ARTICLE

The geopolitics of the water justice movement

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Abstract

Privatization dynamics with respect to water represent emerging and significant geopolitical tensions in a new generation of water conflicts. In this sense, a new perspective on geopolitical power politics is needed, one which appreciates the central conflict between agendas of major transnational corporations with respect to water on the one hand, and the global citizen movements and critical non-governmental organizations (what we refer to as the ‘water justice movement’) that oppose these agendas and advance an agenda of human rights on the other. A Gramscian approach to hegemony and counter-hegemony is helpful in framing this understanding of global water conflict. Gramsci’s notion of distinguishing between ‘wars of position and manoeuvre’, adapted here into a concept of ‘waging peace by position and manoeuvre’, is helpful toward understanding current water justice movements as a counter-hegemonic strategy critical of capitalism, as these movements advance conception of water as both a fundamental human right and part of the ‘global commons’ over and against neoliberal definitions of water as a commodity (Gramsci, 1971). As such, this type of critical framework of analysis, we argue, is distinct from most current strands of analysis and theory concerning water conflict that employ mainstream frameworks of international relations (IR) theory – principally versions of functionalist realism, liberalism and constructivism – to explain the terrain of global water conflict.

Using a Gramscian approach that remains true to the marxist context from which it originated, we are attentive to the protagonists in the global struggle for hegemony over the definition of water, where powerful states act as ‘guarantors’ for capitalist expansion through the mechanisms and institutions of global trade and finance, which act as instruments of a capitalist project of hegemony. Corporations, too, as the intended beneficiaries of this project, are engaged as protagonists in this imperialist project, reflecting more clearly the driving forces behind such expansion, generating a global conflict characterized by the conceptual and political battle over the definition of water as a right or a commodity. This conflict – reflected in the concerns of citizens’ and social movements in Latin America and well beyond – points to some of the principal factors implicated in addressing structural violence related to lack of access to water.
Two critical ideas, then, are central to our understanding of the geopolitics of water justice movements in response to these trends: (1) the geopolitics of conflicts within and between countries and non-state actors (corporations, citizen movements) over water control, and (2) the underlying and critical struggle for hegemony between the competing definitions of water as either a fundamental human right or a commodity to be bought and sold. As the following discussion will make clear, these categories are necessarily inter-related. Together they comprise a platform from which to survey the current and future terrain of conflict involving water. This article will highlight some cases of contemporary conflict touching upon these two central themes, as well as press for the adoption of a forceful and binding international treaty on the right to water as a means of addressing the global water crisis that faces humanity.
Introduction

Pressures on the use of global fresh water have reached levels unprecedented in human history. Water’s centrality to all of human life and industry has forced its prominence in the context of inter-state geopolitical power politics and even violent conflict. However, as the literature shows, in the past access and control of fresh water have rarely been a predominant cause of wars or other violent conflicts between states (with the exception of the case of Israel, perhaps). 3 However, increasingly water is involved in conflicts along multiple dimensions involving diverse non-state actors (or NSAs) such as armed groups, civil society movements, transnational corporations (TNCs), international financial institutions (IFIs) as well as other private sector business actors. 4 As such, the analytical framework employed here attempts to trace one dimension we believe is central to conflict in an increasingly freshwater-scarce century.

With the world’s population expected to rise by 3 billion to over 9 billion by 2050 5, and with the bulk of this growth expected to be concentrated in Asia and Africa, it is inevitable that ‘water stress’ or pressure on some of the most critically-pressured global water basins will increase, especially as less developed countries continue to industrialize and more developed countries continue unsustainable abuse of their water resources 6. In addition, humankind remains at a

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Of course, how one characterizes trends in conflict over water depends on one’s classification of ‘inter-state’ and ‘intra-state’ conflicts. For instance, many might choose to view conflict between Israel and occupied Palestine as one or the other type of conflict. In his 2000 book article cited above, Wolf presents a brief chronology of acute disputes in the 20th century where conflict over water has been a factor, yet resists the categorization of any of these as inter-state conflicts or wars driven by concerns over water, leading to his observation that the world has no example of water-driven inter-state ‘wars’, per se. We follow this distinction though also agree with many other researchers that growing scarcity could lead to the possibility of inter-state conflict over water in the future.


6 It is significant to add here that water scarcity, as such, may be socially constructed – a point made well by both Karen Bakker, ‘A political ecology of water privatization’, Studies in Political Economy, 70 (2003); and Barbara Rose Johnstone, ‘The political ecology of water: An introduction’, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 14 (3) (2003). Commercial and industrial users of water, for example, often ‘crowd out’ individual consumers of water for sustenance and sanitation, and are responsible for disproportionate use of freshwater supplies – leading many to
crucial impasse in our ability to collectively ensure adequate access to water as a fundamental necessity for thriving human life. Collectively, we seem unwilling to protect our water sources or to institute sustainable water management practices. Moreover, despite efforts toward international co-operation and goals promoting increased water access for sustenance and sanitation (with the Millenium Development Goals being a recent example), humanity lacks effective international laws to ensure universal access to safe water as a human right. Even the UN Declaration of Human Rights does not explicitly mention water, and though the recent ‘General Comment 15’ from the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has recognized the universal right to water, a *formal* human right to water has not been agreed upon. During the time of the original Declaration’s drafting sixty years ago, freshwater supplies were not under the same pressure they are today, as we witness increasing pollution (notably in the global south), massive rates of river diversion\(^7\), and the persistent threat of privatization and commodification under neoliberal imperatives supported by TNCs as well as the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), the World Bank (along with its various arms) and International Monetary Fund. Correlated with these dynamics is the alarming trend towards increasing private control of groundwater and upstream sources of water. This will have significant implications for future water security and ultimately water conflict in the new century. We argue that these considerations form a critical factor in attempting to assess trends in conflict over water as an increasingly strategic global resource, one that is too often left aside in predominant research on water and conflict in general, whose vision often stops at the level of the state. A critical interpretive lens that is attentive to the central problem of the struggle between definitions of water as a human right or commodity, we submit, is useful toward understanding a new generation of conflicts over water.

\[\text{argue that commercial users ought to be levied much higher rates in order to ‘cross-subsidize’ the poor through subsidized, cheaper rates for water use. See also Patrick Bond, ‘Water commodification and decommodification narratives: pricing and policy debates from Johannesburg to Kyoto to Cancun and back’, }\text{Capitalism Nature Socialism, 15 (1) (2004).}\]

\(^7\) Though this article does not directly treat the matter, the implication of mega-dam projects in both ecological destruction and forced displacement (often of indigenous and already-marginalized peoples) is a serious issue that dovetails with critiques of neoliberal development solutions involving water.
Working within a broad framework of political ecology and economy – and from a positive peace paradigm, we submit that privatization dynamics with respect to water represent emerging and significant geopolitical tensions in a new generation of water conflicts. In this sense, a new perspective on geopolitical power politics is needed, one which appreciates the central conflict between agendas of major transnational corporations with respect to water on the one hand, and on the other, the global citizen movements and critical non-governmental organizations (what we refer to as the ‘water justice movement’) that oppose these agendas and advance an agenda of both universal access for sanitation and sustenance, as well as ecological balance and water management, through the lens of human rights. A Gramscian approach to hegemony and counter-hegemony is helpful in framing this understanding of global water conflict. Gramsci’s notion of the ‘war of position’ as a counter-hegemonic strategy critical of capitalism encapsulates well the current project of water justice movements advancing advance conception of water as both a fundamental human right and part of the ‘global commons’ over and against neoliberal definitions of water as a commodity (Gramsci, 1971). Shifting Gramsci’s terms to reflect the essential non-violence of this movement, we argue that the struggle to advance the idea of water as a fundamental human right encompasses a counter-hegemonic (non-violent) ‘waging of peace by position’, insofar as it comprises a collective political project across various contexts and communities that is diametrically opposed to the currently dominant/hegemonic capitalist project and discourse advancing the idea of water as a commodity, subject to the functions of capitalist ownership and accumulation. Water justice movements additionally employ the tactic of a (non-violent) ‘waging of peace by manoeuvre’ in the Gramscian sense of a ‘war of manoeuvre’ through attempting to steer legislation and international frameworks toward the hegemony of the definition of water as a fundamental human right.

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8 Many potential definitions of political ecology abound that could serve our purposes well here, however for the present we will follow Bakker’s good summation (though not definitive for her; the authors cull it from her work, 2003, op cit.) of political ecology as “an analysis of the mutually constitutive interrelationships between the discursive, social and material dimensions of environmental change and socioeconomic restructuring.” (p. 53)

9 In the context of his own work, we interpret Gramsci’s ‘war of position’ as referring to a marxist struggle of attrition against a capitalist order, characterized by the attempt to forge a competing (or ‘counter’) ideological hegemony of the working class and civil society against that order. This type of struggle is conducted in anticipation of the revolution represented in a ‘war of manoeuvre’ (or ‘movement’) wherein state power is targeted for direct seizure and control.
As such, this type of critical analytical framework, we argue, is distinct from most current strands of analysis and theory concerning water conflict that employ mainstream frameworks of international relations (IR) theory – principally versions of functionalist realism, liberalism and constructivism – to explain the terrain of global water conflict. Using a Gramscian approach that remains true to the marxist context from which it originated, we are attentive to protagonists in the global struggle for hegemony over the definition of water, where powerful states act as ‘guarantors’ for capitalist expansion through the mechanisms and institutions of global trade and finance, which act as instruments of a capitalist project of hegemony. Corporations, too, as intended beneficiaries of this project, are engaged as protagonists in this imperialist project, reflecting more clearly the driving forces behind such expansion, generating a global conflict characterized by the conceptual and political battle over the definition of water as a right or a commodity. This conflict – reflected in the concerns of a third protagonist, water justice movements – points to some of the principal factors implicated in addressing structural violence related to lack of access to water. Two critical ideas, then, are central to our understanding of the geopolitics of water justice movements in response to these trends: (1) the geopolitics of conflicts within and between countries and non-state actors (corporations, citizen movements) over water control, and (2) the underlying and critical struggle for hegemony between the competing definitions of water as either a fundamental human right or a commodity to be bought and sold. As the following discussion will make clear, these categories are necessarily inter-related. Together they comprise an additional platform from which to survey the current and future terrain of conflict involving water. This article will highlight some cases of contemporary conflict touching upon these two central themes, as well as press for the adoption of a forceful and binding international treaty on the right to water as a means of addressing the global water crisis that faces humanity.

We will begin by referring to a global picture of water stress and inequity of access that helps contextualize these particular dynamics. After referring to existing literature and cases that highlight a ‘traditional’ perspective of the geopolitics of water in terms of inter-state conflict and security principally, we then move on to outlining further cases reflective of the struggle for hegemony as we frame it, characterized by the global corporate agenda for water privatization as a new geopolitics of water, giving rise to resistance through the discourse of human rights on the
part of global water justice movements. We conclude by arguing that the ongoing result of this struggle for hegemony – essentially one between forms of public, or citizen control/administration/stewardship of water as a human right and part of the global commons, and private forms of control of water for profit – holds crucial implications in terms of both equity of access to water and implications for future conflict.

**The global politics of water: Some Background**

‘Hydropolitics’ have evolved in a constant and worsening global scenario of lack of equitable access to water for human sustenance and sanitation. Many others have helped to point out the sobering stories, struggles and statistics that define the global politics of water\(^{10}\), politics marked by sharp divisions in access to basic needs correlated with social polarization and growing global and national levels of inequality and hardship along the lines of class, ethnicity and gender. The statistics are sobering: while the global population has increased by a factor of three over the 20th century, our collective thirst has grown by a factor of six. More than 1 billion today lack access to safe drinking water, and an estimated 2 ½ billion lack access to proper sanitation. Further, it is estimated that from 14 to 30 000 people die daily from preventable water-related illnesses, a figure that works out to nearly 5 million yearly, most of whom are children\(^{11}\). These facts are attested to within a context of severe inequity of access: a recent report documents that while the average U.S. citizen consumes 250-300 litres of water per day, the average Somalian citizen by contrast consumes only 9 litres per day\(^{12}\).

This set of dynamics must be considered as a critical foundation from which to consider the geopolitics of water continue to be manifested in the different types of conflicts touched upon here. Following Galtung and others, we typify the social deprivation associated with a lack of access to water as a form of structural violence that relates to both direct violence associated with


\(^{12}\) FOEI, Water justice for all, p. 4.
conflicts over water (direct physical harm) and cultural violence, where the final category represents any cultural form or discourse that legitimizes direct or structural violence or makes it seem ‘normal’. In the case of controversies over water, the second theme for this article elaborated above relates most closely to political struggles currently underway involving issues of structural violence. As the cases brought up in boxes 4-7 below highlight, for example, movement toward market-based models of development – emphasizing the commodification and privatization of water – have characterized a central plank of neoliberal development, often typified as the ‘Washington consensus’ due to the U.S.’ staunch support of such models and the power of its corporate lobby. In such a context, relations of power and control within and between countries as well as predominant neoliberal development paradigms are intertwined with the worsening trends of social polarization and inequality. Critically, as this article will explore, structural violence is discernible both in the lack of access to safe fresh water for basic sustenance and sanitation, as well as economic and political projects and policies that advocate that water be defined as a commodity. In the geopolitics of water, concerns with inter-state positioning and power are inseparably intermeshed with concerns of equity of access and neoliberal market-based agendas.

Geopolitics and water conflict: From a negative to a positive peace paradigm

Direct violence and the negative peace paradigm

Most research into the role of water in global (principally inter-state) conflicts has acknowledged two contradictory pressures arising in recent times concerning the growing human dependency on readily-available, and increasingly scarce global freshwater resources. Some researchers emphasize the trend toward more co-operation among states with shared ‘transboundary’


14 Although with respect to water, as will be touched upon further in the article, many of the major transnational corporations involved are European, making the ‘consensus’ in this case reach much further than the U.S.
Wolf et al note that ‘co-operative events’ involving countries sharing boundaries with access to major water sources outnumbered conflicts by a factor of two to one in the period between 1945 and 1999. They also note that factors such as institutional capacity, effective and binding international treaties and collaborative water management accords have all led to successful inter-state mitigation of conflicts over water.

Still at the global level, other researchers highlight the growing dilemma of changes in demographics and pressure on critical freshwater basins. Postel, for instance, draws on the work of previous researchers in illustrating the notion of ‘basins at risk’ as a means of identifying areas of the world where pressure on use of water per capita cannot keep pace with population growth trends. In this framework, the politics of water are characterized by dividing the planet into regions/basins yielding more or less water on a per capita basis. Consequently, the major freshwater river basins of the world that Postel portrays as ‘basins at risk’ reflect those parts of the planet where expected population trends correlate with unsustainable stress on available freshwater supplies where scarcity is greatest. Scarcity of water resources in this way dictates water’s critical geopolitical importance to the security interests of states in water-stressed regions.

Several regions sharing boundaries on major international river basins are potentially at risk under this type of model for future or ongoing disputes around water supplies. It is estimated that 41% of the world’s total population lives in areas under water stress. Ohlsson further clarifies this global dilemma by putting the matter of increasing water scarcity in the context of access to available freshwater runoff by region:

The distribution of runoff over the continents is uneven and does not match population concentrations. Asia has 60 percent of the world’s population but only 36 percent of the runoff. South America with 5 percent of the world’s population has 25 percent of the runoff. A large part of the runoff, both in the tropics and in the northern areas, is inaccessible both to-day and in the foreseeable future. Water must be available at the time it is needed, both for irrigated agriculture, industry and domestic uses. This means that the highest reliability comes from that part of global runoff which is constituted by renewable groundwater or the minimum river flow. This part only constitutes 27 percent of the geographically available flow.\(^1\)

Such forecasts take into account average rates of recharge of groundwater and expected trends, as well as predictions of rates of withdrawal of water for human needs.

This pressure on freshwater resources is borne out in tangible consequences for human communities as well as on ecosystems, both arguably reflecting further forms of structural violence. A recent UN report\(^2\) estimates there will be an additional 50 million refugees created by the end of the decade because of environmental degradation, and many of these will be displaced by lack access to safe freshwater, in many cases compromised by destructive industrial practices and ineffective or non-existent sanitation and water treatment systems. Even today, many so-called ‘environmental refugees’ are fleeing drought, disease and poverty related to lack of clean water. All this describes a world where increasing numbers of people struggle for access to limited freshwater resources resulting in displacement and increasing conflict\(^3\).
Within this broad global outlook, the particularities of regional and sub-regional access to available freshwater supply are varied and complex, and represent the more accurate arena or perspective from which to appreciate the implications of the strategic value of water as well as the impact of conflicts over its use. Internationally, by far the most stress on major water systems is based in regions bordering the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates and Jordan basins in Africa and the Middle East, as well as the Aral Sea and Indus river basins in Asia. The U.S. researcher Michael Klare points out the stress on some of these basins by highlighting the fact that populations in the Jordan, Tigris-Euphrates and Indus basis is expected to increase on average by approximately 100% from the period 1998-2050\(^22\). These projections of population increases range from 53.4 percent in Turkey to 178.3 in Jordan.

Zeitoun and Warner offer the framework of ‘hydro-hegemony’ as a further means of understanding transboundary water conflict and the relative lack of recourse to armed conflict over increasingly scarce water resources. Using a conception of hegemony that is completely de-linked from Gramsci’s marxist use of the term, these authors outline a continuum of inter-state struggle over water according to the ‘intensity’ of both conflict measured by levels geopolitical power-broking, where such maneuvering is a more common tool for exerting influence concerning transboundary water issues than direct violence\(^23\). In this model, regional trade relations overseen by state ‘hegemons’ act as constraints on the potential resort to armed conflict over water, where international co-operation prevails. While this framework is useful for analysis at the level of inter-state relations, we argue that it is ignorant of the broader concerns of how economic neoliberalism – reflected in trends toward the privatization and commodification of water – is increasingly acting as an outlet for conflict over water of a different kind than that tied to direct violence and war. The difference between these sets of concerns equates roughly with the distinct perspectives of negative and positive peace paradigms, where the former is understood here as the absence of direct violence, and the latter


as the absence of structural and cultural violence. Such a difference does not imply our judgement of a lack of insight on the part of mainstream perspectives on water and conflict mentioned here, but rather our acknowledgement of the limits of this type of perspective in helping to understand a newer generation of hegemonic struggle over water.

**Neoliberalism, water privatization and the positive peace paradigm**

Existing literature based in political ecology and economy frameworks dealing specifically with water privatization has usefully unpacked specific stories and struggles that form a global portrayal of the terrain of hegemony and counter-hegemony around water as we understand it. Articles by Bakker\(^{24}\) and Johnstone\(^{25}\) on the political ecology of water privatization offer a nuanced analysis of the politics of water control, characterized by the entry of private actors, where this term principally represents for-profit, corporate actors taking over water utilities and supply/distribution systems, often as a condition placed on loans and aid from IFIs and bilateral donors. Given the contextual variation of water privatization across different global communities and locales, the specific nature of ‘private sector participation’ in water systems\(^{26}\) varies widely in scope and depth, as Bakker points out. However, for her a central feature of such trends involves the ‘discursive reshaping’ of both water as a public service and of citizens as the bearers of rights to water as a critical service in the context of some kind of social democracy/welfare state model:

> In most cases, the introduction of private-sector participation entails a degree of commercialization, whether through a reworking of allocation principles (from social equity to economic equity) and infrastructure management goals (from security of supply to cost recovery), or through a redefinition of principles underlying the business of water supply; water ceases to be a service, supplied at subsidized rates to citizens as a right, and is increasingly viewed as a commodity, sold to consumers on a profit-making basis of willingness-to-pay, rather than ability-


\(^{26}\) In Canada, for instance, as Bakker notes, the language of the public-private-partnership is used (or ‘P3’), to designate a range of potential options in ownership arrangements, including private ownership and leasing arrangements for public structures and systems, as well as ‘public ownership’ and private operation, etc. Additionally, the potential involvement of civil society/non-governmental organizations of various kinds in water systems represents another facet of ‘private sector’ involvement where ‘private’ can be taken to refer to entities that are not democratically accountable or controlled.
The familiar litany of rationales to support this shift rests in a concerted effort to de-legitimise state involvement in water systems as ‘inefficient’, while praising the private sector conversely as ‘efficient’ because of its accountability to market forces (where these are privileged, naturally, over ‘democratic forces’ demanding of equity of access). Bakker further argues that water scarcity is used as political leverage by would-be privatisers and proponents of neoliberal solutions through the argument that as a scarce resource, market-based private actors are supposedly best situated to ‘efficiently’ manage water. Thus a discourse of ecological conservation is co-opted by this camp, in the name of a (specious) argument of inherent efficiency as compared with the state or other forms of democratic control. On the other side of this debate, as can be seen in various cases of public/democratic regaining of control of formerly-privatized water systems in Latin America and elsewhere, ecological concerns of sustainability have been capably balanced with social equity concerns in access to water.38 One essential lesson that emerges from these debates is that forms of water service must be both affordable and democratically accountable at the local level in order to ensure expanded and adequate service for the poor.39 Vandana Shiva has referred to the necessity for this kind of transformation as the imperative for ‘water democracy’.30 Budds and McGranahan amplify this point further, noting that both central government responsibility as well as private for-profit involvement in water

28 See Belén Balanyá, Brid Brennan, Olivier Hoedeman, Satoko Kishimoto and Philipp Terhorst (Eds.), ‘Reclaiming Public Water– Achievements, struggles and visions from around the world’ (Corporate Europe Observatory and Transnational Institute, 2005), available at http://www.tni.org/books/publicwater.htm
29 Bond, ‘Water Commodification and Decommodification Narratives’, op cit. Bond chronicles the attempt by South African social movements to hold their government accountable for constitutional rights to water as well as stated water targets for expansion of services to the poor, both of which were effectively compromised by a neoliberal approach, which in the 1990s, utilized ‘full cost recovery’ mechanisms and thereby disproportionately burdened the incomes of the already poor and marginalized in that country.
utilities has failed to expand service to the vulnerable, marginalized and poor. Local democracy, accountability, and participation in water governance must inevitably be coupled with state support in terms of funding for infrastructure. Such a shift arguably calls for systemic reform on the part of the state toward a willingness to work with, and honour the concerns and priorities of communities that may be marginalized and excluded from adequate access to water for sustenance and sanitation.

Detailed critical work on African cases studies/communities has documented the involvement of IFIs and complicit governments in enforcing modes of water privatization through loan conditionalities, supported by the neoliberal imperatives underlying international trade regimes. In separate work, both Bond and Swyngedouw argue that neoliberal approaches to water encompass a tactic a “accumulation by dispossession” (after David Harvey), precipitating resistance consonant with larger historic trends of capitalist exploitation, and in Bond’s terms, ‘global apartheid’.

Contemporary water conflict: Regional cases from both paradigms

Focusing our discussion first on the theme of geopolitical tensions around water, one can see two distinct sub-themes emerge from this general area of concern. Traditional geopolitical factors with respect to water are reflected both in areas of the world where freshwater resources are comparatively abundant or scarce, intersecting with the viability of states and the capitalist economic enterprise that maintains them. Boxes 1-3 below explore some of the cases of conflict around water that reflect both a negative peace paradigm, and a model of ‘hydro-hegemony’ that

Box 1: Middle East tensions 1 – Israel and Palestine

The Jordan River supplies Israel and Jordan with the vast majority of their water. Some hydrologists have identified 1000 cubic meters per person per year as a minimum water requirement for an efficient moderately industrialized nation. Inside Israel's border, the availability of water per-capita in 1990 was 470 cubic meters. It is estimated that by the year 2025 this availability will be reduced to 310 cubic meters. As such, over 50 percent of Israel's water sources rely on rain that falls outside of Israel's borders. Thus, Israel depends on water supply that either comes from rivers that originate outside the border, or from disputed lands.

Israel has constructed an elaborate system of pipes and canals, called the National Water Carrier, that carry water to the communities along the coast including Tel Aviv and to the arid south where it is used for irrigation of crops. Only a few people know how much water the National Water Carrier is capable of transporting because Israel considers such information a matter of national security. A popular assumption is that it can carry the full capacity of the Jordan River. To its credit, Israel has developed a very efficient system for reusing water and has advanced the technology of drip irrigation for agriculture that uses one-fourth the water of conventional irrigation.

Only 30 percent of the water in the region comes from rivers; groundwater accounts for the rest. The most important groundwater aquifers are the Mountain, Eastern, and Coastal. The Mountain aquifer is the largest and provides Israel with almost a fourth of its total water supply. Most of the Mountain and Eastern aquifers are located under the West Bank.

Part of the Coastal Aquifer is located under the Gaza Strip and has been over-pumped for many years, not only by the Palestinian refugees who live there but by Israeli settlers tapping into it from outside the Gaza itself. Gaza has one of the highest growth rates in the world despite a high rate of infant mortality. Over pumping has resulted in seawater incursions into the wells so that the water is mostly undrinkable. In 1995, Gaza Palestinians paid $1.20 per cubic meter for water, while Israeli settlers paid 10 cents. The government of Israel tightly controls the extraction of water from the aquifers with permits. Palestinians receive fewer permits than Israeli citizens receive and they are allowed to draw water only from shallow wells that often go dry during dry periods. Inequity in water distribution is high on the list of Palestinian grievances and any redress of this inequality would cost the Israeli's a great deal of their economic advantage over their neighbors.


fits with Zeitoun and Warner’s framework. The direct, structural and cultural violence evident in these first few cases relates principally to the interests of states seeking to control water, or disrupt access to it (in the case of Iraq). The cases selected are unique for their conspicuous characteristics of direct and structural violence (in the cases of Iraq and Israel/Palestine), as well as ‘hydro-hegemony’ in the sense offered by Zeitoun and Warner. Other cases that could fit this profile are amply chronicled by Gleick in his ‘water conflict chronology’

It is fitting that the first of our examples in this vein come from the Middle East. As an area of the world where water scarcity predominates – as do geopolitical struggles over that lifeblood of capitalism, oil – this region has seen growing tensions over access to dwindling water supplies that have frequently erupted into various levels of violence. As touched upon above, the pressure on water availability in this region is among the most severe in the world, and the consequences of this dynamic have been borne out in major inter-state rivalries. Despite the

low incidence of acutely violent conflict over water during the period 1945-2005, of the 37 disputes over water that could be designated ‘acute’ during this time, 30 were between Israel and a neighbouring state. Apart from difficulties stemming from its quest to secure water supplies in relation to its neighbouring states sharing the Jordan River basin, Israel – consistently supported by the U.S. as an ally to its interests in the Middle East – has also been critically implicated in negative consequences stemming from inequitable handling of water resources underneath the occupied Palestinian territories. Box 1 comprises an overview of some of these tensions as they’ve unfolded in occupied lands and Israeli settlements. Reflecting more recent geopolitical power plays, Box 2 looks at examples of conflict implicating water in the recent U.S. war with Iraq, as noted by Gleick, in the case of direct consequences of the conflict for Iraq’s water supply. As this example highlights, destruction of critical water infrastructure in the context of armed conflict continues to occur despite international legal mechanisms designed to protect water resources in times of war.

Also related to water and the war in Iraq, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (which includes water), Jean Ziegler, has condemned the US-led coalition’s reported practice of cutting off water from insurgent strongholds as a ‘flagrant violation of international law’.

Mr. Ziegler has called upon countries to condemn this practice in a resolution at the UN. How the UN deals with these claims is an issue worth monitoring, the outcome of which could illustrate the lack of consistency with regards to enforcement and sanctions against violations of the right to water that must be addressed. This specific case represents a point of intersect between direct violence, conflict, and international humanitarian law as well as emerging discourses emphasizing water as a fundamental human right; a matter we will return to shortly.

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35 Aaron Wolf et al., “Managing water conflict”, op cit, p. 84.
37 Peter Gleick, “Water conflict chronology”, op cit
39 http://www.righttofood.org/
As a link to our next set of examples, it is relevant to mention the work done by critical researchers who have documented how lucrative ‘reconstruction’ contracts that accompanied the U.S.’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 have involved prominent TNCs such as the water giant Bechtel, the central corporate protagonist of Bolivia’s water conflict (highlighted below in Box 4). Bechtel was granted a contract for control over Iraq’s water and wastewater systems in the context of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. This example neatly juxtaposes the interests of TNCs in critical natural resources such as water and oil, in situations where the military of invading countries can act as a ‘guarantor’ for corporate expansion and profit from these areas, as touched upon above. Finally, the case of conflict over water between Turkey and Iraq makes for an interesting example in the context of the U.S. offensive. As another element of the destabilizing impact of this war on regional relations, this case is explored in Box 3.

Box 3: Turkey and the GAP project

With respect to transboundary water issues, it is illustrative to observe how a weakened Iraq in the context of Turkey’s GAP project is an example of how geopolitical power shifts also shift the flow of water. The GAP project is a system of 19 dams built by Turkey to control the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. A strong Iraq had been able to thwart completion of this project but as Iraq emerged weak from prolonged international conflict the project has progressed. The result geopolitically culminated in Turkey signing an ‘Arms for Water’ deal with Israel as reported by the BBC. Under this 20-year deal, Turkey has become a regional water power and would be sending water to Israel via tanker and later pipeline in return for Turkey receiving Israeli arms and military assistance. After the deal was made public through a BBC report, Turkey backed away from the agreement but lessons regarding geopolitics and the power of water in the region remain. Syria’s water supply is also being threatened by Turkey’s upstream control project.


Geopolitics and the corporate agenda for water: The ‘new water wars’

Traditional perspectives on geopolitical tensions relating to water take us only so far in scrutinizing and understanding global conflict around this precious resource. Peeling away the predominant concern with states that informs most discourse on water and conflict, we suggest that any appreciation of the complexity of such tensions must be informed by the controversy around the global trends toward privatization of water, and the specific conflicts they engender, in agreement with aforementioned authors who have done pioneering critical work in this field. Such an assumption locates the final cases we offer firmly in a positive peace paradigm. As mentioned, trends toward water privatization implicate multiple actors, from individual states and multilateral agencies, to – most significantly – key transnational corporations pushing for further markets in water management and distribution. Such a shift in perspectives takes us from a conception of hegemony that is concerned principally with states toward one that is attentive to the aforementioned actors, and their role as protagonists in the struggle for hegemony in terms of how water is defined. The final examples we offer represent a concise portrayal of the geopolitics of this particular struggle in different sites. Though this conflict can accurately be typified as global, we turn to Latin America first for some of the most salient examples of this trend.

Though such conflicts have not been isolated to the region but evident in Africa and Asia as well, Latin America has been host to some of the most sensational and widely-discussed instances of such conflict. In Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of the world comparatively rich in freshwater supply, access is complicated due to a concentration of a significant portion of the region’s population in areas where access to available freshwater runoff is limited. Although as a region Latin America and the Caribbean are host to 30% of the world’s available freshwater (due largely to runoff from the Amazon), 10% of this access is confined to three regional basins that host 40% of the region’s population.43 Meanwhile, 76 million of the regional population of

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43 UNEP, Global environment outlook 3: Past, present and future perspectives (Nairobi & London: UNEP & Earthscan, 2002), p. 167. The distinction between ‘available’ and ‘accessible’ sources of freshwater is important to note here; thus in Latin America’s case as noted, a substantial portion of the regional population must share access...
510 million lack access to safe drinking water\textsuperscript{44}, a figure that connects well with the region’s comparatively high level of within-country income inequality as reflected in the Gini index.\textsuperscript{45} As Figure 3 illustrates, one critical component to this stress on the area’s water supply can be seen in the La Plata basin, which supplies available runoff to roughly 50\% of the populations of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and is implicated in an estimated 70\% of the GDP of these countries through its use in industry and agriculture.\textsuperscript{46} Overall, 73\% of total renewable freshwater in the region as a whole is diverted to agriculture, with 70\% the global average.\textsuperscript{47} The strategic importance of the La Plata basin makes for an informative context from which to appreciate recent conflicts over water in the region (see Boxes 4 and 5), where countries such as Argentina and Bolivia have been the sites of protracted struggle over the corporate agenda to privatize water supply systems and transform water into primarily a commodity.
Beyond Latin America in particular, the World Bank – including its lending arm, the International Finance Corporation – and the International Monetary Fund have been protagonists and advocates of the privatization of water in developing countries the world over, most notably through the coercive instrument of structural adjustment. Structural conditionalities attached to loans from these IFIs, also including regional entities such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank, ensure that privatization and other neoliberal measures are implemented as a preferred (and often required) condition of multilateral as well as bilateral aid and loans. As such neoliberal solutions to water have tended to result in private corporations “cherry-picking profitable neighbourhoods” (in Bakker’s terms) while failing to extend water services to the poor, citizen movements and critical non-governmental

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48 UNEP, Global Environmental Outlook 3.
50 Bakker, ‘the political ecology of water privatization’, op cit, p. 41.
organizations have been foremost in challenging the impact of such schemes on equity of access to water, constructing broad-based transnational social alliances. Boxes 4\textsuperscript{51} and 5\textsuperscript{52} outline two cases of citizen resistance to World Bank-enforced water privatization in Latin America. Already implicated for the failure of massive water infrastructure schemes in India, Africa and elsewhere, the World Bank and corporate drivers behind it continue to push for development schemes that favour the centrality of its ‘private sector development’ strategy, favouring market and private actors over state social investment in critical water infrastructure and distribution mechanisms.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Box 4: Cochabamba, Bolivia}
\end{center}

The first big water war of the 21st century erupted in Bolivia, when under direct pressure from the World Bank and under IMF structural adjustment, water services were privatized in Latin America’s poorest country. After the public water utility in the city of Cochabamba [pop. over 500,000] was handed over to Bechtel, a powerful U.S. corporation, through a closed-door process, water rates doubled and tripled in January and February of 2000. The people of Cochabamba took to the streets, by the tens of thousands day after day, protesting against the rate hikes and subsequent water cut-offs. Oscar Olivera, a visible leader of the struggle said “they even want to privatize the rain” a reference to provisions under a new Bolivian water law enacted to push water privatization and full cost recovery. Eventually, the escalating protests ignited a general strike that shut down the city’s economy. At the height of this mass resistance, Bechtel was forced to pack its bags and flee the country. But not without consequence. A 17 year old, Victor Hugo Daza was killed by a bullet to the head, another 6 were killed in ensuing protests in other parts of the country. Bechtel, with revenue of over 14 billion USD at the time, also struck back with a punitive $25 million USD suit against the Bolivian government, claiming compensation for future lost profits under a bilateral investment treaty. Since this time, the Cochabamba water system has been controlled by SEMAPA, the public utility created after the conflict and publicly-managed.

Transnational Institute, Corporate Europe Observatory. “Reclaiming Public Water: Achievements, struggles and visions from around the world.” Amsterdam:TNI/CEO, 2005

The evidence from cases of privatization of water inevitably shows reduced access for the poor throughout the world.\textsuperscript{53}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Box 5: Buenos Aires, Argentina}
\end{center}

The Buenos Aires privatization deal, consummated in 1993, had been widely lauded by the World Bank, the Argentine government and the water industry, as an international success story. But, the success story turned sour after the contractual clause that permitted Suez to link water prices to the U.S. dollar, and ensured hefty profits, was overruled by the Argentine government’s emergency decree, precipitated by the country’s currency crisis. During the first eight years of the contract, weak regulatory practices and contract re-negotiations that eliminated corporate risk enabled the Suez subsidiary, Aguas Argentinas S.A., to earn a 19% profit rate on its

\textsuperscript{51} Polaris Institute, Global water grab: How corporations are planning to take control of local water services (Ottawa: The Author, 2003), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{53}Public Citizen, Water Privatization Fiascos. For more documentation on these global trends, see Ann-Christin Holland, The water business: Corporations versus people (London: Zed Books, 2005). Africa is obviously another important regional example highlighting these trends. For a good set of case studies highlighting tensions around privatization of water in the southern African region, the authors recommend David McDonald & Greg Ruiters, The age of commodity: Water privatization in Southern Africa (London: Earthscan, 2005).
average net worth. However, by 2002 Suez had to write off $500 million in losses because of the Buenos Aires concession.

IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs have long been squeezing social services and public infrastructure in Argentina. The privatization of water became an added burden on the general population. According to Fernando de la Rua, one of many presidents that have come and gone during the Argentine crisis (speaking in March 1999 when he was Mayor of Buenos Aires): “Water rates, which Aguas Argentinas said would be reduced by 27% have actually risen 20%. These price increases, and the cost of service extension, have been borne disproportionately by the urban poor. Non-payment for water and sanitation are as high as 30 percent, and service cut-offs are common, with women and children bearing the brunt with health and safety consequences.”

As Suez tries to recoup its losses, the government, and the nation’s taxpayers, will be left to clean up the mess. Using an increasingly feared tactic of multinational corporations, Suez will bring claims against the Argentine government using the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The exact amount of Suez’s claims against the Argentine government are “secret” but they are demanding compensation for losses relating to water concessions in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Cordoba.


Additionally, one must bear in mind that lack of access to water has differential impacts on already-inequitable social relations across contexts where the brunt of social hardship is felt disproportionately along the lines of gender, race and social class combined (what is sometimes referred to as a ‘parallelist’ view). Gendered impacts of water privatization are discussed in Box 6, building on an example of conflict over water privatization in Plachimada, India.54

Despite damning evidence, however, IFIs and many state-sponsored development agencies continue unabated in their enthusiasm for the panacea of privatization as a development solution55, witnessed well by the regressive yet stubborn support for neoliberal measures such as prepaid water meters, profiled in Box 756. The co-ordination of geopolitical positioning on the


part of key states and actors such as the E.U. and the U.S. with the agenda of TNCs with respect to the commodification and privatization of water promises to remain a salient feature of conflicts over water into the 21st century. As mentioned previously critical NGOs and others simultaneously continue to hold these trends to account for their devastating social and environmental impact, a trend documented well elsewhere.57

Box 6: Gendered impacts of water privatization

In many cultures women are primarily responsible for the use and management of water resources at the household level which are tied to care responsibilities typically associated with women as a gender. This can include (but is not limited to) accessing and paying for water for household needs such as drinking, cooking and cleaning. The case of a Coca Cola bottling plant in Plachimada, India confirms the extent to which the impacts associated with privatizing water is gendered.

When water levels surrounding a Coca Cola plant in Plachimada India fell between 150 to 500 feet devastating local crops, it was women who had the task of walking further distances to access water. Not only is this exhausting, it takes time away from income generating activities. It is only fitting that it was primarily women, Ms. Sathi Mailamma being a key figure, which led the internationally recognized movement that led to the bottling factory’s operations being suspended in 2003. This gendered impact and resistance is directly related to treating water as a commodity. In this case, a private corporation’s profit seeking precipitates the overuse of local water resources in order to produce one of Coca Cola’s many products packaged in disposable plastic bottles. Consequently profit is prioritized above the right of the people to their water for meeting their basic needs and small-scale farming.

Other gendered impacts associated with the privatization of water outside of this case include girls missing time from, or foregoing school entirely in order to fetch water and increases in water-borne diseases such as cholera. This increase is directly associated with rising water tariffs that become so restrictive, women as caretakers are forced to seek water from contaminated, free sources. Water privatization measures in places such as Cochabamba, Bolivia, Conakry, Guinea, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Colombia, and the Philipinmes have also resulted in negative gendered impacts.1

http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/right/prepaid/southafrica/orange-farm/?searchterm=Orange%20Farm


57 Some examples of such criticism and resistance can be found in David Hall, Emanuele Lobina, & Robin De La Motte, “Public resistance to privatization in water and energy”, Development in Practice, 15 (3/4) (2005); Vandana Shiva, Water wars: Privatization, pollution, and profit (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002); Maude Barlow & Tony Clarke, Blue gold: The fight to stop the corporate theft of the world’s water (New York: New Press, 2002).
The erection of pre-paid water metres, such as those installed in Orange Farm South Africa, demonstrates the very real hazards of treating water as a commodity even when it is framed in a discourse of human rights (South Africa’s constitution enshrines water as a human right). Water metres function by requiring people to pay for water with a card and input code for the metre which then gives them credit for a certain number of litres of water. In this case, the local municipal water utility (Johannesburg Water) adopted the private sector’s model when it joined forces with Johannesburg Water Management Company, which is predominately controlled by Suez via subsidiaries (Ondeo, Northumbrian Water and Water and Sanitation Services of South Africa). The decision to install metres in Stratford Four, a district in Orange Farm, in 2002-2003 was made as a result of a public-private partnership and reflects the broader trends toward development policies that uphold neoliberal values in South Africa. The metres were installed for the purposes of implementing cost recovery, a policy designed to ensure the recuperation of costs and pave the way to long-term profitability for private sector actors. This clearly treats water as commodity – if you cannot pay, you do not receive access to water – and reveals the primary motive of private sector participation in water management; profit. Likely in an attempt to soften the impacts of this policy and appear to not contradict its own constitution, at least on paper, the South African government agreed to subsidize 6000 litres of free water per household, per month as part of a block tariff system; the lifeline being the first, subsidized block.

Despite this water ‘lifeline,’ citizen groups such as the Coalition against Water Privatization and the Southern African HIV Clinicians Society and interviewed residents of Orange Farm insist that 6000 litres of water was not enough to meet the basic needs for water which often ran out halfway through the month. This was particularly true for large families and households caring for family members with HIV/AIDS which requires increased amounts of water for care provision. Thus in order to access water after the ironically named ‘lifeline’ was used, citizens were forced to pay for their basic water needs. The block tariff system was set up so that the steepest increase was experienced after this first block was used. This resulted in creating an economic, profit-driven barrier to accessing water, the impacts of which intersected with class and race. Stratford Four is a very impoverished district, 68% of the residents live below the poverty line. As primary care providers, women typically burdened the resulting need to balance the high costs of water with other key needs such as food and school fees, often being forced to make sacrifices in order to afford access to water. Thus in prioritizing the needs of profit above the needs of people, the social importance of ensuring access to water was largely overlooked. Water metres have also been installed with similar consequences in places such as Namibia, Sudan, Egypt, Philippines, South Africa and Brazil.

As well as ‘national treatment’ and the universal ‘most-favoured nation’ clause that effectively enforce adherence to trade rules favouring the rights of transnational corporations (TNCs) over any other consideration. In addition, they ensure that any privatization or commodification of water is effectively irreversible. In particular, the European Union’s negotiating demands for the GATS – leaked in March 2003 – highlighted a desire to entrench patterns of the commodification of water through market access in a host of countries deemed potentially profitable territory for major EU-based TNCs such as Vivendi, Suez Lyonainse and Thames RWE. In addition, returning to regional issues for Latin America, countries in the region face ongoing pressure from the United States in the context of ongoing bilateral negotiations...
concerning regional trade agreements such as the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and a potential bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the Andean community. CAFTA represents an extension of the principles and scope of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – complete with its contentious investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism – and for the U.S. represents a hopeful stepping-stone toward the stalled Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), an agreement that would forcefully entrench privatization processes across all areas of public services, including those related to water distribution. Trade regimes such as these put the conflicts in Bolivia over water in critical perspective, and lend credence to the prediction that social conflicts over the privatization of water could be set to increase in frequency and prominence depending on the rate of progression of current trade talks across a variety of contexts. Current attempts to create a counter-hegemonic regional bloc to challenge Washington’s plans for Latin America offer the possibility that alternative agendas for trade may yet emerge. In the meantime, a global water justice movement has begun to coalesce and organize against the corporate agenda for water, a movement rooted in the definition of water as a fundamental human right.

Toward the Right to Water

Although some important preliminary steps have been made in the direction of securing the notion of water as a fundamental human right and subject to binding, legal frameworks, some nagging paradoxes in practice afflict this progress. Overall, economic, social and cultural rights (under which the right to water resides) have less weight in the UN and international legal system than do political or civil rights. They are generally viewed as non-justiciable rights as opposed to political and civil rights which are viewed as justiciable. A right is deemed justiciable if it can be adjudicated in a court of law. This is by convention and contradicts the very concept of fundamental human rights. Putting the right to water beyond the reach of courts is arbitrary and violates the principle that human rights must be indivisible and interdependent.

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60 The latter agreement excludes, for the present time, Venezuela and Bolivia, with Bolivia party to negotiations as an observer for now.

In addition, there the right to water falls under a category of human rights which are non-derogable and can never be pushed aside. Water because it is essential to life falls under this category. The UN must address this paradox because the right to water and other economic, social and cultural rights are not being enforced as a result of limited national legal frameworks that exist for this right as well as the currently non-justiciable nature of the right.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has identified the problem:

> Under international human rights law (as well as in terms of its application at the national level), civil and political rights have, in many respects, received more attention, legal codification and judicial interpretation, and have been instilled in public consciousness to a far greater degree, than economic, social and cultural rights. It is therefore sometimes wrongly presumed that only civil and political rights (right to a fair trial, right to equality of treatment, right to life, right to vote, right to be free from discrimination, etc.) can be subject to violation, measures of redress and international legal scrutiny. Economic, social and cultural rights are often viewed as effectively "second-class rights"-unenforceable, non-justiciable, only to be fulfilled "progressively" over time.\(^{62}\)

This status as ‘second-class rights’ has resulted in complacency about monitoring and enforcing economic, social and cultural right. Currently, a broad-based international citizens’ movement is pressing an international water treaty to be developed under the auspices of the United Nations that could help to resolve this dilemma in favor of the right to water. The authors of this article endorse this project and its aims, including creating a binding legal instrument that is enforceable. An initial draft principles document has been produced for feedback\(^{63}\). Various tensions and dilemmas have surfaced as the international community has struggled with the idea of defining water as a human right.

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\(^{63}\) See http://www.blueplanetproject.net for details.
In a recent report, The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources\textsuperscript{64} reviews various international legal mechanisms for their relation to the idea of water as a human right. Although they argue that water essentially and realistically prefigures any and all of the human rights as enunciated in either the Universal Declaration, the UN Charter, or in the 1966 Conventions\textsuperscript{65}, they note that it remains to be formally enshrined as a fundamental human right in any context\textsuperscript{66}. The Geneva Conventions also incorporate rights to water as protocols for acceptable conduct in the context of armed conflict. The authors of the report argue that a substantive right to water, enforceable through national legal frameworks and international human rights mechanisms and institutions, could make significant progress in ensuring redress of the current global predicament of a mass lack of access to water for human sustenance and sanitation. Although the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued a statement in favor of the idea of water as a human right in its ‘General Comment No. 15’ (GC15) in 2002\textsuperscript{67}, this statement represents only a contribution to the movement toward the recognition of such a right as enshrined in binding legal mechanisms through the UN. [\]

In the meantime, various international fora and conferences have reflected the ongoing tension between water conceived of as a social right and water perceived as a commodity, by presenting definitions of water as a human right or as a ‘human need’.\textsuperscript{68} The notion of a right evokes implicit obligations to provide access, whereas the idea of a ‘need’ implies only that water may be provided by any entity and at un-regulated rates as well as by varying standards. Though non-binding in terms of their effect or relation to international legal instruments and mechanisms, the battles of language and representation reflected at such meetings are indicative of the protracted struggle over how water ought to be perceived under existing tools of international law.

\textsuperscript{65} The ‘1966 Conventions’ refers to both the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
\textsuperscript{66} To put this state of affairs in context, it is worthwhile to note that water is indeed explicitly mentioned as a right in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).
\textsuperscript{67} http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/ge15.doc
The ongoing tensions at such meetings reflect the vigilance of two opposing groups. On the one hand are the TNCs and governments that help represent their agenda for water, with a vested interest in transforming water into a commodity. On the other are critical citizen movements, NGOs and unions, which have all continually pressed for the conception of water as a fundamental right, as a part of the global commons and a public trust.

No unanimity has been reached on the concept of water as a right. The Mar Del Plata Water Conference of 1977 explicitly endorsed the idea of water as a human right, only to be succeeded by the 1992 Rio Conference’s articulation of the idea of water as a human need. Successive World Water Forum meetings in 1997, 2000 and 2003, reflecting the interests of the corporations which play a strong role in the body organizing the forum, the World Water Council, have failed to decisively declare water a fundamental human right, even after the right to water was explicitly recognized through the UN’s Economic, Social and Cultural Committee adopting General Comment 15. They instead have respectively reinforced a dichotomy in thinking about water (as both a right and a need) that provides the murky context we deal with today. Thus corporations are encouraged by IFIs, under the tutelage of the powerful governments that control them and with the threat of violation of international trade regulations, to enforce the idea of water as a commodity with full impunity.

The Right to Water Campaign and global water justice

It is in this context that contemporary citizens’ movements such as the Blue Planet Project\(^{69}\) (BPP), as part of the internationally based Friends of the Right to Water, are pressing for the adoption of a treaty to provide accountability in international law for the redress of violations of the right to water. These efforts take the ‘soft law’ of the General Comment and attempt to create a binding, enforceable, legal instrument to secure the right to water.

Subsequent to General Comment 15, it is worth noting the way those in favour of water privatization have altered their public response to the concept of the human right to water.

\(^{69}\) \url{http://www.blueplanetproject.net/english/}
Understanding that their previous public opposition to the human right to water was sensitive and harmful to their public relations, corporations and the organizations that they work with, such as the World Water Council, are now putting energy into reframing the human right to water to more closely serve their interests. They have set upon the idea that they can be the ones to define the meaning of the right to water and would not then have to fear the implications to their business. In fact, with the right framing it could even be beneficial.

RWE Thames, the world’s 3rd largest water corporation, has publicly embraced the human right to water, as has the World Water Council. This change of heart for those who condone privatization and have previously resisted declaring water to be a human right stems from a new optic on this right: that it can be viewed as fundamentally a question of access. Critics of this approach—for example the Friends of the Right to Water, including the Blue Planet Project, COHRE, FIAN, Council of Canadians, Bread for the World, Alliance Sud, Food and Water Watch, Heinrich Böll Foundation and others—believe that the right to water is much broader and must encompass control of water if it is to respect the spirit of the right. This view is based on GC 15, whereby water is viewed as part of the global public commons; as such, the state is responsible for ensuring the right to water to its citizens. This re-framing of the right to water does make it more difficult for states to hand control over to the market or to corporations that deliver water on a market-based approach which is in violation of the right, but without enforcement and monitoring it is meaningless.

Recently progress has been made at the new UN Human Rights Council where a report was tabled during the 6th Session from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the right to water. This report outlines many of the challenges faced in implementing the human right to water, but it does provide some concrete steps which must be taken. At the 7th Session of the Human Rights Council this report will be discussed further based on a German resolution. Strong countries support further movement on the right to water and we expect to see appointment of a special rapporteur on water as a positive sign that the Council takes this issue seriously. The authors also believe that the Office of the High Commissioner is a natural place to do more work on this issue. There are many hurdles still facing substantive movement at the UN but there are some interesting developments in the works.
Possibly the most critical part of the campaign, however, will not take place at the UN. It will take place in the communities that are struggling to secure the right to water and are fighting corporate control of their water. If the concepts behind the right to water take hold in these communities, the fight takes on a very different tone and becomes about how to protect water for people and nature.

The authors also see the need for a mechanism to deal with being the arbiter of state to state water conflict. Access to water is about power and if countries do not have a means to deal with this power relationship, then we risk greater instability. The precise mechanism of this campaign are being worked upon but there are good models for resolution of water conflict, such as the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 signed between Canada and the USA with oversight by the International Joint Commission (IJC), as well as effective efforts at enshrining co-operative mechanisms around freshwater in the E.U. and many other jurisdictions. However, such positive examples must be tempered with attention to ongoing political dynamics. Unfortunately, in the case of the IJC for example, the treaty and other similar mechanisms of mediation are in jeopardy as raw power politics supersedes diplomacy or multilateral negotiation in an increasingly polarized and unstable global order.

Conclusions

In terms of the outcome of the current struggle for hegemony in the definition of water, the stakes are high as we move further into the 21st century. We believe water conflict, within and between states, will rapidly grow in the coming years unless efforts are successful to ensure the right to water rather than allowing scarce water resources to be distributed via primarily economic considerations. Indeed, in this context the struggle for hegemony (as we have outlined it in this article) is itself a major conflict, rooted in the attempt of citizen movements and civil society to come to terms with the impact of failed experiments with privatization as well as overall stagnancy in progress toward expanding service to the poor and marginalized. Market-based allocation of scarce water resources leaves the poor without access and will inevitably lead to social strife and upheaval. Resulting conflict around water can take many different forms,
ranging from disputes within communities and between neighbours regarding allocation of water, to inter-state regional power politics where stronger countries attempt to wrest more and more water from weaker states. While overt conflicts of this kind may well be few in the new century, water will inevitably be an intricate part of conflicts within states, and without resolution of the politics of water in such contexts, lasting solutions will remain elusive. In the meantime, corporate protagonists continue to benefit from permissive water regimes, contributing to pressure on vulnerable people and ecosystems. The struggle for hegemony over the definition of water will continue to figure prominently in these trends.

We must vigorously resist the trend whereby powerful countries (and corporations) are able to operate outside international law. Ratification of international treaties and proper implementation must become the norm rather than the exception. The binding water treaty being promoted by groups working within the international water justice movement explicitly holds non-state actors, including transnational corporations and international financial institutions, accountable for violations of the right to water. If successful, promotion of this treaty will change the way we think about our water and the number of positive solutions will grow vigorously. If we are not successful, the market will run rampant and water rights will mean only individual and property rights, not collective rights. This would signal that everything is ultimately for sale and conflict would increase dramatically as dwindling water progressively comes under the control of those who seek economic profit. The existing evidence and potential future consequences of the impact of neoliberal hegemony over the definition of water points to the fact that this hegemony is inimical to the pursuit of any meaningful conception of water as a human right.70

Solutions for the global water crisis must uphold the fundamental right to water and water as part of the commons. Articulating a commons-based water management approach goes to the heart of democracy and democratic control. This is a key companion to the human right to water and a rights-based approach. Ultimately, the best way to ensure equitable distribution of water, to expand delivery in a manner that does not favour the wealthier at the expense of the poorer, and to reduce conflict is through participatory processes that respect the needs of the community. In

many places there will not be enough water to meet all the competing needs, including those of
agriculture and industry as well as those of individuals, families and communities. If, however,
the overarching principles of the right to water are respected, the potential for long-term
solutions increases dramatically.

With the openness of democratic participation there is the potential for reduced conflict through
doing as much as possible to meet the needs of the overall community rather than first meeting
the needs of those who have power within the community.71 To see the way forward, we can
divine a lot from exploring examples such as the building of SEMAPA, the public water provider
in Cochabamba, which was left to completely rebuild the system when Bechtel abruptly left.
Through this example we can see one powerful way forward to a world with less conflict and
where the hope of ‘water for all’ can be realized. In addition, and on another hopeful note,
Uruguay has shown critical leadership in Latin America and worldwide by recently amending its
constitution to reflect the conception of water as a fundamental human right. There is hope that
this victory can be used as a model in other countries. It was achieved by the CNDAV, a
grassroots coalition on water in Uruguay, organizing to secure and verify the signatures of 10%
of voters, a truly enormous task. These types of tactics on the part of social and citizen
movements can be seen as representative of a ‘waging of peace by manoeuvre’, in both the case
of public ‘reclamation’ of the water utility in Cochabamba, to enshrining of water as a
fundamental human right in Uruguay’s constitution. ‘Waging of peace by position’ can be seen
in the broader struggle for hegemony for the definition of water as a human right and part of the
global commons, on the part of internationally-networked activists, such as those involved in the
Blue Planet Project and related movements.

On this note, at the 7th World Water Forum in Nairobi, water activists from across Africa co-
ordinated with northern supporters to contribute to form the African Water Network, a counter-

http://www.blueplanetproject.net/cms_publications/VictoryinUruguay.pdf. Also see Belén Balanyá et al,
‘Reclaiming public water’, op cit. In some ways it is more profound to look at what has happened to Cochabamba,
for instance, after control was turned over to the community from the transnational corporation, than to explain the
immediate conflict.
hegemonic coalition dedicated to interrogating and resisting neoliberal solutions for water and their social and ecological impact. The network’s founding principles powerfully sum up its orientation of a ‘waging of peace by position’, as we have termed it:

1. To fight against water privatization in all its forms
2. To ensure participatory public control and management of water resources
3. To oppose all forms of prepaid water meters
4. To ensure that water is enshrined in African countries’ national constitutions as a human right
5. To ensure that the provision of water is a national project solely in the public domain

The creation of the network was a significant event for the water justice movement in Africa and globally. Reflecting characteristics of the shifts in Bolivia and elsewhere, this movement embodies a further shift toward ways of searching out local, participatory and democratic structures for water management and access that honour both the needs of the marginalized and excluded as well as the demands of ecological balance. This dimension of the geopolitics of water in the context of hegemonic struggle deserves further research.

Just as each situation is unique, so the solutions devised by communities in response to local water problems and politics must be particular. The neo-liberal model for the world ignores this fact, promoting privatization of public services and seeking to impose one vision on all the diverse communities of the globe, thus benefiting the few at the expense of the majority. From Cochabamba to Ghana and Uruguay to South Africa, people are fighting against the commodifying, corporatising and privatising of the world’s water. Water conflict and continued lack of access to safe and affordable water will increase unless we can take back control of water as a public good. This is undoubtedly one of the great challenges of our time. To be successful, the world must act together, acknowledging the right to vital, life-giving fresh water as a collective right and accepting the responsibility for ensuring this right as a collective responsibility.