Subordination or cooperation? New interfaces between development and security policy (with reference to examples from Germany)

Stephan Klingebiel / Katja Roehder
Introduction

"No development without security" is proving more and more to be a development-policy paradigm, one that calls for new approaches in the field of development policy. The discernible distance between development and military actors and their tasks of the past, has in recent years rapidly diminished. This applies to Germany, but also to most other bilateral donors and multilateral institutions (including the United Nations).¹ Thus far, however, too little reflection and discussion have been devoted to the consequences implied by this state of affairs.

Afghanistan, the Balkans, Liberia, and – for some donors – Iraq are topical examples for the growing closeness between development and security. The World Bank analysis "Breaking the Conflict Trap"² documents the close mutual relationship between development-policy and military engagement. The report even assumes that development policy is in a position to provide help in lessening risks in post-conflict situations that could be sufficient to permit reductions in military presence.

The boundaries defining development-military cooperation are not always clearly drawn among the group of bilateral development actors. Traditionally, for members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) one of their top "no-go areas" in terms of assistance was direct support for operational capacities of military actors.

Furthermore, areas that are not officially classified as ODA (Official Development Assistance)-eligible are often exempted. The lack of clarity as to whether or not activities such as those related to security-sector reform are eligible for ODA support highlights the reluctance by some development actors to fully embrace the new development-military ‘closeness’.

There are several reasons why the changing relationship between development policy and the military has entered the focus of public attention. First, a significant number of so-called "protracted crises" are characterised de facto by trusteeship rule – and therefore involve functions that extend beyond purely military tasks (e.g. Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq). These situations are often marked by efforts to stabilise fragile security, to restore effective statehood, and to embark on a course of economic and social reconstruction. Nation-building tasks, already a major element of peace missions, are taking on a growing role in this context.

Second, development policy is increasingly interested in gaining more constructive influence in post-conflict situations, in some cases even expects contributions from the field of security policy and advocates or calls for military intervention to end violent conflicts. In April 2004, the German Minister for Economic Cooperation and

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Development called for peacekeeping troops to be sent to Darfur/Sudan\(^5\); and, in a 2003 appeal, international non-governmental organisations active in Afghanistan called for an expansion of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mandate there\(^6\).

Third, other policy fields, above all foreign and security policies, are coming more and more to expect, and call for, an active involvement of development policy in post-conflict situations. Experiences made with past military missions are cited as reasons: As the European Security Strategy (ESS), prepared by the High Representative of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and approved by the European Council in December 2003, puts it, "In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos."\(^7\)

Finally, the growing number of overseas missions directly involving the German *Bundeswehr*\(^8\) have served to move the overall spectrum of German policies and their potential scopes of action into the focus of public attention. Germany thus provides a useful case study to explore the changing relationship between military and development actors and policies.

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\(^8\) Currently some 7,300 *Bundeswehr* soldiers are directly involved in missions abroad, including ISAF, KFOR (Kosovo Force), SFOR (Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Enduring Freedom. The costs for these missions have increased more than tenfold between 1995 and 2003. (Data from: http://www. Bundeswehr.de/forces/print/einsatzzahlen.php (08/11/04); Klingebiel, Stephan / Katja Roehder (2003): *Development-Military Interfaces. New Challenges in Crises and Post-conflict Situations*, Bonn: German Development Institute, p. 3.)
The relationship between civil and military actors includes on the one hand civil actors, e.g. from the fields of foreign and development policy, and the other hand various instruments such as democratization and equipment aid, dispatch of civil peace personnel, humanitarian aid, police aid provided by civilian actors, or support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), etc. Looking at the case of the development-military relationship, we find that interest in the civil component tends to focus on development-policy actors and instruments. "Relationship" refers to all forms of interaction between the two groups of actors. That is, the term may encompass targeted cooperation strategies, a deliberately complementary approach, or unintended sequences of actions carried out by actors linked by a relationship structure. The present text thus sees the terms "interface" and "linkage" as synonymous.

This paper discusses the current challenges that this new relationship poses for development policy. A number of examples, with special focus on Germany, serve to illustrate some of the ongoing changes. The paper provides an overview of the different relations between development policy and military actors / security policy and categorises development-military interfaces. Finally, the paper outlines some initial strategic reference models open to development policy in its relationship to military actors and other externally oriented policy fields.

Legitimacy of military missions as a precondition for development policy in post-conflict situations

The mandates, and thus the legitimacy, of military missions play an important role in the development-military relationship in post-conflict situations debate. This applies, to take a prominent example, for the engagement of some donors in Iraq as well as for the debate in Germany on the character of the German reconstruction efforts in the Kunduz Region of Afghanistan.

The need for mandated military missions has today found widespread acceptance. Pre-emptive interventions, however, and other military activities without an adequate mandate, and thus without sufficient legitimacy under international law, have attracted considerable controversy and are widely rejected.

In general practice we can distinguish three categories of military operations:

3. UN peace missions with classic monitoring, buffering and, aid mandates geared to restoring deficient state power.

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10 For a discussion from the view of development policy, see e.g. Collier et al. (2003): Breaking the Conflict Trap, pp. 163ff.
13 These would include Operation Enduring Freedom, which was legitimised by the UN Security Council under Resolution 1368 on combating all forms of international terrorism.
Furthermore, in connection with UN peace operations (categories 2 and 3) we speak of different types of military peace missions which are legitimised under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter:  

- Traditional peacekeeping, which is based on consensus and neutrality and provides only for self-defence measures (e.g. in the Sinai in the 1950s and in Cyprus in the mid-1960s).
- Multidimensional peacekeeping, which is geared to the dynamics of processes and provides for an expansion of non-military functions (e.g. in Namibia in 1989/90 and Cambodia in 1992/93).
- Robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement, which also provides for a possible use of military force (e.g. in Somalia).
- Peace support and governance operations, in which the assumption of political and administrative functions plays an additional, important role (e.g. in Kosovo and in East Timor).

Accordingly, international military peace missions are increasingly assigned nation-building functions. The concrete shape given to UN peace operations may vary considerably in this context. This applies as well for the profile defined for non-military and civil activities (including reconstruction) and the extent to which a mandate covers

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protection of the civilian population.\textsuperscript{15} Apart from the mandate, though, this also depends on the capacities available to a mission, as we have seen in cases of missions that have proven problematic.\textsuperscript{16} The 2000 Report of the Brahimi Commission, which was written on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, goes in detail into the experiences made by UN peace missions and calls on the UN to give greater weight to the civil component of peace missions.\textsuperscript{17}

The type of military engagement is also a highly relevant factor for development-policy decisions. Thus, there should, as a matter of principle, be no doubts as to a military mission’s legitimacy and mandate under international law before development policy considers to get involved in reconstruction efforts.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Perspectives of different actors involved}

The development-military relationship is influenced by national factors such as the closeness, or distance, between development policy and foreign policy, the share that humanitarian aid and emergency relief account for in the work done by development cooperation, and national traditions and experiences made with military interventions.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15} For more in-depth information, see ICISS (2001): \textit{The Responsibility to Protect}. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa.
\textsuperscript{19} See overview on chances and risks of cooperation from the perspectives of different actors, table 1.
Viewed from the *perspective of development policy*, closer convergence and/or cooperation with the military involves a number of risks and chances. On the one hand, it may be assumed that improved mutual understanding leads to greater coherence in reconstruction efforts in post-conflict countries. Development policy could contribute more of its specific strengths and competences for purposes of decision-making in the fields of military and foreign policy. In exchange it could tap the know-how of military actors for its own work, e.g. in the field of security-sector reform. A further aspect is concerned with the possibility that a military presence could provide for a more stable security situation on the ground, a situation from which development-policy would stand to benefit.

On the other hand, though, there are also risks involved. These are bound up with the possibility of military dominance and a diminished influence of development-related concepts in connection with short-term political or military missions. It is furthermore argued that development policy could be made to share responsibility for a military strategy in cases in which such a strategy lacks sufficient legitimacy or acceptance. And not least, development-policy actors might in this case be faced with the risk of becoming targets of armed attacks (soft-target debate).

In the framework of the new peace missions, like those in the Balkans and Afghanistan, *the military* is itself becoming increasingly involved in carrying out

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21 Developments in recent years show an increasing number of development-actors (NGOs etc.) used as target for violent actions. Staff is sometimes kidnapped or killed. Therefore security risks are more and more an issue for development policy.
genuinely civil tasks. In the framework of the concept "Civil-Military Cooperation" (CIMIC) both the Bundeswehr and NATO routinely conduct strategically conceived civil reconstruction projects (in the sense of “force protection”) that have impacts on the domain of development policy. While focusing on the aim of increasing the acceptance of military presence in conflict areas, military actors nevertheless see the risk of a watering down of their military mandate (so-called mission creep).  

Development and humanitarian NGOs, taking up the debate underway in the field of humanitarian aid, have engaged in an intensive discussion over the complexities involved in the military-civil relationship. European NGOs in particular, pointing to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, largely reject co-operation with military actors and voice criticism of any blurring of the boundaries between military and civil aspects.

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<th>Actor</th>
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| Development policy | Risk that development policy may find itself subordinated to a military strategy as well as to short-term political considerations  
- Security risk in that development policy may find itself in the position of a target of attacks  
- The possibility that involvement of development policy may serve to legitimise and support military interventions  
- Risk of public criticism along the lines: "Development policy providing military assistance"  
- Resources may be diverted from the "core business" of development policy (i.e. long-term tasks)  
- Resources used for noncivil tasks are not eligible for recognition as ODA  
- Regional reorientation of development policy  
- Possible inability to adhere to principles of development policy |  
- Security and stability as the sine qua non for the development of the country affected  
- Security as a condition required for the engagement of development policy  
- Constructive influence on security strategies  
- Influence on approaches adopted by military actors in areas relevant to development policy  
- Coherence of overall policy, including consideration of aspects relevant to development policy |
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<td>- Greater acceptance on the part of the local population due to better planning of civil activities</td>
<td>- Complementary and effective approach in acute crises based on purely subsidiary aid provided by the military</td>
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<td>- Access to additional (development policy) resources (financial, advisory, implementation)</td>
<td>- Depending on the concrete case, a more secure setting for the implementation of projects and programs.</td>
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<td>- Possibility of mission creep when the military takes on a growing number of civil tasks on the ground</td>
<td>- Loss of impartiality and neutrality</td>
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<td>- Demands for more transparency/disclosure of military strategy vis-à-vis third parties</td>
<td>- Security risk (NGOs as a soft target)</td>
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<td>- Parallel command structures and, possibly, restriction of powers of discretion on the military side</td>
<td>- Diversion of funds to countries in which military missions are underway.</td>
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In international comparison, the situation among donors varies. German development policy has had a tradition marked by a relatively distanced relationship to security policy and military actors, while in the US, for instance, the examples of Afghanistan and Iraq are illustrations of the way in which development policy may assume a role immediately supportive of strategic military goals. Here, it is in part difficult to discern
any clear-cut separation of the tasks of development policy and the military.\textsuperscript{24} The UK is widely seen as an object lesson in innovative inter-ministerial action, one in which development policy has retained, or indeed even enlarged, the self-assured role it plays. This goes not least for the new mechanism of joint conflict prevention pools.\textsuperscript{25}

**Development-military interfaces**

In recent years the interfaces and overlaps between development policy and the military or security policy have grown dramatically in number. They can be classified under four categories.

First Interface: Security and stability are framework conditions that are essential for development policy. In most post-conflict situations the framework conditions needed by development actors for their reconstruction work are predicated on the stability and security brought about by military measures. Ongoing conflicts are marked by the following, additional aspect: as representatives of international engagement, aid organisations are more and more becoming direct soft targets for local conflict parties. In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, this situation is taking on dramatic dimensions, one main reason being that the international conflict parties are blurring the lines between military and civil activities.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} See e.g. Fitz-Gerald (2004): "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus", p. 17.
Second Interface: A second field for development-military interfaces has to do with strategic planning and conception. This would include general concepts and individual country and regional policies. At the government level in Germany, these interfaces are concerned with information-sharing and development of joint strategies.

- **Inter-ministerial co-operation and mechanisms** serve the purpose of information-sharing and development of joint strategies in and among the various policy fields concerned. In the framework of this inter-ministerial co-operation the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is, for instance, able to bring its influence to bear on cross-cutting government concepts and the formulation of country strategies. The BMZ has, for example, played a role in shaping the structure of the German reconstruction teams currently deployed in Kunduz and Feyzabad (Afghanistan) as well as on the formulation of the mandate for the military component involved. The mechanisms of co-operation include, among others, the Federal Security Council, ministerial consultations, and in particular inter-ministerial co-operation, e.g. co-ordination of the German contribution to the G8 Africa Action Plan (GAA).

- **Deliberate integration and subordination of development policy in short-term political and military strategies** would include in particular the extensive use of instruments of development policy, but also of humanitarian aid, in the framework of military approaches, e.g. in US-Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.

*symposium „State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan“, 30 May-1 June 2003, Bonn: ZEF.*
Third Interface: Another interface is concerned with various situations involved in funding for non-civil measures and missions as well as civil activities conducted by the military.

- **Development policy funding for non-civil measures and missions:** There are a number of different current examples which can, as far as their character is concerned, be viewed as a shift of the boundaries defining the traditional practices of development policy. For instance, € 5 million of un-disbursed funds were made available from the European Development Fund (EDF) to support the Economic Organisation Of West African States (ECOWAS) peace mission in Liberia.\(^\text{27}\) In November 2003 the decision was taken to set up a Peace Facility for Africa (an initial € 250 million) that is to be financed from the EDF and used to fund non-civil peace missions in Africa.\(^\text{28}\)

- **Development-policy funding for civil activities conducted by the military:** One main example that deserves mention here is the BMZ's funding of CIMIC measures conducted by the *Bundeswehr*.

- **Military competition for development funds:** To conduct CIMIC measures, the military competes e.g. with the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ) or NGOs for funds in the fields of humanitarian aid and development assistance.

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Fourth Interface: The last field of interfaces covers a variety of different operational approaches.

- **Interministerial projects:** The German support for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra/Ghana is seen as a pilot project for the development of a coherent and inter-ministerial concept involving the German Foreign Office (AA), the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), and the BMZ.

- **Military conduct of typical development co-operation measures:** This may be observed above all in the framework of CIMIC (e.g. in the field of vocational training).

- **Military provision of concrete protection functions for development policy actors and measures and benefits of an improved security situation:** Apart from the general role played by the military in the field of security, concrete forms of co-operation may also develop on the ground.

- **Co-operation in training and capacity-building:** In various contexts military and development-policy actors are involved, on a reciprocal basis, in training and capacity-building functions as well as in dialogue forums, e.g. in the framework of the German Federal College for Security Policy (BAKS), the **Bundeswehr Command and Staff College (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr)**, or the course on "Civil-Military Cooperation Abroad" (ZMZ A) offered by the German Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Defence (AKNZ).

**Examples bearing on the debate over development military interfaces**
There are several interesting examples of immediate current relevance, all of which represent closer forms of co-operation between civil and military actors.

**Integration of military and development actors in Afghanistan:**

The strategy of using reconstruction teams to stabilise the security situation and accelerate reconstruction in Afghanistan may be seen as a particularly important precedent. The PRTs of the US in particular are an example of integrated civil-military "units" used directly to integrate reconstruction activities within the US military strategy. In the framework of its reconstruction team in Kunduz, Germany is relying on a three-pillar concept consisting of independent but co-ordinated sectors (development policy, foreign policy, defence) as a means of deliberately distinguishing its approach from that pursued by the US.29

*Proactive inter-ministerial co-operation in the UK*

The UK has been working for some time now with a proactive co-operation model which provides for strategic co-operation between development policy and the military – on the one hand, within the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) of the Department for International Development (DFID) and on the other hand by developing an inter-ministerial strategy and funding instrument (so-called Conflict Prevention Pools) for the government's conflict-related work abroad.30

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Intensive co-operation between development policy and the military at the European level

The rapid pace of developments at the European level are of particular importance for future development-military interfaces. In the European Union there are a number of approaches that – building on the "Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts" (Gothenburg 2001) – are aimed at expanding the EU’s civil and military capacities and – in particular – their combined use. The task facing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is to systematically integrate the whole of the EU's external relations, including development policy. One element of great importance to the EU's overall external relations may be seen in the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the Council in December 2003. In view of the new threats analyzed in the document, one of the strategy’s main concerns is to increase civil-military cooperation. The Union, it states, “could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.”

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana was set up in 1998 as a regional training center; the aim was, among other things, to tap Ghana's experience in peace missions and make it available to other African countries. The training program includes e.g. courses on military-police tasks as well as

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preparatory training for military observers. Germany is using various instruments to support the development of the KAIPTC in the framework of its G8 Plan for Africa:

- Development of a course model on the use of civil forces for peacekeeping; the project is being funded by the BMZ and implemented by the Berlin Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (Center for International Peace Missions / ZIF); the GTZ is responsible for handling and transacting the project.

- The German Foreign Office funds are being used to construct / equip the Centre, the Federal Ministry of Defence is responsible for implementing the measures.

- Support for training operations is provided by a German Bundeswehr instructor specialized in the field of civil-military cooperation. In Germany African training personnel is trained by the Federal Ministry of Defence and the German Foreign Office.

**Defining the position of development policy**

*Development-policy engagement in post-conflict situations: interest in coherent approaches*

Development policy – mindful of the fundamentally limited options open to external actors – has important and useful means to potentially contribute to addressing challenges that typify the security challenges of fragile states. It can help restore effective statehood and to embark on the process of post-conflict economic and social
reconstruction. This is all the more the case in view of the fact that peace missions have grown increasingly complex in nature.

Viewed against this background, development policy can be said to have a fundamental and strategic interest in shaping its interfaces with other externally oriented policy fields, including security policy. One of the crucial tasks facing development policy is therefore to define its position on the character and shape which should and can be given to this process. This is not to rule out the possibility of tensions and occasional differences in perception, for instance as regards individual regions or countries.

Development policy not only has a fundamental interest of its own in comprehensively shaping its interfaces with foreign and security policy. Outside pressure aimed at inducing development policy to "fall into line" and show more "flexibility" has grown dramatically. This is clearly illustrated by the present, and at the same time crucial, cases of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and funding for military peace missions from development funds (e.g. in Liberia).

On the other hand, there are a number of possibilities for development policy by engaging in more intensive co-operation with other externally oriented policy fields to exercise constructive influence in terms of coherence with development goals.

*Sensitive areas*
It cannot be said that all development-military interfaces are fundamentally problematic in nature. But it is possible to identify four sensitive areas from the perspective of development policy that must be taken into consideration in efforts to the shaping of interfaces:

1. **Subordination of development policy to a military logic**: Any subordination of development policy to military contexts or short-term action constraints that deprive development policy of its say on the "whethers" and "hows" of policy should be rejected (examples: the embedded role of development policy in the PRTs conceived and set up by the US; options of development policy following the war in Iraq in 2003).

2. **Implementation by the military of measures with a development character**: In this area the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ should continue to play the central role. As far as the field of humanitarian aid is concerned, the relevant actors have defined clearly outlined exceptions in which the military may be allowed to assume certain tasks. As far as the spectrum of functions of development policy is concerned, there appear to be no such reasonable exceptions for the military.

3. **Development policy as a source of funding for military missions**: Both in principle and in the individual case development policy should continue to refrain from funding military missions (by partner countries and organisations). True, there are legitimate funding needs in the field, and these needs are evidently – one need think here only of the EDF-Liberia debates – not covered by specific and suitable

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33 See Barry/Jefferys (2002): A Bridge Too Far, pp. 15ff., who sum up the discussion on this issue.
34 In 2003 a sum of €5 Million was used from the 8th European Development Fund in support of the ECOWAS (Economic Community for West African States) military mission in Liberia.
budget lines (above all in the framework of CFSP/ESDP). But development policy should not move in to fill this gap, since this is beyond its scope.\textsuperscript{35}

4. \textit{Development policy as a source of funding for civil activities conducted by the military}: Since civil activities of the military are generally geared to achieving higher-level goals (above all force protection) that have little to do with the goals of development measures, development policy should not provide funding for them.\textsuperscript{36}

A number of problems faced by development policy in post-conflict reconstruction – e.g. the question of whether or not it is possible to enforce development-policy principles in such situations – are chiefly due not to the presence of military but to difficult starting conditions encountered in the countries affected.

\textit{Principles of development policy}

Furthermore, any more pronounced linkage with military components may have direct implications for fundamental principles of development policy. We can distinguish two forms of principles: (1) general principles (the civil character of development policy and “do no harm”) and (2) development-policy principles with impacts at the operational level (above all sustainability / long-term character and partner orientation / ownership). In general terms, closer contact between development

\textsuperscript{35} The imbalance between development and military budgets is reflected in numbers: „Aid still uses only seven percent of the resources absorbed by the military worldwide (\$56b vs. \$794b)“ (Picciotto (2004): "Aid and Conflict", p. 2).
\textsuperscript{36} This is not at all to say that civil measures conducted by military actors may not be legitimate or appropriate and useful in view of concrete situations on the ground.
and military actors need not necessarily mean any curtailment of these principles; but in this case three fundamental conditions must be given:

- Acceptance of the military by both the local population and conflict parties.
- Independence of development-policy activities from military actors.
- Clearly outlined cooperation based on division of functions and limited in time.

**Strategic reference models**

There are, in essence, three strategic models that are conceivable for German development policy (and also other donors) to position itself vis-à-vis security policy and military actors:

1. **Distance strategy:**

   The aim of a distance strategy is to retain the historically and socially conditioned distance between development policy and security policy and military actors.

   The hoped-for advantage would be a relatively large measure of ministerial autonomy for decisions taken largely on the basis of development-policy considerations, i.e. involving the possibility to reach decisions without having to focus unduly on foreign-policy and short-term political constraints. Development policy would in this case be free to concentrate on longer-term tasks, including the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals.
The potential risks of such a strategy would include the possibility that, given the important political challenges involved in central conflicts (e.g. Afghanistan), any pronounced distance strategy might serve to cast doubt on the relevance of development policy. In this case development policy would be relinquishing its ability to take a constructive hand in shaping elementary framework conditions (security) and would lose some of its influence on security- and foreign-policy strategies concerning such countries.

2. Co-operation strategy:

Based on far closer co-ordination and joint approaches with foreign- and security-policy actors, a co-operation strategy would seek to give more weight than it has in the past to the concept of "development through security."

The hoped-for advantage would be a strategy fully coherent in terms of overall policy; this would mean a policy in which development policy would be better able to bring its interest and concerns to bear on security-related and military thinking and approaches.

The potential risks of such a strategy would include the possibility that development policy would be forced to make a good number of compromises and concessions on principles as well as on concrete approaches bound up with short-term and military considerations. Development policy would have to bear greater responsibility for military actions. Finally, development policy would have to come to terms with the risk that other actors might seek its co-operation not least with an eye to existing financial resources and that these resources would in this case no longer be available for the current "core business" of long-term development policy.
3. Complementary strategy:

A complementary strategy would aim for goal conformity and, in strategically selected fields, a complementary approach involving security- and foreign-policy actors. This would, in other words, be an interrelated and thus mutually complementary approach, but one which would not entail any overlaps between the two fields involved. That is, the military would, for its part, define its tasks in such a way as to ensure that they do not include any development-policy measures; and development would be conceived in such as way as to ensure that it does not take on or fund any noncivil tasks.

The hoped-for advantage would be an approach which, compared with a distance strategy, would, on the whole, prove more coherent and effective, but without blurring the lines between tasks and spheres of responsibility.

One potential risk of this strategy would be the possibility that development policy might find itself harnessed to overriding considerations of other policies (e.g. security and/or foreign policy) and see at least some of its interests and concerns sidelined.

The advantages and significance of these reference models depend on the interface in question. They could seek orientation along the following lines:

- **Complementarity** for the interface "Security and stability as framework conditions for development policy": In this area close co-ordination is appropriate, indeed essential in many cases, although it should focus primarily on information-sharing. One essential principle here is a clear division of tasks. Co-operation, on
the other hand, would entail an overlapping approach of the kind involved in direct military protection (e.g. escorts).

- **Complementarity to co-operation** for the interface "Strategic planning and conception": Many situations call for a complementary or even a joint strategic approach.

- **Complementarity** for the interface "Funding": A prudent approach to the funding of noncivil measures and missions as well as for the civil activities of military actors is one that involves complementarity, but not overlaps. That is, approaches or individual activities can and should be planned jointly, although funding should be based on the specific tasks and areas of responsibility of the policy fields involved.

- **Case dependence** for the interface "Operational approach": Here the benefits derived from joint interfaces concerned with operational matters will depend in very large measure on the individual case. Accordingly, action strategies should be chosen on an individual basis.

**Conclusion**

Development policy and military actors and/or security policy share an increasing number of indirect and direct points of contact as well as fields of possible co-operation. In the past some of these points of contact hardly even entered the minds of the actors involved. These interfaces and overlaps have grown dramatically in recent years. Development policy is on its way to defining for itself a responsibility for overall policy that goes far beyond its present tasks and competences.
While there is reason to welcome many of these points of contact, serving as they do to enhance the overall coherence of given policies, we can at the same time pinpoint some sensitive areas that pose an inherent risk of instrumentalising development policy and blurring lines of competence.

Development policy's future concern must be to define its position on the character which should and can be given to shaping the interfaces with other externally oriented policy fields. This process should, among other things, accord greater weight to development-policy considerations in areas of concern for security policy. As far as reconstruction efforts are concerned, legitimacy of military missions must always be a precondition when development policy engagement is considered.

Facilitating more effective action entails overcoming the gulf previously existing between development and security policy, and civil and military activities. In many situations, fragmented approaches present a serious obstacle to more effective contributions. This applies equally to governments and international organisations both with broad mandates (for instance, in the case of the United Nations, the relationship between UN development organisations and the DPKO / Department of Peacekeeping Operations), or comparatively “narrow” ones (e.g., NATO in the defence policy sector).

However, it should be noted that greater alignment and cooperation between development policy and the armed forces does not automatically lead to a resolution of potential conflicts of interests in the goals set, or a prevention of diverging perspectives. The allocation of ODA resources varies (by country and region, for example) depending on whether the assistance is targeting the Millennium Development Goals (poverty reduction, absorption capacity, performance etc.) or the reduction of threats to security
and stability (the actions of those in power, the fragility of the state, or the limited monopoly on the use of force, etc.).
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