‘Too Little, Too Late’?
A Strategy for the Prevention of War Crimes, Genocide, and Crimes against Humanity in Darfur [Sudan]

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Abstract

The conflict in Darfur has recently become a focus of the international community. After the failure of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, the international community has refused to stand by while another episode of genocide occurs. Though these sentiments are noble, the execution of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has been wrought with problems, specifically a lack of military hardware. This failure has resulted in increased pressure on the United States (U.S.) to act to prevent on-going genocide in the west of Sudan. Yet, the American administration1 under George W. Bush, and under Barack Obama, is faced with a conundrum: whether to satisfy the needs of the international and domestic community while neglecting its current overseas military obligations, or to maintain its current military commitments and ignore the crisis in Darfur. In this article, the authors argue that neither option is acceptable to the American public, nor the international community, but a third option is available. American pressure and financial support of key international allies, outside of the NATO sphere specifically, could provide a viable solution to the need of UNAMID.

Keywords: African Union, Darfur, genocide, international system, NATO, peacekeeping, policy, solution, UNAMID, United Nations, United States

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1 It is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the conflict in Darfur has taken place during the previous U.S. administration under former President George W. Bush (2001-2009), as well as the current U.S. President Barack Obama (2009-). As such the timeline for this article may be considered from 2003 to the present day. Many of the policies that are currently implemented were done so during the Bush years, and were inherited when power shifted from the Republicans to the Democrats in Washington, D.C., and therefore the term ‘administration’ refers to both terms of Bush and Obama. However, for the purpose of clarity, this article will indicate whenever necessary, which administration is being referred to.
Introduction

Since 2003, the on-going conflict and open violence—often deliberately targeting civilians—in the Darfur region of west Sudan has left an estimated 300,000 Sudanese refugees dead and over 2.5 million displaced. The official position of the United States is that genocide has, and continues, to take place in Darfur, and that all parties to the conflict must end the violence immediately. On 31 July 2007, the U.S. government supported United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1769 authorizing a hybrid United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force to replace the less robust African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which has patrolled Darfur since a ceasefire was temporarily reached in 2004. However, since its deployment on 31 December 2007, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), much like its predecessor, has not received the critical resources promised in order to “fulfil its mandate” and protect Sudan’s civilian population. The present lack of resources, including critical transportation assets, constitutes a significant challenge for UNAMID given Darfur’s limited infrastructure, inhospitable environment, and sheer size.

United Nations officials have faulted the international community for not providing necessary equipment and funds to put an end to the atrocities taking place. A critical examination of whether the U.S. government is able to provide further assistance to UNAMID is warranted due to its stated policy to ensure “rapid deployment of the robust UN-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur, resulting in protection of civilians.” Given the past and present

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2 These numbers are estimates and the subject of dispute. Estimates set the number of people killed at approximately 300,000 Sudanese refugees killed and 2.5 million displaced. The government of Sudan claims that only 10,000 have died as a result of the conflict. Louis Charbnonneu, “Ukraine May Offer Helicopters for Darfur – UN’s Ban,” Reuters UK, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUKN07453134.CH2420> (accessed 8 July 2008).


7 Ibid.


American support for the success of UNAMID, the peacekeeping force’s lack of essential resources presents an obstacle to successful achievement of current U.S. policy. This problem is especially acute given expressed concerns by the current UNAMID commander that the peacekeeping force may need to remain on the ground for up to ten years, and thus, deserves consideration by the Department of State (DoS) and the Obama administration. While neither option is seen as acceptable to the American public, or the international community, a third option exists to bring about a favourable outcome to the humanitarian crisis. American pressure and financial support of key international allies, beyond the sphere of NATO specifically, may provide a viable solution to the need of UNAMID. Unfortunately, the articulation of the viable third option cannot be heard by policy-makers so long as it remains enveloped by traditionally narrow approaches to conflict management and resolution.

In examining the constellation of public policy, scholars have sought to explain how certain issues find a place on the government’s agenda. One of the leading experts on agenda-setting and the policy process, John Kingdon, offers what he has termed the “multiple streams model”, positing that when three separate “streams” intersect, a “policy window” opens which policy entrepreneurs can act on to ensure an issue is placed higher on the decision agenda. Kingdon identifies these three streams as the ‘problem stream’, ‘policy stream’ and the ‘politics stream’. This model helps explain the case study concerning U.S. policy with respect to the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur.

Problems come to the attention of policymakers through what Kingdon terms indicators, which focus specifically on events and feedback. In this case study, the initial focusing event was the rebel attacks in 2003 on the Government of Sudan. It was the rebel attacks that led to an all-out conflict, and what the United States would later declare to be acts of genocide. These actions placed Darfur on the U.S. agenda as a problem deserving attention, leading to subsequent support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and its replacement, UNAMID. Indicators began to surface by way of UN officials that UNAMID lacked critical resources necessary to be successful in the long-run. The U.S. administration under former-President George W. Bush subsequently began receiving feedback from a variety of domestic actors including interest groups such as Save Darfur, and the House of Representatives itself, that U.S. policy with respect to Darfur and UNAMID was not sufficiently addressing the resource problem indicated by the UN.

13 Ibid., 90.
Binding the hands that protect: restrictions on American policy

Since 11 September 2001, the United States has been fighting two major wars, one in Afghanistan and the other in Iraq. In both cases, the degree to which U.S. political objectives were served by military strategy has fluctuated over time. Arguably one of the greatest restrictions on the United States' ability to intervene in the atrocities being committed in Darfur is America's current involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, consequences of political-military disintegration in several phases of both wars are likely to comprise the main constraints on the United States' capability for major ground campaigns in any other theatre in the next several years, particularly in Darfur. The American public's disposition for military intervention, including in Afghanistan and Iraq beyond 2010, may take longer to recover than the ground forces' readiness. The case may also be said of Darfur; however, in this case the political objectives would be served by military strategy in different ways. Leading experts on the sources of international militarized conflict and strategies for conflict resolution have concluded that support for continuing a military operation, or beginning military operation in the face of mounting combat casualties is a function of the interactive effort of two underlying attitudes, those of expectations about the probability that the military operation or campaign will be successful in achieving its objectives, and the belief in the initial rightness of the decision to launch a military operation.14

Some of the differences between the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq versus American involvement in Darfur can be measured in terms of U.S. spending. Assessing the amount of resources that have been invested by the U.S. in its "just wars" offers a clear picture of the resources available to the U.S. to bring about a solution to the Darfur crisis. In this case, resource availability is best measured in terms of money, men, and machines. With enactment of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Supplemental on 24 June 2009, Congress approved a total of approximately $944 billion for military operations, base security, re-construction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans' health care for the three operations that have been initiated since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001.15 These include: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter-terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Congress has also considered the FY2010 war request that was submitted along with the Department of Defence’s (DoD) baseline request earlier in 2009.

The House passed its bill on 30 July 2009 with the Senate having acted on its version in late September 2009. The $944 billion total covers all appropriations approved by Congress for FY2001 to meet the nation’s war needs through FY2009, the current fiscal year ending September 30, 2009. Of that total, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that Iraq will receive approximately $683 billion (72%), OEF about $227 billion (24%) and enhanced base security about $29 billion (3%), with about $5 billion that CRS is unable to allocate (1%).

The U.S. currently spends a monthly amount of $7.3 billion as of October 2009; although this is significantly less than the $12 billion spent monthly throughout 2008, it is likely that this number will begin to increase with additional deployments of troops scheduled to reach Afghanistan and Iraq in 2010. The U.S. currently operates 75 major military bases in Iraq with a total of 115,000 U.S. troops as of 30 November 2009, while all other nations have withdrawn their military forces and personnel. Additionally, the number of U.S. troops operating in Afghanistan is expected to surpass that 100,000 mark by mid-2010. By comparison, during the eight-year long Bush administration, not more than a single aircraft has been committed to support a resolution to the Darfur crisis.

As of July 2009, DoD’s average monthly obligations for contracts and pay were about $10.9 billion, including $7.3 billion for Iraq, and $3.6 billion for Afghanistan. Compared to 2008 when the surge ended but troop levels remained high, average obligations have fallen by about 12%. Decreases in costs as troops are withdrawn from Iraq have been largely offset by increases in costs for additional troops for Afghanistan. In a January 2009 update, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that additional war costs for FY2010-FY2019 could range from $388 billion, if troop levels fell to 30,000 by 2011, to $867 billion, if troop levels fell to

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Under these CBO projections, funding for Iraq, Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) could total about $1.3 trillion to about $1.8 trillion for FY2001-FY2019.\(^{23}\)

Assessing the current and projected budgetary allowances for the GWOT as it pertains to the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq is necessary to illustrate the degree to which Darfur is being neglected. Since 2003, the Bush and Obama administrations have spent approximately $700 million in humanitarian assistance for Darfur, whereas the Iraq war and occupation operations have been allotted over $192 billion in spending.\(^{24}\) On the one-year anniversary of the Bush Administration’s declaration of genocide in Darfur, a coalition of these groups and their supporters gathered outside the White House to condemn the failure of political leadership on the part of the President in ensuring protection for the people of Darfur, and to urge immediate action to stop the genocide in Darfur.

Any solution to the problem under review must satisfy a series of three conditions, each of equal importance. First, the solution must be deemed acceptable by a majority of the American public. Any possible provisioning of resources by the United States entails the risk of placing American military personnel in harm’s way, especially as certain resources may need to be operated exclusively by the United States military in a conflict zone.\(^{25}\) Loss of American personnel will cause a substantial decline in public support for the Obama administration.\(^{26}\) Given general public wariness of current foreign policy and their feelings in terms of the Iraq war of 2003, any further involvement in another conflict zone must receive almost unwavering public support.\(^{27}\)

Second, any alteration of current policy not only needs to be feasible in the short-term but must also be able to be maintained years down the road. This is especially pertinent given current commitments overseas in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Department of Defence must be able to provide the resources without affecting current long-term commitments or the national security interests of the United States at home or abroad. Additionally, it must be feasible for the State Department to ensure its success in working with relevant international actors.

\(^{22}\) CBO, A Preliminary Analysis of the President’s Budget and an Update of CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook, p.21-p.24, Table 7; <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10014/03-20-PresidentBudget.pdf>. (accessed 31 December 2009).

\(^{23}\) Ibid.


\(^{26}\) Ibid.

Lastly, the solution needs to be acceptable to particular segments of the international community; specifically it must be acceptable to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that has overseen the implementation of UNAMID to date. Furthermore, it is equally important that any potential solution should be acceptable to Sudan or at least, that Sudan should not vehemently disapprove. Resolution 1769 notes that UNAMID “should have a predominantly African character” and Sudan has expressed objections to personnel and other resource offers of different countries in the past on this basis. Any solution cannot be forced on the sovereign government of Sudan, and care needs to be taken not to further destabilize an already brittle country.

Too many voices: balancing international and domestic interests

Various policy communities, international and domestic, are engaged in the discourse concerning the challenges faced by UNAMID with few having posed a series of solutions. At the international level, UN officials have issued repeated pleas for a variety of resources, especially helicopters, from any member states that have them. UN documents note UNAMID “[faces] shortfalls in troops and critical transport and aviation assets.” This includes a lack of “[m]edium and heavy transport trucks to move personnel and matériel throughout the rugged terrain.” These appeals have been made at the highest levels of the UN. While the Ukrainian government has indicated it may provide helicopters to UNAMID, discussions are still on-going and do not account for other resource needs.

30 Andrew S. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur: Sudan’s Slide Toward Civil War,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008): 77-93.
Domestically, policy communities are more engaged with the international issue at large as opposed to the specific problem at hand. There is general public concern that the United States should “do something” about Darfur.\(^{36}\) Once learning about the situation, a majority polled believe that the U.S. government should make Darfur “a high but not top priority.”\(^{37}\) However, the majority of Americans are not in favour of sending large numbers of American peacekeepers to address the issue directly, and even suggestions of sending small numbers of American military personnel elicits support from only a very marginal majority.\(^{38}\) Particularly vocal in the discourse have been a number of interest groups that have often mobilized the public to pressurize the U.S. government to increase its commitments in Darfur.\(^{39}\) These include *inter alia,* Save Darfur, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW). These as well as other interest groups have made calls for the provision of additional resources by UN member-states to resolve the issue.\(^{40}\) Save Darfur has called on interested parties to pressurize the U.S. government to “use all diplomatic resources” to also secure resources from other countries and in concert with other developed nations, to set aside funds for countries who are able to provide resources but “are incapable of supplying them without financial support.”\(^{41}\)

In addition to the public and social organizations, Congress has also been actively engaged. The House of Representatives recently passed House Resolution 1351, a non-binding bi-partisan bill that expressed support for UNAMID while simultaneously calling on “the United States to contribute the resources needed to ensure the mission’s success.”\(^{42}\) Influential members of the Senate have expressed concern with the issue of resources for UNAMID positing that the


\(^{38}\) Ibid., 4-5.

\(^{39}\) The President’s former Special Envoy to Sudan, Andrew S. Natsios, has noted that interest groups have “organized a national campaign to ensure that policymakers in Washington do not overlook the crisis.” Andrew S. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur: Sudan’s Slide Toward Civil War,” *Foreign Affairs 87,* no. 3 (May/June 2008): 77.


responsibility rests with the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to provide them.  

The White House has long been supportive of UNAMID, as has the State Department first in supporting the resolution establishing the force and secondly, in funding “approximately 25% of UNAMID’s budget.” While not addressing the specific requests for transportation assets, former President George W. Bush indicated additional funding of $100 million would be made available “to train and equip African battalions headed for Darfur.” DoD also played an active role in supporting the peacekeeping missions in Darfur by providing the military training as well as air shuttle to African countries sending peacekeepers to Darfur. However, DoD has resisted alternatives to the status quo, with senior officials at the department arguing that the United States does not have any spare helicopters for Darfur and NATO countries, which may have these resources available should be providing them for the mission in Afghanistan where they argue these are desperately needed.

No good choices: assessing America’s options

Given the input of the various policy communities, it is argued here that three options necessitate consideration. First, the United States can elect to maintain its current course. The government currently remains the largest financial backer of UNAMID and had already spent over $450 million constructing 34 bases for the AMIS peacekeeping forces. Alternatively, the U.S. can reinforce the current policy through the provision of the requisite helicopters and transport trucks. Lastly, the U.S. can elect to provide neither trucks nor helicopters but to use its financial and diplomatic resources to provide both incentives for and pressure on other states to


45 Ibid.


provide the missing resources. The State Department would work diligently to ensure Sudan approves of these contributions.

While feasible, maintaining the status quo will continue to draw the ire of interest groups and members of Congress. The U.S. will also face continual international criticism that it is not, “doing enough.” A strong majority of the public believes “that the United States should take action to bring about peace in Darfur” and it is argued here, if the public learns that more can be done and the United States has failed to act, this fact could be detrimental politically. Therefore, the status quo solution will be unacceptable to both the international community and the American public. It is advantageous only in that it incurs no extra risk to American personnel or valuable matériel. While presumably unhappy if more is not done, the public would be equally unhappy if American casualties were incurred in Darfur.

The second option, based on an analysis of various documents, is not feasible as the Department of Defence will be unable to marshal the resources. While a recent defence analyst’s report found 30 suitable American helicopters available for the mission, more than the 18 medium-lift tactical helicopters requested by the UN, it also concluded that the United States is not the best country situated in the international community to provide them. As previously noted, the Department of Defence has consistently reiterated, the U.S. Army needs these helicopters for other missions and even then, they are in short supply and also have to press other countries involved in those missions to commit their aviation assets. Emphasizing DoD’s position, former-NATO Secretary-General Jaap Hoop de Scheffer “asked alliance members to increase the number of helicopters based in Afghanistan.” While not confirmed with colleagues at DoD, it is assumed here that the provision of medium and heavy transport trucks is just as unlikely given the heavy, on-going commitments of the U.S. military overseas. Removing any resources from either Afghanistan or Iraq would present significant risks to American personnel in those areas. This would be seen as unacceptable to the American public and would be resisted vehemently by the Department of Defence. Finally, the use of American helicopters would involve American


personnel operating in Darfur which, as previously noted, only a slim majority of the public supports.\textsuperscript{55} If casualties are incurred, public approval would rapidly decline.\textsuperscript{56}

While the option to provide helicopters enjoys immense support from other policy communities, including Congress, the United Nations and various interest groups, it would be unacceptable to Sudan which has already rejected Norwegian engineering units as part of UNAMID on the basis that the mission is designed to be “sourced from African countries.”\textsuperscript{57} While non-African units have sometimes been approved by Sudan as part of AMIS and UNAMID, it is unlikely that Sudan would accept well-equipped, well-trained American personnel and matériel in Sudan.\textsuperscript{58} However, transport trucks would not only be acceptable to Sudan as American personnel can train UNAMID peacekeepers approved by the Sudanese government to operate them but would also be appreciated by the UN and supported by the other aforementioned policy communities. Nonetheless, neither transport trucks nor helicopters are currently available.

The preferred solution, being the most advantageous to the American government while simultaneously meeting all necessary objectives for the U.S. is to use high-level diplomatic and substantial financial resources to encourage other states with available matériel to support UNAMID. A recent report indicates that countries such as India and Ukraine have the requisite helicopters which satisfy the needs of the UN.\textsuperscript{59} By creating a fund to defray the costs incurred by countries, which may offer the resources, and using the weighty diplomatic resources of the Department of State and President Obama to pressure these countries to commit, the United States could resolve this problem indirectly. Given current negotiations between Ukraine and the UN, the likelihood of American financial support and diplomatic pressure helping bring about a successful conclusion to these talks is high.

This option is both feasible and meets all the aforementioned objectives. The previous administration under Bush committed itself to providing more resources, and the State Department became engaged in the process of working with the international community on this problem. At an estimated cost of $50 million for the fund, it is assured that the government has the necessary financial resources to absorb the cost of the provision and operation of the

\textsuperscript{55} Thomas Withington, “Grounded: The International Community’s Betrayal of UNAMID,” \texttt{<http://darfur.3cdn.net/b5b2056f1398299ffe_x9m6b17cu.pdf>}. (accessed 8 July 2008), 16.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
helicopters and trucks by another state. Additionally, such a solution would meet little resistance from other departments including the Department of Defence as it does not require any additional commitment of resources.

This option would likely be approved by UN officials who would see the funds and diplomatic support as helping to facilitate the acquisition of resources from hesitant states and others currently considering providing them. Furthermore, it would not meet strong opposition from the Government of Sudan. However, the Sudanese may object to some of the countries that take advantage of the newly provided fund as some may be non-African, such as Ukraine or India. In this instance, the State Department and the Secretary of State herself will need to apply pressure directly on Sudan and indirectly by securing the support of its allies and other members of the UNSC. Even with these efforts, one of the possible disadvantages to this option is that the Government of Sudan may prove to be the ultimate roadblock to a successful outcome. It is also true that the resource problem is not directly solved. However, the advantages provided by this solution outweigh these two potential disadvantages. Sudan may very well accept non-African personnel as it has done in the past and as previously mentioned, but American financial support may be the ingredient necessary to secure Ukrainian provisioning of the requisite helicopters. Beyond enhancing the United States’ reputation abroad for taking further action, it will also satisfy a majority of the public as it entails further action by the United States in an issue they feel of high importance while simultaneously avoiding the involvement of American personnel in potentially fatal situations. Moreover, it will be acceptable, though not preferred, by a broad spectrum of interest groups and of Congress. Whereas maintaining the status quo leaves large swaths of the American public, interest groups, governmental representatives and members of the international community unsatisfied and given the unfeasibility of actual provisioning of the resources directly, the third option is the best approach for the American government in seeking to address the resource problem of UNAMID.

Getting it done: how America could implement its policy option

To successfully implement the preferred option, the government will need to undertake a series of strategic actions to ensure that the revised, supplemented policy will be met with approval. The Secretary of State should encourage the Office of the White House to issue an announcement detailing the new, more robust approach taken by the United States Government. The State Department should also issue a press release. It is necessary for the State Department to engage in a public information campaign to increase general awareness as to what it and the United States Government has previously done and is currently doing with

respect to not only UNAMID, but Darfur overall. This campaign, via its website, creation and dissemination of pertinent literature, targeted advertising can help secure public approval. Lastly, the new approach necessitates justification by DoD. They should convene a press conference and explicitly detail why the other alternatives are not in themselves feasible. While direct statements have already been made by Secretary of Defence Robert Gates and Admiral Michael Mullen, a further reiteration of the inability of the Department of Defence to marshal the necessary resources will mitigate direct criticism from interest groups and members of Congress who may not be wholly satisfied with a policy that they may feel is incremental.

These actions will help garner the support necessary to facilitate implementation of the new initiative. With the aid of supportive members of Congress, presumably from the ranks of those who voted in favour of House Resolution 1351, an amendment can be added to already pending legislation, namely the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriation Act 2009. This piece of legislation already contains monies for training African peacekeeping troops for UNAMID and authorizes additional funds to support humanitarian relief in Darfur so an addition of the $50 million fund to the Act should be met with little opposition.

While securing implementation of the financial component of the more robust policy, other minor alterations institutionally are required to help effectively concentrate diplomatic resources on the problem. The Secretary of State should establish a working-group within the Department of State charged with creating a plan for effectively pressuring the relevant actors such as Ukraine, India and Sudan to secure the provisioning of the needed matériel and ensuring it arrives in Darfur without facing significant hurdles. This group would include personnel from the Bureau of African Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs, and International Organization Affairs, and could be chaired by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. With the plan provided by this group, the State Department could most effectively ensure implementation of the diplomatic component of the new policy.

The United States has been supportive of peacekeeping operations in Darfur since the arrival of AMIS in 2004 and worked diligently to ensure the passage of Resolution 1769, authorizing UNAMID. Recognizing, through various inputs from international and domestic actors that UNAMID continues to lack resources needed to effectively carry out its mission and cognizant that this fact impedes achievement of present United States policy with respect to Sudan, the briefing presented here outlines an achievable recommendation to ameliorate current policy and help resolve UNAMID’s resource problem.

62 Ibid.
Summary and Concluding Remarks

This study has suggested that the application of John Kingdon’s multiple streams model, whereby the problem stream, policy stream, and politics streams are identified, may serve as a method by which the case study concerning U.S. policy with respect to the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) can be adequately explained. While Kingdon’s method meets the characteristics for three critical areas, this article has also addressed four areas significant in dealing with the ongoing crisis in Sudan: those of restrictions on American policy with some of the greatest measurable differences between Darfur and America’s “just wars” presented as money, men, and machines; balancing international and domestic interests; assessing America’s options; and how the United States could implement its policy option. It is argued that three options necessitate consideration. First, the U.S. can maintain its current course; second, the United States can reinforce the current policy through the provision of the requisite helicopters and transport trucks; third, the United States can elect to provide neither trucks nor helicopters but to use its financial and diplomatic resources to provide both incentives for and pressure on other states to provide the missing resources.

During the course of the heinous acts that have and continue to take place in Sudan, a range of interest groups such as Save Darfur, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are not only providing feedback to the American government on how to address the problems; they are simultaneously developing policy solutions in the policy stream. From suggesting that the U.S. provide the equipment requested by the UN directly to calls for “the Administration to ... [u]se all diplomatic resources, including the President himself, to press other nations to provide ... helicopters”, interest groups generated a myriad of policy solutions, which could be used by the United States government. Politically, groups such as Save Darfur were also involved in pressure campaigns on various elected officials. Armed with a policy solution to a pressing problem, they have found that “the political climate [has made] the time right for change.” A generally partisan House of Representatives passed a bi-partisan bill reflecting a consensus that there is an issue at hand that needs greater examination and the national mood is generally receptive to making the issue of Darfur generally, a high governmental priority. Thus, the intersection of the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream has generated a policy window which the interest groups (or “policy entrepreneurs”) have attempted to take advantage of in their effort to place the issue even higher on the government’s decision agenda. Kingdon’s model may therefore be neatly applied to the case study presented herein.

Despite the policy recommendations made by the various actors, the solution must take into consideration practical limitations of the presently overstretched American military. Commitment of American soldiers would only put further strain on American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, even if the United States could provide helicopters for UNAMID, Sudanese objections would prevent the deployment of these aircraft. It is because of these limitations that America should play on its current rise in goodwill and utilize its financial resources to urge other nations to make the necessary commitments for USAMID. Though this solution may be decried by some as being “too little, too late” it is currently the only viable and acceptable solution to this complex international issue.

References


