Peacekeeping’s New Partnerships

Deanna Iribarneagaray

Abstract

The shift in armed conflict from inter-state to predominantly intra-state conflicts has seen a growing progression of sophistication in the type of United Nations peacekeeping operation that has been mounted to address these now prevailing conflicts. Concomitant with this change has come an increasing inability of peacekeepers to cope with the complexity of the mandates upon which each new peacekeeping mission is based. This has resulted in failures of various proportions for United Nations peacekeeping missions. This paper argues that a new model of peacekeeping is now required by showing how this new context of conflict has forced a different mode of operational practice upon peacekeepers, a practice that must accommodate the nexus between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. A model is presented based on civilian-military partnerships which endorses the central role of the military but also affirms the central value of civilian commitment to foster the activism of indigenous communities in the recovery process permitting a broadening of the concept of consent to accommodate increased community responsibilities. Focusing on an indigenous rather than an external expert perspective, I demonstrate the potential for increased collaboration between the military and civilians in peacekeeping operations.
Peacekeeping’s New Partnerships

Introduction

The world is experiencing radical political, social and economic upheaval. The aftermath of two world wars and the Cold War has unleashed a new set of dynamics which have created a shift in armed conflict from inter-state to predominantly intra-state conflicts. This new context of conflict has impacted greatly upon all peacekeeping endeavours and increased the need for more far reaching peacekeeping missions. While such missions have therefore increased in size, frequency and complexity, little improvement to practice has been witnessed. Thus at the dawn of the 21st century, peacekeeping faces a most fundamental crisis: How can the peacekeeping model, in its forms of operational practice, successfully accommodate this new context of conflict?

In this paper I argue that a new model of peacekeeping is required, a model that endorses an essential role for the military but also affirms an essential contribution civilians can make. No longer can predominantly military means adequately meet the expansive mandates of peacekeeping missions like those of Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor. Unlike the early, far simpler peacekeeping missions which were based on merely keeping the combatants separated, contemporary missions are operationalised on a dynamic based on the nexus between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, disciplines that were formerly conceptualized as being separate and sequential but now whose interconnectedness is becoming more visibly apparent in today’s complex emergencies. Using the mandate as an index to the growing complexity of peacekeeping operations today and drawing on aspects from various missions, it will

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be shown how interrelated peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding have become and why this interaction requires a new solution to peacekeeping operations. I will propose a model based on civilian-military partnerships which can potentially accommodate a broadening of the concept of community consent, enabling the emergence of an indigenous focus, as opposed to a solution based on an external expert perspective. More indigenous activism and involvement, it will be argued, will sustain the effects of the peacekeeping operation and make for a long term solution rather than a short term crisis intervention. In order to show how contemporary contexts of conflict have intertwined the disciplines of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, it will be necessary to be conscious of how peacekeeping has evolved to meet the conflicts now prevalent. This will be reflected in peacekeeping mandates which will be compared over a period of time and in a number of specific missions.

The Evolution of Peacekeeping

Significant observations can be made on the nature and purpose of United Nations peacekeeping by a comparison of a representative sample of peacekeeping mandates. In broad terms, peacekeeping can be defined as a global conflict management system which aims to employ a nonviolent rather than an enforcement ethic. However, as Table 1 will show, the mandates of peacekeeping missions have changed dramatically over time. These mandates reflect a growing complexity to the concept of peacekeeping and challenge the simplicity evident even in such a broad definition as the one presented above.

Table 1: Mandates From Selected Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2 All data on the missions listed in Table 1 was obtained from the United Nations Website (http://www.un.org) by accessing the specific mission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Inter- or Intra-state</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mission Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>Inter-state</td>
<td>1948 to present</td>
<td>To observe truce in Palestine To subsequently monitor ceasefires between other states in region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>Inter-state</td>
<td>1948 to present</td>
<td>To supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu and Kashmir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>Inter-state</td>
<td>1956-1967</td>
<td>To secure ceasefire and supervise withdrawal of armed forces of France, Israel and the UK from Egyptian territory To serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>Inter-state</td>
<td>1973-1979</td>
<td>To supervise the ceasefire and redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli Forces To man and control buffer zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>Intra-state</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>To monitor democratic elections To monitor the actions of the South West African Police To monitor the ceasefire between South West Africa People’s Organisation and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>Intra-state</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>Aspects relating to: Human Rights Organisation and conduct of free and fair general elections Military arrangements Civil administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK Kosovo</td>
<td>Intra-state</td>
<td>1999-present</td>
<td>The maintenance of law and order, Repatriation of refugees, Rehabilitation of infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK Kosovo</td>
<td>Intra-state</td>
<td>1999-present</td>
<td>To perform basic civilian administrative functions, To promote the establishment of autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, To facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status, To coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies, To support the reconstruction of key infrastructure, To maintain civil law and order, To promote human rights, To assure the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET East Timor</td>
<td>Intra-state</td>
<td>1999-2002 Replaced by UNMISET on independence May 2002</td>
<td>To provide security and maintain law and order, To establish an effective administration, To assist in the development of civil and social services, To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To support capacity-building for self-government
To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development

The table shows that chronologically there is a sequence of progression in the sophistication of the mandate. For UNTSO and UNMOGIP the objective has been to observe and monitor ceasefire lines between neighbouring states. Notwithstanding the fact that ceasefire observance can be a laborious task, seen in the fact that these two missions are still active, it is conceptually simple as compared with missions that were to come later. UNEF I and UNEF II represent a step forward in UN peacekeeping in that they were established to secure the ceasefire, a more complex task. UNEF II interposed itself between the Egyptian and Israeli forces, thus serving as a buffer and consolidating a short term peace\(^3\). The complexity increases with the passage of time. It can be seen from the table that by 1989, the end of the Cold War, a new direction in peacekeeping emerges: UNTAG includes the monitoring of elections in the newly independent state of Namibia. Monitoring of elections will become a feature of many later missions including UNTAC. It is the mandate of UNTAC, however, which definitely makes visible the extension of peacekeeping objectives into social recovery processes: From human rights issues and the repatriation of refugees, the mandate extends to encompass the dimension of infrastructure rehabilitation and civil administration as well as the usually expected policing and military functions. UNMIK’s mandate embraces not only social reconstruction but also economic and political reconstruction, particularly in promoting the establishment of autonomy and self-government in Kosovo and in the facilitation of a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status. Finally, the mandate of UNTAET embodies not the reconstruction but the actual construction of a state from “scratch”. In supporting capacity-building for self-government and in the

fostering of conditions for sustainable development, there is at last the recognition by United Nations peacekeeping planners, of the value of indigenous input for the establishment of a culture of peace in a host country.

In short, the table suggests that peacekeeping is an evolving concept. While there indeed exist many peacekeeping missions in addition to those listed which caution the drawing of conclusions, it has been largely acknowledged among researchers in the field that peacekeeping has undergone an evolutionary transformation since the end of the Cold War. Rasmussen⁴, for example, refers to this expansion of activities as second generation peacekeeping, where the emphasis is on reconstruction and peace implementation, rather than conflict freezing, which characterized peacekeeping during the Cold War period and which has been referred to as first generation peacekeeping. From the table it can be seen, albeit in crude form, that what has fueled the evolution from first to second generation peacekeeping is the change in the context of conflict – the intra-state dynamic has replaced the inter-state. Released from the bipolar Cold War paradigm, we are living on faultlines produced by the opposing forces of nationalism and globalization awaiting stabilization into a paradigm that will stand up to the challenges of a new world system.

The proliferation of intra-state disputes in the last decade has been increasingly characterized by racial, ethnic and religious struggles which possess a long and often complex history. Such struggles give rise to social injustices which result in inter-communal violence. Internal conflicts, as opposed to inter-state conflicts, demand an innovative approach to peacekeeping. The increasing complexity of the contemporary peacekeeping mandate, seen, for example, in the cases of Kosovo and East Timor, is evidence of this requirement. Peacekeeping has thus become complicated by new demands, new commitments, new objectives. What is peacekeeping’s new arena of responsibilities?

The Nexus between Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding

In response to the new context of conflict, peacekeeping missions have been expanded to include the disciplines of peacemaking and peacebuilding. While peacekeeping aims to provide an environment of stability to facilitate the processes of both reconstruction and progress toward peace, peacemaking is a diplomatic and political endeavour applied strategically to confrontation situations, through such undertakings as mediation and negotiation, in order to arrest the conflict or at least prevent it from escalating. The securing of human rights, the facilitation of elections, the support given to attempts at political reconciliation and new modes of governance, all agendas on United Nations peacekeeping mandates, also fall within the ambit of peacemaking. Peacebuilding is the peaceful political and socio-economic reconstruction of a country. Peacebuilding works to prevent a recurrence of conflict through the practical implementation of reconstruction on all fronts; political, social, economic and humanitarian, embodying the peacebuilder’s objective in the creation of peaceful social change after conflict. Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, once thought of as separate disciplines which operationalized in sequence during a conflict, intertwine in the large second generation peacekeeping mission of today. They each impact on one another and interact with one another, a deficit in one area often meaning a failure in another. They merge into one another thus challenging the concept of these disciplines being discrete and sequential.

The activities of UNMIK in Kosovo illustrate the dynamics of the relationship between these three pathways in the progress toward peace. Where political violence has divided communities, issues of national reconciliation become extremely important. However, reconciliation at the community level is usually not specified in mandates and therefore remains a less visible goal of social reconstruction. This is paradoxical for surely reconciliation must be a basic goal of the peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding processes. Indeed, it is the bedrock upon which all

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other recovery action rests. A major barrier affecting political reconstruction in Kosovo has been a failure to reconcile ethnic divisions. Two and a half years after the end of the 1998-99 war in Kosovo, leaders of the Albanian majority and Serb minority are far from forming any kind of lasting and mutual understanding. How does this affect progress toward peace and in particular, the relationship between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding?

Re-establishing order immediately after war is the province of the peacekeeper. This was shared in Kosovo by the combined efforts of UNMIK and the NATO based Kosovo Force (KFOR). As well as deep ethnic rivalries between antagonists fuelling violence, there was the presence of sometimes violent political groups each seeking power, in addition to criminal gangs competing for resources that were in short supply. Eradicating the violence from Kosovo was a peacekeeper’s nightmare. Although UNMIK and KFOR had been able to coordinate their activities and establish some degree of stability upon which reconstruction could proceed, the inability to address issues that were based on the hatred of former adversaries remains an obstacle to lasting peace and poses a threat to what has been accomplished through peacemaking and peacebuilding measures. For example, sound peacemaking attempts through the coordination of several international actors led to the general election of 17 November 2001. However, only 54 percent of Kosovo Serbs turned out to vote in this election. Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica claimed that both KFOR and UNMIK failed to provide a climate which would enable Serbs to participate in the elections and that the Serbs who did turn out to vote did so under very difficult circumstances. Although Kostunica called on Serbs to vote, this call was predicated on the knowledge that it was very difficult for non-Albanians to live in Kosovo. On the 10 December 2001 the Assembly of Kosovo opened, marking the start of the transfer of power from the United Nations to the provisional institutions of self-government. The social reconstruction projects, commenced under the

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peacebuilding efforts of the international community, have been carried on by the new Assembly. However, the low Serb participation in the general election calls into question the legitimacy of the results of the election and the consequent representation in the Assembly. This means certain minority views are being ignored. Hence, continuing social reconstruction through peacebuilding will not be truly representative. Peacemaking was also affected by the inability of peacekeeping efforts to address reconciliation issues and could not, therefore, deliver a just democratic base despite good intentions. Placing reconciliation under the umbrella of peacekeeping may indeed be questioned but its absence in the peacekeeping mandate impacts severely upon the interaction between peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding and impedes progress towards a sustainable peace.

National reconciliation is just one example of an issue that must be addressed to ensure successful conflict transformation. Modern complex emergencies demand attention, through the disciplines of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding, to an unprecedented range of functions:

The supervision of cease-fires, the regroupment and demobilisation of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programs; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of respect of human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; the observation, supervision and even organisation and conduct of elections; and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Such functions require different approaches and skills than peacekeeping based predominantly on a military solution. Although there has been a growing civilian component in peacekeeping missions in the last decade, I propose that civilian-military partnerships, which can work with the local community at a level

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unprecedented up to now, could potentially contribute to more sustainable peace solutions than has been realized previously.

Civilian-Military Dynamics

The evolution of peacekeeping in the shift from an inter-positional role to a more engaged role has already brought increased collaboration between military and civilian personnel and organizations. As an indication of this, civilians (excluding the police) engaged in UNTAC in Cambodia, for example, represented not quite 11 percent of the total peacekeeping force,\(^\text{10}\) while military personnel are now required to work, in most peacekeeping missions, in concert with civilian police, UN volunteers and members of NGOs and INGOs. While such collaboration has presented considerable challenges, it is in the increasing co-function of civilian and military cooperation that the peace mission may potentially find greater success. However, this option seems to go largely unacknowledged by peacekeeping planners. Kanugi et al\(^\text{11}\), for instance, recognize the expertise that civilians can bring to the peacekeeping operation and contend that civilian capacity within these United Nations operations remains largely undeveloped.

In the first place, are combat troops who comprise United Nations peacekeeping forces, the appropriate instrument for peacekeeping operations? Can their offensive potential always be checked by the deterrence mechanism required in conflict management? Granted it is not the most fitting or realistic of solutions to expect soldiers trained in the “western way of war” to promote a culture of peace but given the current situation, where nations contribute their own troops to United Nations peacekeeping, surely this state of affairs can be optimized by incorporating greater civilian capacity into these missions. The duties peacekeepers face today are very much multi-faceted. They require skills beyond purely military ones. In suggesting a

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greater civil-military co-function, it is appropriate to determine what roles each can most effectively perform.

**Civilian-Military Co-function**

Gourlay\(^{12}\) explains that military institutions are top-down hierarchical organizational structures which place value upon command and control and possess an unambiguous respect to the chain of command in matters of authority, discipline and accountability. Nevertheless much effort is invested into seeing that military personnel can function independently under adverse circumstances. While approaches to problem solving are usually coercive and short term oriented, this must be tempered in peacekeeping situations where conflicts call for restraint in response to provocation. On the other hand, as Gourlay\(^{13}\) argues, civilian humanitarian organizations are less hierarchical and more participatory in styles of decision-making than the military. They attach more importance to long term goals. Thus there is a tension between military and civil operating methods. Despite this tension, however, I contend that each body has an integral role to play in the peacekeeping operation, roles which complement each other.

The military excels in a protective role. This incorporates an enabling function in that it allows the safe passage of resources and personnel and makes possible the demobilization of combatants and the de-commissioning of weapons. There is also the all important function of keeping the peace. Monitoring ceasefires, mounting border patrols and controlling militia activity are essential elements of most peace operations.

Civilian personnel, owing to the more diffuse chain of accountability civilian organizations employ, work optimally in a looser, freer environment, as compared with military personnel. Those working for NGOs, for example, are consummately


skilled in emergency relief and in long term post conflict peacebuilding capacities. Civilian volunteers such as Peace Brigades International (PBI) are particularly effective in peacemaking ventures through non-violent human rights protection. Mahoney\textsuperscript{14} describes the strategy of protective accompaniment where high-profile citizens targeted for possible persecution by militia or rogue political elements are escorted on a continual basis by members of PBI thus deterring violence. PBI has shown how civilians can function as effective peacemakers by being \textit{in} the community and learning \textit{from} the community.

It is this connection with the community that is so important yet so under-represented in the contemporary peacekeeping mandate. I believe it represents a key factor in the consideration of improvement of the existing United Nations peacekeeping system. However, connecting and working with indigenous populations are more aptly facilitated through a civilian network than a military one. As Pugh\textsuperscript{15} declares, civilian organizations are often more aligned with and in tune with the actions of local grassroots organizations and hence give them primary importance in their operations. For example, reconciliation attempts in Kosovo between hostile ethnic elements may indeed benefit from more widespread civilian based intervention and from the recognition that this sort of intervention is legitimate and holds value.

Notwithstanding the value of civilian participation, simply interacting with local communities is not enough. There needs to be a facilitation of indigenous activism such that local capacities are stimulated and enhanced, enabling local populations to ultimately claim ownership of the processes of reconstruction on all fronts, political, social and economic. This will ensure that local populations can operationalize the recovery mechanisms put in place during the term of the peacekeeping mission. In order for this increase of responsibility to the community to be effected, there needs to be a formal recognition of the value of community participation within peacekeeping.

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operations and an inclusion of such a broadening of the concept of consent into the peacekeeping mandate.

**Broadening the Concept of Consent: Why It Is Necessary**

While community consent is indispensable for peacekeeping personnel to fulfill the tasks necessary for continued recovery, it is also essential that the community is in the first place consulted prior to the commencement of operations and subsequently shares in the planning and implementation of projects. In this way, actual community needs are addressed, instead of a model being imposed on to a population, a model which may seek to satisfy the Western democratic ideal ‘to integrate the country into the dominant world paradigm’, but a model which is not culturally relevant. Pugh appropriately questions the integrity of post-conflict peacebuilders:

The dominant intervention paradigm places a premium on creating stability rather than security; law and order rather than justice; and the ability of societies to participate in global capitalism rather than provide welfare.

There are serious consequences to the reliance on only external intervention in the reconstruction of a host country – dependency, resentment and a reluctance and inability to take on the responsibility of governance when that external intervention ceases. Peace will not be sustained. Community involvement in reconstruction not only fosters responsibility for that community, it can ultimately lead to community ownership of recovery processes thereby facilitating a smooth transition to autonomy on the withdrawal of the peacekeeping operation.

An example where lack of community consent and community involvement in the reconstruction process may seriously compromise the outcome of an otherwise acceptably executed mission is East Timor. UNTAET’s intentions with respect to

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engaging the local population looked promising. As at 31 March 2002, UNTAET included a civilian contingent consisting of 737 international civilian personnel representing 7 per cent of the total peacekeeping force and 1,745 local civilian staff which represented 17 per cent of the total peacekeeping force. Hiring local civilian staff was progressive, but the United Nations peacekeeping authorities failed to capitalize on their potential and the potential of the international civilian personnel, by not using these human resources sufficiently to engage constructively at the local level and not allowing them to interact meaningfully with the local population regarding its input into recovery processes. This has attracted widespread criticism.

Despite a commitment given by UNTAET to build local capacity in order to actively incorporate this capacity in reconstruction, local capacity building failed to materialize to any significant degree. For example, the joint UNTAET/UNDP document on capacity building in East Timor suggested that the level of skills available to occupy ‘key positions in the government to lead the process of development’ was either very low or just not available. This was evident in the civil service and the judicial and legal system, both plagued by recruitment and training problems. It is questionable whether the civil structures developed by the United Nations in East Timor will endure.

At independence on 20 May 2002, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) succeeded UNTAET. This event triggered a decrease in both military and civilian personnel reflecting the post-independence state. While the percentage of international civilians has remained constant, there is a marked decrease in the percentage of local civilians from 17 percent of the total peacekeeping force to

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only 9 percent as at 31 May 2002\textsuperscript{20}. While this might be due to the fact that some of the original local civilians may have been absorbed into governmental and administrative structures, it shows little acknowledgment of the role that indigenous people can play in the continuing reconstruction of their country.

Thus while civilians constituted part of the peacekeeping force of UNTAET, it was a flawed model of civilian-military cooperation. However, it is a fact that civil contributions to what have been predominantly military operations have produced successful outcomes where community consent has been considerably broadened. Examples are the peace monitoring operations in Bougainville, the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) and Peace Monitoring Group (PMG).

A brief investigation of these operations will show the potential inherent in civilian-military co-function and engagement with the indigenous population.

\textbf{Civilian-Military Cooperation in Bougainville}

The islands of Buka and Bougainville comprise the remotest province of Papua New Guinea (PNG). Between 1988 and 1997 civil war devastated this province. The conflict began as a local dispute over the copper and gold mine at Panguna and then escalated into a wider separatist movement causing divisions within Bougainvillean society. The issue of independence eventually took on prime urgency. In October 1997, the Burnham Truce officially brought an end to the fighting. This instigated the introduction of the unarmed TMG led by the New Zealand Defence Force followed in due course by the PMG led by the Australian Defence Force. When referring to these peacekeeping operations of Bougainville, the two monitoring groups will simply be referred to as the TMG/PMG: The difference represents a shift from truce to ceasefire.

The TMG/PMG has been hailed as a convincing success. This peacekeeping/peace-monitoring force consisted of forces from Australia, New

Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu. PNG wanted strong civilian participation from the outset. The Bougainville Interim Government (BIG)/ Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) were also eager to see civilian representation. In addition the BIG/BRA requested female monitors, an appeal which resulted in a very positive effect on local communities. In fact the combination of culturally sensitive personnel in the presence of Maori, Fijian and Vanuatu agents combined with the civilian presence, which included female monitors, facilitated local reconciliation and emphasized the importance of working closely with local peace committees and clan leaders. Thus a military-civilian, multicultural, mixed-gender peacekeeping force was able to both work with the indigenous community and facilitate indigenous activism. MacMillan, a military analyst, comments: ‘I could not help but be awed by the commitment of ordinary people to rebuilding their lives’.

The value of having female civilians in the operation cannot be over-stated. A female monitor could make a more effective link with the local women than could a male. Having made the link, they then had the capacity to bring indigenous women more actively into the peace process. This was the experience of Bray who said that local women readily embraced her. Bray claims women were prepared to be ‘clear and honest’ in assessing post-crisis situations and were willing to communicate freely if they saw the PMG were prepared to listen to them. In addition the women were exceptionally active in facilitating contact and discussion between conflicting factions. Parry also claims that local women felt angry and excluded from the peace process, emphasizing that they had a keen interest in political and peace

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developments. Like Bray, Parry asserts that women really knew what was taking place in their area as opposed to the Chief whose pride may have distorted his account of the situation.

It can be seen then that indigenous women actively encouraged peace. The political and cultural value of women’s activities were thus brought to the attention of the TMG/PMG through female civilian monitors, vindicating the decision to include women as part of the TMG/PMG. The success of this mixed-gender force will hopefully encourage the inclusion of more female field personnel in future peacekeeping operations especially those under United Nations auspices.

In the TMG/PMG there was a change of focus from pure military mechanics to political and cultural engagement. Patrols spent increasingly longer intervals in the villages and patrol commanders were allocated the same villages to assist in the deepening of relationships. The winning of trust and building of confidence were the aims of the exercise. Patrols took the time to listen to villagers’ stories such that an empathy was created between them. Friendships were able to form and contributed at the grassroots level to the peace process. Extending the hand of friendship included the mobilization of former combatants into sporting competitions with members of the TMG/PMG, inviting the villagers to share music particularly with the Maori, Fiji and Vanuatu members, learning the language of the Bougainvilleans and respecting the native culture.

Thus from the perspective of a participant, a four nation military-civilian peacekeeping operation showed how cohesive such a force could be. Military-civilian interoperability was of a high standard benefiting from the female presence having a positive educating influence upon the military institution. Working at the indigenous interface, these peacekeepers have shown they can be effective peacemakers who have interacted with the local population and facilitated their activism. This is important because the peace process ultimately belongs to the people of PNG and

Bougainville and it is their responsibility to find a durable solution which will lead to a culture of peace.

**Civilian-Military Partnerships**

The peace monitoring missions in Bougainville have demonstrated that civilian and military personnel can co-function and complement each other in ways, such that the mission may benefit from the best of what civilian personnel can offer and the best of what military personnel can offer, given that both components work in mutual support of one another. Such ‘civilian-military partnerships’ can not only accommodate and support the involvement that is required of local populations in the political, social, and economic reconstruction of their communities, they can also facilitate the activism necessary for continuing rehabilitation and recovery. In this way, the intervention assumes an indigenous focus with the result that a sustainable peace; a long term solution is possible.

Civilian-military partnerships may consist of military personnel working with members of NGOs or civilian police or even UN volunteers. In a sense the peoples of local communities also become ‘partners’ together with the civilian-military team in the peacekeeping enterprise. Making real partners of civilian and military personnel in the context of United Nations peacekeeping operations, however, would surely optimize the chances of mission success. How to operationalize such a partnership, it is acknowledged, would present a keen challenge to United Nations peacekeeping authorities but the rewards of that challenge would be invaluable. A primary requirement would surely be to increase the number of civilian personnel serving in peacekeeping operations.

**Conclusion**

A change in the nature of peacekeeping has been brought about by a change in world conflicts which moved from an interstate to an intrastate dynamic after the Cold War. This has underpinned the evolution of peacekeeping missions from the far simpler
first generation type to the complex second generation type. The second generation mission is now based on a mandate composed of multifaceted and far-reaching tasks which call for broader indigenous community involvement as a basis for success.

I have proposed that a civilian-military response in the form of civilian-military partnerships could possibly meet that need. Civilian-military partnerships would necessitate co-function and cooperation between the two different types of hierarchy. The military are needed because, in short, they provide a disciplined force that is capable of the multifarious duties of protection in the broadest sense, preserving peace between rival factions and combatants when it is deemed necessary. Civilians are needed to build local capacities and mobilize activism of local populations such that they can ultimately own the processes of recovery and experience a sustainable peace. Harmonization of military and civilian agents can thus produce a complementary effort.

That civilians and the military can complement each other in performing the many varied and arduous functions of a peacekeeping operation may seem unrealistic at first sight. However, the peacemonitoring missions in Bougainville, regarded as successful missions, although not under United Nations auspices, have demonstrated to some degree that civilian-military co-function and complementation can become a reality. While these missions are supportive of civilian mobilization and interaction with military function, it must be acknowledged, however, that there exists a deficit in knowledge of civilian based models, of relationships between contending factions, arbitration, and rivalry with military components. While this, of course, must temper my reasoning and introduce moderation to my argument, I offer this suggestion for the potential of improvement that it may hold over the present system.
### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIG</td>
<td>Bougainville Interim Government</td>
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<td>BRA</td>
<td>Bougainville Revolutionary Army</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Nongovernmental Organisation</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force (NATO)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organisation</td>
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<td>PBI</td>
<td>Peace Brigades International</td>
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<td>PMG</td>
<td>Peace Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>TMG</td>
<td>Truce Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>First United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<td>UNEF II</td>
<td>Second United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Assistance Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation</td>
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