of free and equal citizens”³⁹. It is to be suggested that the relationships between the state and its citizens have been the *Alfa* not only for building democracy on the Balkan region but mostly from saving the integrity of the state.

Western Balkan states failed to balance this relationship between state-politics and civil society. Furthermore, in the Western Balkan countries we had “the frequent rise of dictators and arbitrary recourse to power, to the point where the individual’s daily life was systematically conditioned”⁴⁰. “The political culture of statism and authoritarianism remains deeply embedded in the region”⁴¹ and as a result the Western Balkan states failed to be a democratic state which is sufficiently flexible and which can function in a (even ethnically) pluralist context. In much of the Western Balkan countries, the non-democratic political cultures of authoritarianism and nationalism could be found on the political agenda. The very “narrow nationalistic and populist interests had a very strong influence”⁴² in shaping state policies.

All of the above arguments lead to the hypothesis that the Western Balkans political cultures and state illegitimacy were strong enough to head towards a logic of conflict. Taken together, they portray the weakness of the Western Balkans states which at the end resulted in disintegration (a violent one) in the case of Yugoslavia and disorder in the case of Albania (1997-1998).

THE CONFLICTUAL LOGIC IN STATE-CITIZENS RELATIONS

Generally, the ex-Yugoslav conflicts can be explained as products of the undemocratic nature of the old political system.⁴³ Such arguments usually point out that these legacies, their impact and uneasiness to change that placed several obstacles to comprehensive democratization and further developments. The question to be addressed here is how did such legacies of the past and weakness of the state bring violent dissolution and disorder to the Western

Balkan states? How can we encompass all of the above elements in an argument valid for all the cases in the Western Balkan region?

The best explanation to a comparative analysis of the whole Western Balkans situation may be found if we look at the citizen-state relations of those countries. In the region the old-type of state-citizens relations is the main reason that led these countries towards disorder and dissolution.⁴⁴ If the region is considered as a whole, it can be argued that from one side we have the citizens demanding their rights (in the liberal context) and on the other side their respective state failing to provide such rights to their citizens. Being recognized a citizen of a country irrespective of your ethnicity or political views is a key element of liberal democracy. All citizens should enjoy the benefits offered by the states. Any rejection of citizens' basic democratic rights (right of their language, right to protests or even some autonomy) may lead those who are excluded, to becoming a source of threat to the whole polity. The kind of relationship between the state and its citizens will depend on the state's attitude; whether it is open and inclusive or exclusive. When the state ceases to represent the interests of all its citizens, the excluded communities perceive this as a threat and may react. Such contradictions between state-citizens have been edging drastically leading the region into dramatically violent conflicts.

It is especially so in the Western Balkans states that the state-citizens relationship needs to be considered. In all the Western Balkans cases conflict has been created as a result of the state exclusion or state dissatisfaction of a part (unit) of its community (be that an ethnic or civil group or even a state under the Federation) and as a consequence "those who are excluded become a source of threat"⁴⁵. The coexistences of different political groups (the Albanian case) and/or ethnic groups (the ex-Yugoslav case) have been impossible and conflictual. The strong divergences led to a de-facto division of the main groups/communities (either political or ethnic) which lived in more or less isolation to each other and with a high degree of mutual mistrust.⁴⁶ The state itself did not smooth these divergences but on the contrary took one's part. Discrimination against ethnic communities or political oppositions has been a structural feature of the Western Balkan states. Excluded groups/communities

may represent a threat to the whole polity because they feel discriminated against and threatened by their own members.

The instability of the Western Balkans' state often stems from strong divergences regarding the inner communities. The main threat to societal security comes when the parties involved (state and guerrillas – as representative of ethnic or different political group) attack each other. By analogy with the (state) security dilemma⁴⁷, a societal security dilemma might use arms to defend their identity and rights while states will do the same to defend their sovereignty and security. The problem we are left with is that the processes of the resultant societal security dilemma would closely resemble those of the (state) security dilemma,⁴⁸ a zero-sum resultant if both the state and the societal groups are considered⁴⁹.

It is this critical moment that requires state attention for finding a balance so it can consolidate its democracy and re-examine its relationship with its own citizens. In order to increase the chances of consolidating democracy, the state should try to give all citizens a common 'roof' by aiming at state policies that grant inclusion and equal citizenship to all.⁵⁰ But many governments in the Western Balkans did the opposite. They considered the existence of different groups/communities (ethnic and political) a threat for them so they exploit and deny 'citizenship' and rights to the members of these communities. In this way, groups/communities cannot participate in the economic, social and political life of the society.⁵¹ This type of exclusion may bring the state from being a solution to being a source of security problems.⁵² That is why the *object* of security should not, however, remain the state, since what is 'really' threatened is not an abstraction like the state, but the material well-being of individuals.⁵³

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The disorder and dissolution that dominated in the 1990s in Western Balkan countries was complex and its causalities even more so. Adding to this, the specificities of each state and/or entity were different. But what can be identified as a common denominator is state-citizens relations where the common element of the region is the weakness/failure of the state to respond to the plurality and needs of its communities.

The developments of the region were usually seen as legacies of the past. The most classic formulation was in the 1996 report of the International Commission on the Balkans entitled *The Unfinished Peace*, which defined the major impediments to effective democracy in the Balkans as “legacies of war, of communism, and of history”⁵⁴. But the problems of post-communist Western Balkans countries were mainly related to the concept of state. The structural weakness of the state in shaping societal dynamics constitutes another major legacy; usually with the distinct profiles of the individual cases, ranging from state weakness without unfinished state building in Albania to inconclusive state and nation building in Serbia.⁵⁵ The Western Balkans were facing “a crisis of representation where citizens found themselves alienated from the public institutions and even more importantly, the Balkan states fail[ed] to safeguard their citizens’ rights”⁵⁶.

These entire arguments describe the situation of the Western Balkan states which at least in general can be characterized as ‘failed’. On the agenda of Western Balkans politicians was concern with state building (in the literal sense of the word), which in the major part failed, resulting in civil conflict. The region’s main concern of that period was with nation- and state-building, a process that is not yet accomplished. Even today, the region’s profile is blurred where we have a mixture of not only weak states, but also some new states and/or semi-protectorates.⁵⁷ This ongoing process of civic building has faced many difficulties of past legacies, the equilibrium of ethnic or political composition and legitimacy as political cultures raising the issues of social security dilemmas within the state itself. Any threat to citizens’ safety and freedom, which derive from the exclusion of any constituent group/community

(since human beings aggregate in diverse communal groups) within the state, may turn to a threat of the whole community.

What is clear from the analysis presented in this paper is that the violent conflict has been first and foremost a result of the improper (undemocratic) relations of state-citizens which in the Western Balkans states has caused a societal security dilemma that brought many times violent conflicts for the whole community. The genesis and escalation of a conflict is a multilayered process involving at least two parts, rather among communities or among a community and the state. That is why the ultimate aim of the state should be the achievement of security for all its citizens and not only for a few.

¹ *Western Balkans* include all the countries of “ex-Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania”

² Economic cost resulted in the “losses of trade; the diversion of transport and as a consequence the increase in transport costs”; rising of unemployment and many other problems. For more on the argument see Vladimir Gligorov, Mary Kaldor and Loukas Tsoukalis, *Balkan Reconstruction and European Integration*, The Hellenic Observatory, The European Institute, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, The London School of Economics and Political Science and Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 1999, p. 18. Available at <<http://www.wiiw.ac.at/pdf/PolicyPaper.pdf>>

³ Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak, “War-related Deaths in the 1992–1995 Armed Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results”, *European Journal of Population* Vol. 21, No. 2-3, June 2005, pp. 207-209.

⁴ Adam Jones, “Gender and Ethnic Conflict in ex-Yugoslavia”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1994, pp. 117-118

⁵ Christ Jarvis, *Rise and fall of the pyramid schemes in Albania*, Working Paper, WP/99/98, July 1999, Washington, D.C., IMF, p. 4

⁶ Centre for Policy Studies, *In Search of Responsive Government. State Building and Economic Growth in the Balkans*, Centre for Policy Studies, Central European University, Budapest, 2003, p. 36

⁷ In the Bosnian War both, Croatia and Serbia was involved

⁸ “Proponents [of primordialism] argue that peoples’ ethnic identities have biological and even genetic foundations, and that the motivation for ethnic and kinship affiliation comes from these socio-psychological forces internal to the individual and related to primordial human needs for security and, more importantly, survival.” Frank Harvey, “Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities and Constraints for Theory and Policy”, *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique* Vol. 33, No.1, March 2000, p. 40

⁹ For some theoretical consideration see for example Fearon James and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 97, No. 1, February 2003, pp. 75-90.

¹⁰ Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, p. 78

¹¹ Harvey, “Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities and Constraints for Theory and Policy”, pp. 38-39

¹² “State-building is principally about the creation and maintenance of the political unit, the state”. P. Kopecký, & C. Mudde, “What has Eastern Europe taught us about the democratisation literature (and vice versa)?”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 37 (4), 2000, p. 529.

In the beginning of 90s Yugoslavia will disintegrate. The disintegration process did not only regard the immediate aftermath period of the collapse of communism. It was an unfinished business, lately revealed through the independence of Montenegro and of Kosovo.

¹³ Harvey, “Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities and Constraints for Theory and Policy”, p.65

¹⁴ In the spring of 1997 there were violent conflicts between the Albanian state order forces and popular masses which brought the total anarchy.

¹⁵ Janusz Bugajski, *Facing the Future: The Balkans to the Year 2010*, C 86 Discussion Paper, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, Bonn, 2001, p. 3. Available at <http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c86_bugajski.pdf>

¹⁶ Jacques Rupnik, “Eastern Europe: the International Context”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 11, No.2, April 2000, p. 118

¹⁷ Stefano Bianchini, “Political Legitimacy and ‘Weak States’” in Stefano Bianchini (ed.), *From the Adriatic to the Caucasus: The Dynamics of (De)stabilization*, Longo, Ravenna, 2001, p. 28.

¹⁸ Tom Gallagher, “Nationalism and Democracy in South-Eastern Europe” in Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher (eds), *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans*, London, Routledge, 2000, p.86.

¹⁹ I would like to thank one of the referees for alerting me to use ‘communities’ instead of ‘minorities’, as the latter may have negative connotations.

²⁰ Judith Pintar, “Review - Genocide after Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan War by Stjepan G. Mestrovic” *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 26, No. 3, May 1997, p. 342

²¹ Maria Todorova, “The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention”, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 2, summer 1994, p. 453.

²² Valentine Stan “Influencing regime change in the Balkans: the role of external forces in the transition” in Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher (eds), *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans*, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 164.

²³ Harvey, “Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities and Constraints for Theory and Policy”, p. 41.

²⁴ Gallagher, “Nationalism and Democracy in South-Eastern Europe”, p. 84

²⁵ Dimitar Bechev and Svetlozar Andreev, *Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Aspects of the EU Institution-Building Strategies in the Western Balkans*, Occasional Paper No. 3/05, South East European Studies Programme, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford, February 2005, p. 6.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ The legitimacy of the Albanian government and parliament have been always contested (except for the 1992 elections). The state became more and more identified with the political party in power making it difficult to tell where the party ends and where the state begins. At the pace of the pyramid schemes collapse the opposition parties placed themselves on the lead of popular protests combining their political agenda with the public’s demand for the return of the lost savings. So in 1997, due to economic crises and the increasingly authoritarian behaviour of the governing party, the state lost control of the whole country putting Albania in total anarchy.

²⁸ Stefano Bianchini, “The Collapse of Yugoslavia: Sources of its International Instability”, in Stefano Bianchini and Paul Shoup (eds.), *The Yugoslav War, Europe and the Balkans. How to Achieve Security?*, Longo, Ravenna, 1995, p. 13-15

²⁹ Ivan Krastev, “The Balkans: Democracy Without Choices”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2002, p.44.

³⁰ Paul Kubicek, “The Application and Acceptance of Democratic Norms in the Eastward Enlargement”, in Helene Sjursen (ed.), *Enlargement in Perspective*, ARENA, Oslo, 2005, p. 184

³¹ Arolda Elbasani, “Albania in Transition: Manipulation or Appropriation of International Norms?”, *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2004, p. 30

³² Gligorov et al., *Balkan Reconstruction and European Integration*, p. 17.

³³ Bechev and Andreev, *Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Aspects of the EU Institution-Building Strategies in the Western Balkans*, p. 3

³⁴ Ugo Vlaisavljevic, "Yugoslav Communism and After: The Continuity of Ethnopolitics", *Identities – Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture*, Vol. 2, No.2, 2003, p. 13.

³⁵ "Political culture involves the beliefs, attitudes and orientations towards the politics and political system of a particular country" p.19 For more on political culture – theoretical issues see for example Kristin Broderick, *The Economy and the Political Culture in New Democracies: an Analysis of Democratic Support in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ashgate Publishing Company: Aldershot, 2000, pp. 18-21

³⁶ Othon Anastasakis and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, *Regional Co-operation and European Integration*, The Hellenic Observatory, The European Institute, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, July 2002, p. 6. Available at <<http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/EBO%202.pdf>>

³⁷ Bugajski, *Facing the Future: The Balkans to the Year 2010*, p. 9.

³⁸ Stefano Bianchini, "The Idea of State in Post-Communist Balkan Societies", in Stefano Bianchini and George Schöpflin (eds.), *State Building in the Balkans: Dilemmas on the Eve of the 21st Century*, Longo, Ravenna, 1998, p. 79.

³⁹ Vlaisavljevic, "Yugoslav Communism and After: The Continuity of Ethnopolitics", p. 13.

⁴⁰ Bianchini, "Political Legitimacy and 'Weak States'", p. 179

⁴¹ Bugajski, *Facing the Future: The Balkans to the Year 2010*, p. 9.

⁴² Vladimir Gligorov, "European Union in the Balkans", *European Balkan Observer*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003, p. 2.

⁴³ Krastev, "The Balkans: Democracy Without Choices", p.43.

⁴⁴ Dorian Jano, "From 'Balkanization' to 'Europeization': The Stages of Western Balkans Complex Transformations", *L'Europe en Formation: Revue d'études sur la construction européenne et le fédéralisme / Journal of Studies on European Integration and Federalism*, No. 349-350, 2008, p.56.

⁴⁵ Nizar Messari, "The State and Dilemmas of Security: The Middle East and the Balkans", *Security Dialogue* Vol. 33, No. 4, 2002, p. 420.

⁴⁶ Caparini Marina, "Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Stabilisation: The Case of the Western Balkans" in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (eds), *Reform And Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, August 2004, p. 157, emphasis added.

⁴⁷ A security dilemma term, traditionally refers to a situation wherein states are drawn into conflict over security concerns because an increase of a state security is perceived as another state security decrease.

⁴⁸ Paul Roe, "The Societal Security Dilemma", Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, working papers, 1996, Available at Columbia International Affairs Online <<http://www.ciaonet.org /wps/rop01/>>

⁴⁹ A zero-sum situation is when the total gains and total losses of the parts sum to zero, that is the gain of one is exactly balanced by the losses of the other part.

⁵⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, p. 33. Reference from Zhidas Daskalovski, "Democratic Consolidation and the 'Stateness' Problem: The Case of Macedonia", *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004, p. 53.

⁵¹ Carla, "Community Security: Letters from Bosnia – A theoretical analysis and its application to the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina", p. 224.

⁵² Messari, "The State and Dilemmas of Security: The Middle East and the Balkans", p. 416.

⁵³ Krause, "Critical Theory and Security Studies", p. 13.

⁵⁴ Reference from Krastev, "The Balkans: Democracy Without Choices", p. 42.

⁵⁵ Balkan Forum, *Rethinking the Balkans: Incongruities of State and Nation Building, Regional Stabilisation and European Integration*, Discussion paper final version (corrected), Bertelsmann Foundation and Center for Applied Policy Research, Berlin, 17-18 June 2004, p. 3.

⁵⁶ Bechev and Andreev, *Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Aspects of the EU Institution-Building Strategies in the Western Balkans*, p. 6.

⁵⁷ In BiH the presence of international military forces and the far-reaching powers of the Office of the High Representative are required to ensure the central state functions. In the case of Kosovo, although independence is

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declared, the international presence still continues and retain certain executive power (EUSR and EULEX are replacing UNMIK). So in practice these countries can be considered quasi-protectorate as most decision making power rests in the hands of external missions.