Confronting Ethnic Chauvinism in a Post-War Environment: NGOs and Peace Education in Bosnia

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I Introduction

In the months and years that follow an ethnic civil war, there is calm but there is not yet peace. After the fighting has been stopped, after the peace accord has been signed and imposed, choices must be made and processes begun, at individual, community and leadership level, that will shape the future of a traumatized nation.

In Bosnia, as in many other post-ethnic-war situations, the period immediately after the ceasefire is critical, the beginning of a time of mourning, recovering, rebuilding and building anew. Peace, at this point, is tenuous. The wounds, fear and hatred are fresh; the ethnicization of the population is almost complete. These add considerable weight to whatever tensions existed that led to the war in the first place. In this unstable time, to avoid renewed violence, programmes and policies must be in place that reduce the tensions, help people mourn and rebuild their lives, and which address the structures feeding the ethnic hatred and fear that are named as both a part and a product of the war.

Since the war ended, non-governmental organizations in Bosnia, both local and international, have attempted to build material, social and political structures that will sustain peace in the country. Many of these efforts include educational programmes directed at civil society building, human rights, professional instruction, conflict resolution, trauma healing and promoting tolerance.

Given the ethnic nature of the war, it seems logical that addressing interethnic relations, fighting ethnic chauvinism and prejudice, and promoting a view of Bosnian nationhood and citizenship which can encompass citizens of many ethnic backgrounds, are central to post-war educational efforts. In North America and Western Europe, interethnic hostility, stereotyping and prejudice of the sort that is commonplace in Bosnia is often understood as racism. Yet most people in Eastern Europe do not use or identify with the language of, and theory on, racism and multiculturalism. Programmes directly targeting ethnic chauvinism and building an understanding of multi-ethnic citizenship are hard to find. Those that do exist use mild words such as bias and stereotyping in their educational material, words that barely begin to describe war-related violence.

This paper examines how NGO educational programmes in Bosnia and Croatia, challenge ethnic chauvinism. The research found that a spectrum of programmes sought, in some way, to challenge ethnic chauvinism and/or work towards the reunification of citizens. For some, these were primary goals; for others they were secondary to other educational or therapeutic goals. Understanding how these programmes relate to one another, what needs they meet and processes they assist, reveals much about the appropriate timing and sequence of peace education and anti-chauvinism efforts.
Concepts of ethnic chauvinistic behaviour and attitudes and ethnic nationalist ideologies are central to this work. These are easily confused with the attitudes, behaviour and ideology of racism. The first section of this paper, therefore, reviews parallels and differences between racism and ethnic chauvinism/ethnic nationalism. This is important for three reasons. First, like the author, many international NGO educators come from countries strongly affected by racism. Racism, therefore, is the chauvinistic framework they are familiar with. This section explains where such concepts translate easily to the chauvinisms related to ethnic nationalism and where they diverge. Second, some material used by NGOs in Bosnia and Croatia was originally developed in other countries to deal with racism, and needs to be adapted accordingly. Finally, it is important to distinguish between hegemonic and institutionalised ideologies that provide the foundation for war thinking, and the attitudes and actions that support them. In the former Yugoslavia, that ideology was ethnic nationalism. This research found that some programming challenged chauvinistic attitudes and actions (stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination) but no programme challenged the underlying ideology of chauvinistic ethnic nationalism which is embedded in institutional and social structures, and was central to the recent wars in the region.

The second section of this paper explores why NGO-sponsored educational programmes in Bosnia which challenge ethnic chauvinism and reunite Bosnians take the form that they do. In particular, it discusses how effective timing of these programmes may relate to two processes: the process of individuals’ or communities’ recovery from the trauma of war; and the conflict transformation process (the process of improving people’s ability to deal constructively with intergroup conflict). Close examination of NGO educational programme outlines and manuals, backed up by interviews with NGO staff, and informed by theory on trauma healing, conflict transformation, multicultural and anti-racism education, and psychoanalytical literature on enemy thinking, suggests that education which challenges deeply-ingrained chauvinisms cannot be morally prescriptive or static: a fixed programme that is suitable for all people at all times. Rather, such education needs to be psychologically astute. It needs to be sensitive to the individual and community situations of people in a conflict environment.

While this research focuses on Bosnia, for the sake of comparison post-war programmes in Croatia are also examined. Croatia and Bosnia experienced similar wars, but the Croatian nationalist government’s one-sided victory, resulting in the expulsion or flight of most Serb citizens from the country, left the dominant Croat population in Croatia feeling more secure than Bosnians of all ethnicities. This sense of security has implications for post-war education. Observing similarities and differences between the two contexts should tell us something about the timing of peace education programmes and their relationship with both community and individual feelings of security.
II  Racism and Ethnic Chauvinism: Finding Common Ground

When television and newspapers first reported ethnic genocide in Bosnia, many people from countries with histories of European colonialism or slavery would have understood what was happening in terms of the construction of ethnic hatred that they know: racism. Indeed parallels exist between the actions of ethnic nationalists who conducted ethnic cleansing in the region and the violence of racist regimes: a dehumanising of the ‘other’; an attitude of superiority by those doing the killing or discriminating; violence towards an individual based solely on ethnicity or race; enforced division of ethnic groups on the same basis.

But ethnic nationalist conflicts are different from colonial racist conflicts and the difference is not simply one of degree of categorization. While attitudes and acts that result from the ideologies of racism and ethnic nationalist chauvinism are very similar and can be discussed using the same terms for both contexts, the ideologies themselves and the psychological processes that relate to them are distinct. This section suggests a framework for understanding those similarities and differences.

The Ideologies of Racism and Ethnic Nationalist Chauvinism

The idea of race is a relatively recent social construction. As Allport (1958) points out, most prejudice and persecution throughout history have been based on ethnicity and religion. Unlike ethnicity, however, race has no positive meaning. In practice, racists use certain visible physical features, such as skin colour of an individual and attach to them essentialized notions of culture, character and ability (and corresponding views of worth and rights). Our understanding of racism has been shaped by three historical experiences and writing that emerged from them: the Holocaust; the enslavement and labour exploitation by Europeans of people visibly distinct from them; and the related project of colonialism, supported ideologically by racism and religious chauvinism, which was used to justify the seizure of foreign territory.

Ethnicity, in contrast to race, has a more concrete, identity-based meaning. Allport (1958: xi-xii) defines it well as “characteristics of groups that may be, in different proportions, physical, national, cultural, linguistic, religious or ideological in character. Unlike ‘race,’ the term does not imply biological unity.” While people’s racial labels are immutable, they can change their ethnic identities, over generations, by adopting the main identifying characteristics of another ethnic group. In multi-ethnic Bosnia, for example, where people of different ethnic backgrounds have long mixed and converted from one religion to another, ethnic labels tend to be more representative of religion than ancestry (Malcolm, 1996).
Yet although ethnicity is socially constructed and not biologically deterministic, perceived ancestral links are part of an individual’s construction of ethnic identity. While culture, language and religious beliefs may be some of the visible markers of ethnicity, not just any culture, language or religion with which an individual happens to identify is considered part of his or her ethnic background. Rather, one’s ethnic identity is related to the culture, language or religion of one’s parents, grandparents or ancestors.

Ethnic chauvinism is the belief that one’s own ethnicity is superior to others. Because its effects are similar to those of racism, it is tempting to equate the two. However, there are important distinctions between ethnic chauvinism and racism. While racism was constructed as a formal ideology, ethnic chauvinism is not. Xenophobia, the fear and dislike of strangers, especially those nearby and therefore in competition with the same resources, can be observed all over the world. This often manifests itself in stereotyping of, and prejudice and sometimes violence against, the ‘other.’ While it can be used by ideologies, like Nazi fascism, it does not, in itself, constitute an ideology.

Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is an ideology. And while it is not necessarily chauvinistic, it can – and in ethnic nationalist conflicts, it usually does – use chauvinism as a tool for dehumanising the ‘other’ and invalidating the latter’s citizenship, territorial, economic or political rights. Like racism then, ethnic nationalist chauvinism can be described as an ideology used to achieve power and resources at the expense of a specifically targeted ‘other.’

Wanting to be with people who share the same cultural or linguistic background, especially in the private realm, may be ethnocentric, but it is not necessarily racism or ethnic chauvinism. It is normal to want to socialize with people who share the same language, culture and values, whether they are defined ethnically, ideologically, religiously or in other ways. Members of a religious community, for example, may want their children to be taught in a separate school which supports their values and beliefs. However, when desiring to be with one’s ‘own kind’ becomes a feeling of being superior to other ethnicities; denying citizenship, membership or employment rights to others based solely on ethnicity; or preventing people from relating as they naturally would, according to what they feel they have in common, then the otherwise admirable qualities of community loyalty can rightly be seen as racism or chauvinism (Adam et al, 1997).

A second important distinction between racism and ethnic nationalist chauvinism lies in the nature of creating an ‘other’ in the minds of those discriminating. While racists use easy, visible physical variations in people to create clear markers of difference, ethnic nationalist chauvinists have to work harder at the task. As people involved in ethnic nationalist conflicts often share very similar cultures,
language, physical characteristics and values, ethnic nationalist chauvinists are usually obsessed with finding differences between groups.

It has become a cliché to point out how difficult it is, if not impossible, for a foreign visitor to distinguish a Serb from a Croat in Croatia; a Turk from a Greek in Cyprus, or a Canadian from an American, for that matter. Yet to a person from an ethnic or national group feeling the need to discriminate, the differences are obvious and extremely important. This is a normal way for an individual or group to define identity and does not have to include a feeling of superiority. However, ethnic nationalist chauvinists will artificially create and enforce these differences, dividing people who were not previously divided. Freud (1961: 61) called the obsessive need to create barriers of difference “the narcissism of minor differences.” One example is the division, by Croat, Serb and Muslim nationalists, of one language, Serbo-Croat, spoken by most Yugoslavs before the war with small regional differences, into three languages: Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian, each with new words or new letters added or ‘retrieved’ and others erased.

Ideologies in Action: Common Ground

Adam, Moodley and Van Zyl Slabbert (1997) distinguish between racism as an ideology and racialism as an act. A person can hold racist beliefs and not act on them, and they can carry out racist acts without holding racist beliefs. One more distinction needs to be made: that between ideology (regarding a system and how people relate together), and attitudes or beliefs about targeted groups of people.

The words ‘prejudice,’ ‘stereotype,’ ‘intolerance’ and ‘bias’ are commonly used to describe both racist and chauvinistic attitudes or beliefs about people, but they are devoid of recognition of any ideological background. Although stereotypes and prejudices are inherent in chauvinistic ideologies, they do not necessarily indicate that such an ideology exists. Many people hold stereotypes, biases and prejudices without subscribing to chauvinistic ideologies. These views are problematic and chauvinistic, but they are distinct from the ideology itself. Because of that, these words fail to describe ideological systems like racism or chauvinistic ethnic nationalism. For a just peace to be achieved, problematic and institutionalized ideologies which provide the foundation for war thinking must eventually be addressed.

The next section describes the research findings and posits a way of understanding how a broad range of programmes may interlink. Using this model, it is possible to understand why educational programmes may not challenge the hegemonic structures and ideology of ethnic nationalism early in the peacebuilding process. The model also points to the need to eventually address destabilizing ideologies and structures and suggests the appropriate timing of such educational efforts.
III NGO Education Programmes in Bosnia and Croatia

Although ethnic nationalism and ethnic chauvinism remain major destabilizing forces within the former Yugoslavia, I found few educational programmes in Bosnia that dealt directly with chauvinism. Moreover, I found no work in either Bosnia or Croatia that addressed citizenship or challenged an ethnic conception of nationhood which contributes to chauvinism. By broadening my view of anti-chauvinism education, however, I encountered a spectrum of educational programmes which tackle issues related to peacebuilding and post-war reconstruction. Taken together, they form a fairly comprehensive strategy for challenging ethnic nationalist chauvinism. The programme methods, largely as described by the NGO programmers themselves, include:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active learning training for teachers</th>
<th>Trauma healing workshops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-community cooperation</td>
<td>Conflict resolution training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights education</td>
<td>Peace education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political literacy</td>
<td>Media literacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity appreciation</td>
<td>Intergroup mixing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education on stereotyping &amp; prejudice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three other methods, which were conspicuous by their absence, were historical education, citizenship education which discusses ‘who belongs’ in the country; and anti-chauvinism education which challenges hegemonic ways of thinking.

During my fieldwork, carried out in early 1998, I collected information about 26 educational programmes, 19 in Bosnia and seven in Croatia. These programmes, listed in Appendix B, were run by 18 organizations, including 14 NGOs, two United Nations organizations, and two government-funded institutions whose programmes are run fairly independently of government, and which received considerable NGO assistance. Eight organizations were directed and run solely by Bosnians or Croatians; the rest are international. I analysed manuals or outlines for 14 of these programmes.

1 For a more detailed description, see Appendix A
and the findings were contextualized using background interviews with educators, programme managers and two participant-observer sessions. The next section briefly reviews three of the 12 educational methods that I encountered as examples of how these methods relate to the goal of challenging ethnic chauvinism.

2 The two government-tied organizations are the Pedagogical Institute at the University of Zagreb, and Medvescak Children’s Library. The Croatian government does not fund the extra programmes at the library so no government permission for, or input into, the programmes is required.
Active Learning

Active learning was the most popular method used for groups involving children and/or teachers. Six of nine programmes for this group incorporated active learning strategies, often in conjunction with other methods. These programmes, often carried out in ethnically ‘homogeneous’ groups, were considered to be politically ‘safe’ and were popular with teachers who were eager to learn new teaching methods, to make teaching more interesting both for them and their students.

CARE Canada sponsored a number of drama-in-education programmes in Bosnia, some for entire classes and some only for teachers. In the teacher training session I attended in Llubinje, participants, who pretended to be students, acted out Mornar, a poem about a journey that was part of the required language curriculum. In the process, the ‘students’ not only learned the poem, they also discussed themes relevant to their lives and the war. In discussing the journey by ship, they talked about who they left behind and what they would take on the journey; in discussing the wreck and the lone survivor they could talk about the disaster and what it felt like to survive. This had obvious relevance to the war and the refugee experience.

Active learning programmes were popular with NGOs for another reason. The Bosnian formal education system reinforces divisions between ethnic groups. Although, in October 1997, an attempt by the Bosnian Federation’s Croat and Muslim co-ruling governments to segregate Muslim and Croatian students was abandoned because of local and international protests, schools are still largely divided, if not in their attendance then in their curricula. Even in multi-ethnic Sarajevo, schools are controlled by separate Muslim, Croat and Serb educational systems, each with a corresponding curriculum. In the Federation, “Little-known Muslim and Croat authors and poets dominate curricula, displacing classic writers such as Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andriæ, for whom historical revisionism has been a disaster” (Walker, 1997). Children on the Republika Srpska side of Sarajevo are taught to think of the Federation territory as if it were “another foreign country” (Uzelac, 1997). Graphic, one-sided histories are taught to children as young as grade four, leaving no doubt who the ‘enemy’ is (Walker, 1997; Uzelac, 1997). As a result of skewed curricula, segregation of students occurs without official enforcement. As a British educator working in Bosnia said, “Education is the political

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3 An unpublished translation from a mandatory grade four “Nature and Society” school curriculum unit (n.d.) used in Mostar identifies the “enemy,” and then reads, “Criminals started accomplishing their plans in the most horrible way. Terror dashed against the villages and town. Robberies, rapes and slaughters developed vastly. Screams and cries of wrecked ones were echoing from one end to another end of Bosnia.” This reinforces children’s trauma and entrenches ethnic divisions. The translation continues: “But there were people who fled of fear and weren’t ready to involve in defence of their country. People as such are waiting carelessly somewhere abroad for another ones to free the country, for them to return when the conflict finishes. This deserves the sentence because the act of not helping the bleeding country is betrayal and the
“battlefield.” All sides are scrambling to implant their vision of Bosnia in the hearts and minds of children.

In this highly politicised environment, drama-in-education and other active learning methods allow teachers greater flexibility in adapting often-problematic curricula. These methods also challenge traditional authoritarian classroom relationships and a banking style of learning in which the teacher is expected to be the ‘expert’ and students ‘receive’ information from them.

The experience of UNICEF Bosnia indicates a third reason why active learning programmes may be popular with NGOs. The administrator I spoke with said that few of UNICEF’s ideas for creating inter-entity links between children through educational programming have materialized because UNICEF programmers were unable to gain the co-operation of education officials in the two Bosnian entities: the Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS). One project idea, called “Common Ground,” promoted access to common reading material for children in both entities by donating two sets of ten books to school libraries across Bosnia. The books would be selected and jointly approved by committees of educators from the Federation and the RS. This would ensure that Bosnian children at least had access to common reading material. However, the committees could not agree on common material from the region. Despite the wealth of material from within the former Yugoslavia, they only agreed on ‘neutral’ foreign classics.

Another idea was to provide computers and e-mail access to children in both entities so that they could communicate with one another. This too was rejected. In the end, UNICEF produced a magazine for children and teachers which contains common material, published in both Cyrillic and Roman scripts. The material is written by teachers in both entities and needs to be agreed on by all groups. The administrator says, however, that reaching agreement on content is very difficult. Besides general children’s stories and activities, the magazines also contain some short historical articles about Bosnia and poems and stories on peace themes.

As a result, UNICEF focused on developing active learning skills, which tend to be well received. Its staff developed a mine awareness kit with pamphlets and a manual using active learning techniques. It also sponsored active learning projects in the pedagogical institutes of Zenica and Sarajevo and planned another in Banja Luka. Active learning training is a politically safe area of work and fits in with the desire, expressed by the urban elite of all groups, to be seen as progressive.

“worst crime” (Refugees and displaced persons, trans., Grade four “Nature and Society” school curriculum unit, n.d.).
Mixing and Intercommunity Cooperation

Other common NGO strategies in peacebuilding programming were intercommunity cooperation and interethnic mixing. Programmes using intercommunity cooperation as a strategy required community leaders, educators or parents – people who would have otherwise been reluctant to engage in cross-community work – to participate in joint decision making in order to receive material assistance. As UNICEF Bosnia’s attempts to promote common reading material indicates, this approach is often fraught with difficulties. Such programmes are often deliberately located in communities where interethnic tensions are high, and intercommunity relations are highly politicised. As a result, programmers tread extremely carefully and goals often have to be scaled down.

In early 1999, I participated in a CARE Canada effort to encourage teachers in neighbouring, but ethnically separate, schools in a divided Bosnian town to jointly produce a common magazine based on students’ writing and artwork. The land was still highly contested and I was told that some of the men from one community had been interned in the camps of the other. The schools shared a courtyard, but students and teachers almost never communicated with one another. Although the magazine was eventually produced and more were planned, the atmosphere at joint meetings was extremely tense, talk was constrained, and explosions over seemingly small issues were frequent. However, the programme may have provided the teachers and students in these schools with an excuse to continue communicating and cooperating.

Other NGO programmes in Bosnia involved ethnic mixing: uniting ethnically mixed groups for common activities. Some worked with those already committed to a multi-ethnic Bosnia or with youth outside of schools. Others were the product of an NGO’s long-term involvement in a divided community. After many months or years of building trust, they could eventually convince people who would only previously meet in homogeneous groups to risk participating in an ethnically mixed session.

Multi-ethnic conferences of activists, women, academics, church leaders and youth⁴ provide those who are committed to a multi-ethnic Bosnia with an important opportunity to meet, share ideas, break their feelings of isolation and form alliances. Many participants of such conferences in 1997-98 were

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⁴ A similar approach, not discussed here, was the policy by some international NGOs to assist only those communities which allowed refugees of all ethnicities to return to their homes.

⁵ The term ‘youth’, when applied to these programmes generally meant young people from the age of thirteen to their mid twenties.
meeting for the first time since the war. The partnerships formed and information shared as a result of such conferences and meetings were invaluable to Bosnian and Croatian activists.

Youth groups also provided an opportunity for mixing across ethnic and entity boundaries. NGOs like the German youth organization Schüler Helfen Leben (SHL) and the Bosnian youth organization Danas za Bolje Sutra (DBS), both based in Sarajevo, regularly brought youth together from the two entities and from all major ethnic groups for common projects and activities. The youth they worked with were not always the converted. Some had limited positive experience with people from other ethnic groups. But these groups, run by energetic youth, were willing to take chances that more conservative organizations wouldn’t – such as driving the youth to each other’s villages at a time when such acts were considered to be dangerous. The youth also tended to have a strong sense of ownership over the programmes and were often involved in decision making. As a result of their work, strong friendships arose between the youth involved, and the organizations provided opportunities for the training of young activists.

**Educating About Bias, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination**

The programmes that I encountered in Bosnia and Croatia which dealt with the actions and attitudes of ethnic chauvinism directly were overwhelmingly aimed at children. As discussed above, these programmes tended to use mild words such as bias, stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination to describe the animosities between groups, words that seemed to trivialize the violence and animosities of the wars. Many of these programmes also dealt with ‘similarities and differences’ between children and the rights of children as declared in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Interestingly, every programme that I encountered which directly addressed ethnic chauvinism was located in Croatia, except two Bosnian UMCOR (United Methodist Committee on Relief) programmes for children and youth. The latter took place outside of schools. Also, people who supported tolerance training and human rights education in Croatia often worked for publicly funded institutions: schools, libraries and universities.

In contrast to the situation in Bosnia, the Croatian government has little reason to anticipate a renewal of fighting. This suggests that human rights and anti-chauvinism education for children in Croatia, while recognized as sensitive, is seen as relatively politically safe and important for children’s well-being. Moreover, primary-school-aged children are taught in a generalized way which does not necessarily challenge the structures around them. By using inoffensive language and addressing stereotyping and discrimination against girls, women and minority groups such as Jews and Roma,
such programmes rarely address issues of enemy thinking directly. Similar education aimed at youth or adults would be more inclined to challenge the political status quo.

In Bosnia, however, where many people, including the nationalist political leaders who dominate the government, do not recognize the war as settled, the education of children is seen as very political. It is not seen to be in the nationalist interest to educate for tolerance and against chauvinism; indeed those who develop school curricula go to great lengths to divide communities.
Summary

Although challenging ethnic chauvinism was not always the primary aim of the programmes I examined, it was one of the aims. The many ways in which educators challenged the artificial division of Bosnia along ethnic lines highlight some of the complex intermix of influences contributing to war-related chauvinism. The diverse methods used also reflect the innovative ways educators find to establish common ground, not only between conflicting groups, but also between the goals of educators and participants. And they represent the common ground between this study’s concern, ethnic nationalist chauvinism, and the diverse objectives of the educators themselves.

All programmes in this study were motivated by concerns about the quality of interethnic relations. This concern connects activities, such as active learning, which seem far removed from the goals of anti-chauvinism education, with education directly dealing with stereotyping and prejudice. This next section examines theory on conflict transformation and trauma healing and discusses whether these theories offer insights into the nature and timing of education challenging ethnic chauvinism and enemy thinking in post-war regions.

IV Loosening Enemy Bonds: Trauma, Identity and Reconciliation

Psychoanalysts Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994) argue that, in an ethnic war, a group’s sense of its own ethnic identity is intimately tied to the negative identity that the group has created for the ‘enemy.’ Children are often taught to think positively of their group in contrast with negative qualities projected onto a socially-shared ‘enemy’ or ‘other.’ Often, much has been invested in an enemy relationship, including much of the cultural content on which an identity group bases itself. Challenging that enemy image, then, may seem to be a betrayal of the sacrifices of one’s family, ancestors and community. Tremendous social pressure can be applied against such a challenge as it not only upsets the individuals involved, but also those they care about.

As education which challenges nationalist chauvinism may seem to threaten an individual’s very identity, such education needs to be psychologically astute. Simply presenting lists of rights and moralistic arguments against chauvinism is unlikely to change internalized beliefs. Education should help individuals recognize, understand and confront their own biases, and the biases of their communities. It should help them transform their identities into ones based on positive characteristics, not negative views of others.

Negative images of the ‘enemy’ are not entirely created by projection, however. Such views commonly interweave projected images with a certain element of historical fact. As Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994: 6) write:
Thus, we understand Stein’s remark that the enemies of an ethnic group ‘are neither “merely” projections, nor are they “merely” real.’ They are both. The enemy who kills us is real, but he is also a reservoir of our shared projections supported by the people in our own group.

In many cases, ‘knowledge’ of a generalized ‘other’ is passed on through generations, in the form of stories and myths, often highlighting humiliations and traumas imposed by a named ‘enemy.’ Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994) refer to these unresolved traumas as ‘chosen traumas.’ They define these as “an event that invokes in the members of one group intense feelings of having been humiliated and victimized by members of another group.” Although no group chooses to be victimized, groups do “‘choose’ to psychologize and mythologize – to dwell on the event.” The group incorporates the mental representation of the events into its identity and passes these on to future generations. “Mental representations of chosen traumas and defences against them become vital markers of ethnic identity. Once a trauma becomes a chosen trauma, the historical truth about it does not really matter” (Itzkowitz and Volkan, 1994: 7).

It was such a chosen trauma, dating back more than 600 years, and a sense of loyalty to the sacrifices of ancestors that Slobodan Milosevic appealed to in his famous speech in Kosovo Polje in April 1987. As the site of the legendary battle of the Serbian army against the Ottoman Turks in June 1389, the choice of Kosovo Polje as the starting point for the push for Serb control of the Yugoslav government was not coincidental. It was a place of special meaning to Serb nationalists despite the fact that Serbs comprised only an estimated 10% of the Kosovo population. Also unresolved for many Serbs were the memories of Ustaše ‘cleansing’ of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and the murder of Jews, Roma, Serbs and Croatian communists in work camps during World War II.

Montville (n.d.1: 113) writes that victimhood is typified by three main components: “a history of violent, traumatic aggression and loss; a conviction that the aggression was unjustified by any standard”; and “a deep rooted fear that without explicit acknowledgement that the acts were a crime by any standard, the aggressor is simply waiting for another opportunity to commit the crime” (Montville, n.d.2: 7).

Yugoslav political leaders made no formal apologies for the responsibility of their historical communities for wounds inflicted on other groups. Lacking this apology, Croatian Serbs had good reason to believe that such events could recur. In 1990, the Croatian government began dismissing Serb police and judiciary from their jobs and the Ustaše-linked, red-and-white chequered shield, the Sahovnica, was resurrected on the state flag (Ignatieff, 1994). These moves, combined with alarmist reports by Serb media and memories of the genocide, first hand or passed down through stories, caused panic among many Croatian Serbs (Little and Silber, 1996).
Time alone does not eliminate chosen traumas. Steps toward reconciliation need to take place, including public acknowledgement of what happened and acceptance of responsibility for the damage that was done. Chosen traumas also need to be mourned on both an individual and group basis. Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994: 8-9) write:

A group is (not) like a flesh and blood organism, but its members will share reactions to drastic events... Depending on the impact of the event, society will provide means to perform a shared work of mourning... But, under certain circumstances, mourning may be very difficult. The victimized group may be too humiliated or too angry to mourn... (The) inability to mourn a chosen trauma and the evolution of shared mental defences against it will influence the social and political ideologies of large groups. In effect, an attitude is created that says: 'We have been hurt enough. Now we should be given what others owe us.' This may result in a new generation embracing an ideology of entitlement.

The paradox, Itzkowitz and Volkan (1994) say, is that reactivating a chosen trauma may increase the self-esteem of the group. Members of the group may take on the project of trying to 'repair' the trauma of their ancestors (p. 9). These factors may lead individuals and groups dealing with unhealed traumas to be particularly susceptible to the influence of nationalist rhetoric. As John Mack argues, chosen traumas may lead to the “egoism of victimization,” in which the traumatized group may have little or no empathy for (its) enemy’s losses, ‘even if the victimization on the other side is palpably evident and comparable to or greater than one’s own... The lack of empathy, the inability to identify with the anguish experienced by the members of a national group toward whom one bears hostile feelings, removes one of the central deterrents to... waging war’” (cited in Itzkowitz and Volkan, 1994: 10).

Unresolved trauma, then, may influence chauvinistic attitudes and behaviour. 6

Education against chauvinism in a trauma-filled post-war environment should be sensitive to the nature of trauma healing. Non-governmental organizations in Bosnia have responded to this by making trauma healing programmes a major target area of their peacebuilding efforts. Psychosocial work is valued not only for the health benefits of the individual but also because of the cyclical link between unhealed trauma and violence.

Psychological theory suggests that people integrate routine experiences into their memory at many levels: visual, behavioural, verbal, and somatic. Some events, however, are too traumatic to integrate. Such experiences may be mentally set aside until it can be gradually integrated into the victim’s own

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6 This is not to say that all chauvinism is rooted in trauma – even all chauvinism within a war context. A chauvinistic ideology used only to gain power is distinct from chauvinism rooted in historical trauma, even though both might use the language of fear.
life story. But while the trauma is not being dealt with, it often resurfaces in physical ailments, depression, aggression, repetitive acting out or telling of an undeveloping, unchanging story or, often, a desire for revenge. In that stage the trauma controls individuals; they do not control it (Semeniuk, 1995).

If such trauma is not integrated, a cycle of violence can occur which can last for generations. Semeniuk (1995) cites psychiatrist Eyad el-Sarraj, founder of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, who writes that such cycles of violence can be witnessed in the Arab-Jewish conflict in the Israeli-occupied territories:

The Israelis,... survivors of a long history of persecution... are still bearing the scars of victimization... which culminated in the horrors of the Holocaust... Violence has to end with the victim... If we want to stop the Palestinians from humiliating and violating their own children with the anger of the Nazis against the Jews that was then projected onto the Palestinians, we have to empower the victim in order to break the cycle. (as cited in Semeniuk, 1995: 46)

Hart’s model, illustrated in diagram one, overleaf, (adapted from Olga Botcharova) depicts the cycle of war-related violence and a possible route to recovery.

According to the model, which operates at both individual and community levels, after suffering or witnessing an aggressive act, individuals often experience denial, anger and depression. They also commonly want revenge, a feeling reinforced by other victims of aggression within the community who also seek revenge. Thus, trauma takes on a self-reinforcing social momentum. Together, groups may develop a story of events which mythologizes the trauma in the form of a chosen trauma. This often includes creating and glorifying martyrs in stories which attempt to justify retaliatory aggressive acts.
Diagram 1: Breaking the Cycle of Violence

This cycle can be a reinforcing trap, especially as retaliatory violence often provokes the same cycle of victimization and violence in the ‘enemy.’ This trap is represented in the diagram by a person or group repeatedly going around the inner circle. In a game of tit for tat which can be witnessed in conflicts around the world, it soon becomes unclear and irrelevant who started the violence and why. To end the violence, the cycle needs to be broken by beginning a process of grieving, which is facilitated by groups and individuals acknowledging and taking responsibility for crimes committed.
Based on his work in Liberia, Hart (1995) feels that dealing with trauma through educational programmes enables participants to address conditions that contributed to the conflict and continue to shape it. By informing people of the natural feelings that follow trauma, they might begin to understand their feelings of revenge, for example, as a:

‘universal urge’... brought on by trauma, but not something that has to remain pre-eminent and/or permanent with traumatised persons/groups. The desire for revenge can be, through a thorough healing and problem-solving process, greatly reduced and even eliminated over time” (p. 217).

Hart (1995: 216) argues that addressing issues like stereotyping and prejudice by centring the discussion on war and war-related trauma also “levels the playing field or creates common ground and power equality among average citizens”\(^7\). While Hart is referring to a specific war context in which few people were left unscarred, he raises an important point. In a war like the latest war in Bosnia, there may be a clear overall group of aggressors and some nationalists may have been motivated by a chauvinistic ideology, but the experience of the average Bosnian of any ethnicity was typified by trauma, fear and considerable loss. Primarily for this reason, all educational programmes I came across in Bosnia made no distinctions, or assumptions of guilt or victimhood, in their approach to educating or training people of different ethnicities.\(^8\)

Hart’s model and Itzkowitz and Volkan’s psychoanalytical writing on trauma and trauma healing highlight two important issues relevant to peacebuilding work. First, in regions with historic violence, trauma may be closely connected to identity, enemy thinking and ethnic chauvinism. In such contexts, education against ethnic chauvinism must consider trauma healing issues. Second, trauma healing is a process. The experiences and attitudes of individuals and communities recovering from trauma are different in different stages of this process. Efforts challenging chauvinisms linked to trauma, therefore, must be seen as dynamic: appropriate programming in the early stages after trauma will be different from that for people in the ‘revenge’ cycle and will be different again as people begin to come to terms with what happened in the past. Educators are faced with a double mission: that of challenging chauvinisms and that of assisting traumatized people to move along a path toward incorporating the traumatic events into the story of their lives and their community’s history. It is a

\(^7\) I do not agree that focusing on the effects of war and trauma creates a situation of power equality among participants. Power dynamics are always present.

\(^8\) While this approach might be appropriate in such contexts as Bosnia, Croatia, Northern Ireland, Liberia and possibly Israel and Lebanon, it would not be appropriate for addressing white racism in South Africa or chauvinism in the context of political oppression as in Chile. In spite of possible individual losses by an oppressive elite, there can be no claims to a level playing field based on trauma in such a context.
story of survival, recognizing, but no longer consumed with the past, a story that moves toward the future and perhaps, one day, toward some form of intercommunity reconciliation.

The conflict transformation process also offers insights into the appropriate timing of peacebuilding programmes and the ways in which diverse post-war educational programmes may relate to one another. This will be discussed in the next section.

The Conflict Transformation Process
According to Jean Paul Lederach (1997: 29), reconciliation is a social space, a “point of encounter... between the open expression of the painful past, on the one hand, and the search for the articulation of a long-term interdependent future, on the other hand.” He identifies truth, mercy, justice and peace as enabling reconciliation but acknowledges the tensions and paradoxes that exist between them. Truth, he says, is the “acknowledgement of wrong and the validation of painful loss and experiences” but it is paradoxically linked to mercy, or the “need for acceptance, letting go, and a new beginning.” Similarly justice, which requires restitution, social restructuring and respect for individual and group rights, is tied to peace which stresses interdependence, security and well-being. Reconciliation after an intergroup conflict involves both the private and community levels. Healing, forgiving, compassion, respect and remorse are personal. Nobody can forgive for anyone else or require someone else to forgive. But there is a complex interrelationship and interdependence between the public and private aspects of the reconciliation process, noted above, and between the components (truth, mercy, justice and peace) that facilitate the reconciliation.

Reconciliation centres around a relationship between conflicting communities and between individual members of those communities. Lederach writes:

That relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long term solution... Reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups’ affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-relationship. (Lederach, 1997: 26)

Lederach applies a conflict transformation model to his peacemaking work. The model is centred on the continuing relationship between the parties in conflict. There will always be tensions and conflicts that arise within a relationship; the important thing is the way in which the parties respond to the conflicts when they do arise. The goal of peacemaking and of reconciliation efforts, according to the conflict transformation model, must be to transform a polarized, acrimonious relationship into a more collaborative one in which dialogue and mutual acknowledgement are present (Lederach, 1995). Diagram 2 illustrates what this might look like.
Diagram 2

Conflict Transformation Model

**RELATIONSHIP**

- Divided/No dialogue
- Dehumanization of the “other”
- Attempts to justify away actions
- Blaming/Pointing fingers
- Polarized positions

- Dialogue
- Recognition (of needs/fears)
- Acknowledgement
- Rehumanizing the “other”
- Willingness to listen

- Truth telling
- Taking responsibility for past and present injustices
- Willingness to work together to resolve or work on conflicts
- Re-examining (hegemonic) ways of thinking that conflict with relationship building
- Risk taking in relationship

**RELATIONSHIP**

Addresses
- Stereotyping
- Prejudice
- Discrimination

Addresses
- Ethnic nationalist framework
- Ethnic nationalist chauvinist framework

The arrow in the diagram represents the continuing relationship between conflicting parties or groups. The space in the arrow indicates the many ways in which conflicts can be handled. The approaches listed on the left side of the arrow indicate confrontational ways of handling conflict which are typical of war. These are unlikely to improve the relationship between the conflicting groups and do not usually produce just or sustainable resolutions of conflict issues. From this perspective, ‘victory’ is seen as weakening or inflicting harm on the ‘enemy’ and emphasizing one’s own victimhood. The approaches listed in the two columns to the right side of the arrow indicate more collaborative approaches to dealing with conflict which are more likely to lead to an improved relationship and more sustainable solutions. By listening to others’ concerns and by having their own concerns listened to, those in a relationship in conflict may begin to work collaboratively to resolve what they now see as common problems. Because both sides have been involved in the actions taken to resolve the problems, they are more likely to accept, carry out, and understand the solutions.

During a war, the relationship between conflicting groups is characterized by a lack of dialogue, polarized positions, blaming the enemy, attempts to justify away one’s own crimes, and a dehumanization of the enemy in the form of derogatory stereotypes. At this point the enemy is not an individual. He is one of a mass of people who are usually depicted as both threatening and inferior.
Chauvinism, whether based in ideology or not, needs to be understood as this is a form of dehumanization.

Peace workers, including peace educators, must try to transform this polarized relationship towards one where dialogue and mutual recognition and acknowledgement can take place. The parties need not agree with each other, but they need to be willing to listen. Through this process, they will begin to re-humanize the ‘other,’ seeing them as individuals with whom they share commonalities. Thus Hart, who uses this approach, stresses the common ground of trauma-related experiences shared by people who have lived through war, whether they were victims, attackers or both.

The relationship between the conflict transformation process and educational programmes addressing ethnic chauvinism is illustrated in diagram 3. Educational methodologies, aimed at addressing chauvinism in some way, are presented in stages in relation to the steps they facilitate in the conflict transformation process. The diagram suggests, for example, that in a highly polarized society, educational programmes should be designed to prepare people for dialogue and to address the enemy thinking and trauma that lead to a lack of dialogue. Educational programmes in stage one, therefore, need to prepare individuals for stage two in the conflict transformation process. Programmes appropriate for later stage social relationships where there is dialogue, mutual acknowledgement and a willingness to collaborate may be ineffective or even counterproductive when groups are still highly polarized. The reverse, however, would not hold. Education suitable for a highly polarized environment, such as trauma healing education or active learning, may continue to be useful after intergroup dialogue and a collaborative relationship have been well established.

Stage one educational programmes can play an important part in assisting the first step of conflict transformation from a polarized, divided society (the left-hand column in the conflict relationship arrow of diagram three) toward the beginning of dialogue (the middle column in the conflict relationship arrow). In Bosnia, NGO programmes create some of the few forums where people of different ethnic backgrounds can meet, talk and listen while they address common needs such as trauma, civil society development, or development of active learning skills. As participants share experiences, note commonalities, and acknowledge each other’s losses and pain, they begin to see each other as human beings with similar fears and feelings. Thus, respectful dialogue alone in this context can be seen as a form of anti-chauvinism education.
Stage two educational programmes which specifically aim at educating about prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination, can develop a deeper understanding of how chauvinism works, as well as greater media and political literacy. At this level, discussion may centre on chauvinistic attitudes and behaviour. Chauvinistic ideological and institutional structures and ‘common sense’ ways of thinking are not yet examined.

Once people listen to and acknowledge each other, they can begin telling their stories and working towards developing a shared history. As they become less defensive, the theory suggests that they will be more receptive to stage two educational programmes which teach concepts relating to human rights, chauvinism, media and government. These concepts help participants critically examine their own roles in the conflict and take responsibility for those roles. They can agree to work collaboratively when problems and conflicts arise (the right-hand column depicted in the conflict relationship arrow). Finally, stage three educational programmes can help them build just relationships and re-examine
institutional systems and hegemonic ways of thinking that inhibit dialogue. At the third stage, education against ethnic nationalist chauvinism works at three levels:

1. It can help people learn to solve problems and address tensions collaboratively while building and maintaining a positive relationship as described in the conflict transformation model.

2. It can support fact-finding and information-sharing mechanisms to help people develop a shared view of the history of the war.

3. It can encourage naming, understanding and examining ‘common sense’ or hegemonic ways of thinking, such as ethnic nationalism, ethnocentrism, and enemy thinking, which are either explicitly chauvinistic or chauvinistic in their implications and which may provide an ideological foundation for war.

It is worth briefly discussing the third level here.

**Challenging Hegemonic Ways of Thinking**

When people are situated or ‘centred’ in a society that is dominated by their own culture, the dominant ways of thinking and doing things may appear to be natural or ‘just common sense.’ In an ethnic nationalist environment, it may appear to be common sense that people should only socialize and live with their ethnic group; in other societies people may not even know or care about the ethnic background of their friends and colleagues, and such divisions do not seem natural at all. When a person is centred in a culture without contact or meaningful interaction with contrasting frameworks or perspectives on how people and societies interrelate, her own frameworks and customs may appear invisible and outside the possibility of questioning. These frameworks are not recognized as belonging to a certain social and historical context. They are seen as natural. Education can encourage examination of such common sense or hegemonic ways of thinking, especially those which may lead to injustice or enemy thinking, rendering them visible and open to questioning. Anti-chauvinism education can facilitate critical examination of frameworks, such as ethnic nationalism, which may be explicitly chauvinistic or chauvinistic in their implications and which may be integral to the logic of the conflict. At the same time it can encourage examination of the ways in which institutions and systems reflect these biases and perpetuate chauvinism.

Being centred in a dominant culture may also blind one to the cultural imbalance in one’s society and to the threat that one’s culture poses to non-dominant groups. English-speaking North Americans with European cultural roots, for example, cannot fully appreciate the degree to which they dominate North
American society because, again, much of their culture seems to be natural or common sense. For this reason, they are also unlikely to understand the degree of threat that unity with less dominant cultures poses for those cultures unless steps are taken to rectify the imbalance. The distorted perception caused by the cultural centring of dominant groups in the former Yugoslavia may have contributed to the frustration of all communities in the years leading up to the war. Stage three education might benefit from exposing this natural process.

To summarise, theory on trauma, grieving, and conflict transformation have interrelated implications for post-war anti-chauvinism education. An individual or community’s approach to conflict and their relationship with members of the ‘enemy’ group are strongly influenced by their level of trauma healing and the degree of security that people feel. A society which is still caught in a cycle of revenge will be likely to be highly polarized and lacking dialogue between conflicting groups. Members of the enemy group will often be dehumanized in stereotypes. The theory suggests that when people and communities begin to grieve their traumas, they are in a better position to ‘rehumanize’ members of historical enemy groups and deal with conflict collaboratively. Similarly, a community in which the threat of violence is high will more likely be highly polarized. Dialogue and self-reflection are easier in a more secure environment.

V Conclusion

In the years following an ethnic civil war, it is tempting to want to find educational programmes that quickly diffuse the tensions and reduce the chauvinism that is both a part and a product of the war. The Bosnian and Croatian examples show that there are no quick educational fixes. Education against ethnic or religious enemy thinking is a slow and complex process which is intimately interwoven with the state of trauma, grieving and approaches to conflict resolution of participants and their communities.

Educational programmes which challenge chauvinism caused by trauma and enemy thinking, however, offer two important things. They provide a forum where people who question the divisions and enemy logic of the war can meet, form alliances and friendships, develop their understanding of concepts related to war, peace and chauvinism, and develop joint strategies for pursuing peace. They also help participants who are more reluctant or less able to give up enemy thinking work through their feelings of trauma and change the way they look at, and deal with, conflict, moving towards a situation where dialogue is possible. Through self-understanding and dealing with emotional needs, such as grieving, they may then begin to empathise with the ‘other’ and explore their own enemy frameworks at a rational level.
Although much of the stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination during an ethnic or religious civil war appears to be very close to that which typifies North American racism, the two have many differences. Colonial racism is based on an ideology of exploitation, whereas, for many Bosnians and Croatians, ethnic chauvinism is closely tied to the trauma, anger and fear that come from a belief in the historical inevitability of enmity, a belief played up by the fatalistic myths of nationalist politicians, intellectuals and media. All the educational programmes I came across dealt with this kind of chauvinism, which is closely tied to enemy thinking.

However, there is a second form of chauvinism in the former Yugoslavia which is related to the exploitative, imperialistic form of chauvinism post-colonial societies are familiar with, and which will not be revealed by examining only the educational programmes that currently exist. Many Croat and Serb nationalists believe that Bosnia has no right to exist as a nation-state, and that Bosnian Muslims are simply converted Croats or Serbs who have no legitimate claim to be part of a nation outside of the Serb and Croat ethnic nations. This ideology, which was used as an excuse to invade Bosnia, is clearly both chauvinistic and expansionist. Although nationalist leaders may manipulate people’s trauma and grief to encourage enemy thinking which supports the institution of war, the ideology itself is not based on enemy thinking or current or past traumas.

By focusing too closely on human needs, such as trauma healing, grieving and the need for security, educators run into the danger of interpreting all chauvinism as trauma based. Chauvinistic ideological beliefs cannot be effectively addressed through educational programmes which focus on trauma healing, grieving and reconciliation. Confronting the ideological aspect of the war needs to be made an explicit part of anti-chauvinism educational programmes in the former Yugoslavia. Educators need to help people recognize chauvinistic ideologies for what they are: expansionist land and resource grabs. They should also expose the ways in which nationalist politicians manipulate traumatized people to mobilize their support for expansionist campaigns. As this topic did not arise at all in the programmes I examined, there are tremendous barriers to carrying out such discussions. The conflict transformation theory outlined in diagram 3 suggests that such discussion may occur along with stage two and three educational methodologies. Clearly, more research and educational effort is needed in this area.

Every ethnic war is unique, as the contrasts between even the closely-related Bosnian and Croatian examples indicate. However, parallels can often be drawn between the psychological experiences of individuals or communities caught in a war or post-war context. The impact of trauma, community-based chosen trauma, fear, and enemy thinking which, as Itzkowitz and Volkan argue, binds an individual and community’s identity to the identity of the “other,” are very similar in many ethnic or religious war situations. Similar patterns can also be witnessed in the way people address conflict with a named enemy. By being sensitive to both the psychology of war, trauma and grieving and by
applying notions of conflict transformation, educators concerned with chauvinism can better understand the timing of post-war educational methods.
Appendix A

Methodologies aimed at improving inter-ethnic relations and challenging ethnic chauvinism

Active Learning:
Active learning is an umbrella term which covers a range of teaching and learning methodologies designed to engage students actively and critically in learning. In contrast to a traditional, one-way, banking style of education, active learning methods encourage students to engage in two- or multiple-way dialogues with the teacher and each other. Active learning methods often use drama or physical movement to make learning more memorable, interesting and enjoyable.

Trauma healing:
Trauma healing training teaches about the impact of trauma and the process of healing and grieving after a loss. Exercises may help people express their trauma or grief either verbally, physically or through art. Participants are helped to work through the grief process and to mourn.

Inter-community co-operation:
Inter-community co-operation may either represent an effort by educators to incorporate some form of inter-group co-operation into their education programming when full mixing is not possible, or it may be a co-operative project that has resulted from a mixed programme. Examples of the former may be civil society training projects which require some joint decision-making; examples of the latter are joint media projects that were initiated at mixed youth conferences.

Conflict resolution training:
Conflict resolution training raises awareness of individual responses to conflict and teaches ways of improving both communication skills and approaches to conflicts.

Civil society education:
Civil society education is an umbrella term for education aimed at teaching about democratic processes and strengthening elements of civil society including effective voluntary and non-governmental sectors and a free press.

Peace education:
Peace education is education which raises awareness of the institution of war and of processes that promote and sustain peace.
Political education:
Political education is education that raises awareness of political processes and the role of individual citizens in those processes. Such education should reveal the way politicians try to influence or manipulate citizens and the ways in which social and economic structures influence and constrain political leaders.

Human rights education:
Human rights education is education which promotes knowledge, skills and attitudes consistent with human rights.

Intergroup mixing:
Intergroup mixing means mixing participants from conflicting ethnic groups in one educational programme as a conscious policy designed to enhance learning.

Media literacy:
Education for media literacy is designed to raise critical awareness of media, not only as an important part of a democracy, but also as text with its own biases.

Diversity appreciation:
Diversity appreciation education promotes awareness of, and appreciation for, the many ways in which people differ and are similar in a society. It attempts to broaden definitions of one’s own and others’ identities.

Bias, stereotyping and prejudice:
Education on bias, stereotyping and prejudice raises awareness of chauvinistic attitudes and behaviour.

Historical education:
Historical education can take a variety of formal and informal forms, from truth commissions and books, to classes and historical workshops. It attempts to teach, as objectively as possible, the events that influenced the war and the events of the war itself.

Citizenship education:
Citizenship education involves discussion of what it means to be a citizen of a country, who belongs as a citizen, and how they are represented in public institutions.
Anti-chauvinism education – examining hegemonies:
Anti-chauvinism education that examines hegemonies would take a broader, systemic look at discrimination than anti-chauvinism education which focuses on chauvinistic attitudes and behaviour. It would also examine dominant ways of thinking that are chauvinistic or discriminatory in their implications.
Appendix B:

Brief overview of all projects (1998)

In Bosnia:

CARE Croatia/Bosnia-Herzegovina “Pax” Project:
These drama-in-education and theatre-in-education programmes in Bihac and Mostar use drama and theatre in schools to teach active learning and conflict resolution skills and to contribute towards trauma healing of Bosnian youth and children.

The pilot project in Bihac trained primary school teachers and youth in drama-in-education methods and worked with primary school students to allow them to look at their war experiences from the safe distance that drama permits.

In Mostar, teachers are trained in drama-in-education methods to help them use active learning in their classroom. A manual was developed out of this work. A CARE consultant also works with the Mostar Youth Theatre on educational theatre projects.

CARE Croatia/Bosnia and Herzegovina
A CARE consultant teaches trauma healing workshops to community leaders and refugees. Participants learn about typical stages of trauma, loss and grieving. The consultant uses an elicitive approach to create personal meaning out of the theory.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Bosnia and Herzegovina
Catholic Relief Services conducts leadership skills training in multi-ethnic communities in an effort to build civil society. With the help of a multi-ethnic community advisory group, they find neighbourhood leaders and train them to develop and organize voluntary neighbourhood projects, building on a tradition of neighbours helping neighbours. By encouraging co-operation between ethnic groups, this training aims to improve inter-ethnic co-operation and relations.

Helsinki Citizens Assembly/Helsinki Parlament Gradjana
The Helsinki Citizens Assembly (hCa), sponsors ethnically-mixed conferences, workshops and seminars for women, youth and intellectuals, to discuss issues of concern to NGOs and to a multi-ethnic Bosnia, and to plan ways in which they can collaborate effectively to address those issues.

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Hercegovina
The Helsinki Committee organizes lectures on human rights for high schools and for the police academy. The organization published a book called *Human Rights and the Police*, which the police academy incorporated into its regular training programme. It also published a book for primary school outlining basic human rights. They write regular newsletters describing the state of human rights in Bosnia, not only for the dominant three ethnic groups, but also for such vulnerable minorities such as the Roma.

**National Democratic Institute**
The National Democratic Institute has two programmes: a political party development programme in which they help opposition and ruling parties become more democratic; and a civic programme in which they “help ordinary people become more involved in democratic structures.” As part of this latter objective, they organize civic education programmes in which educators meet monthly with groups in 60 villages and discuss democracy-related topics. The villagers come up with the topics to be discussed. They also promote inter-ethnic co-operation and understanding by creating links between communities.

**Open Society Institute/Soros**
Soros trains journalists in basic journalistic skills to promote objective coverage.

**Protector**
This book project compiled material on the positive things people did for people of other ethnic backgrounds during the war.

**Schüler Helfen Leben/Students Help to Live**
Schüler Helfen Leben brings youth together from towns across Bosnia and from all ethnic groups and engages them in cultural and educational programmes. To this end, it organized a cross-entity youth conference and a multi-ethnic youth magazine. It uses mixing and inter-ethnic co-operation explicitly as a means of improving inter-ethnic relations and challenging ethnic barriers.

**United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)**
UMCOR created workshop manuals and conducts training on peace education for children, child workers and youth, and a conflict resolution skills for community leaders. Both contain exercises on diversity appreciation and minimal exercises dealing with stereotyping and prejudice. UMCOR tries to incorporate mixing as part of its educational structure, in some cases working towards it as a long-term goal.

**UNICEF Bosnia**
UNICEF Bosnia has tried a number of educational programmes to try to establish common ground between children in different regions of Bosnia but, because of political resistance by educational decision makers, has had little success. The organization has been able to develop magazines printed in Cyrillic for distribution in RS and in Roman letters for distribution in the Federation. UNICEF has had more success promoting training in active learning educational methods.

**Youth Bridge International (YBI)**
Youth Bridge International promotes “peace and reconciliation among youth and a respect for diversity and human rights” by sponsoring and assisting media projects and other programmes run by and for youth. It sponsors “the only independent youth radio station in RS.” Project ideas come from the youth and they need to meet certain criteria, including targeting vulnerable groups: minorities, displaced people and refugees. YBI also proposed a series of training workshops for teachers on stereotyping and prejudice.

**Zajedno/Together**
*Zajedno* is an inter-denominational project run by the International Multireligious and Intercultural Centre in Sarajevo. It promotes dialogue and reconciliation between Catholic, Muslim, Serb Orthodox and Jewish leaders in Bosnia. The director teaches religious literacy seminars at the university for political science students.

**Zenska akeija Vidra/Women’s Action Vidra**
This business school is run by minority women in Serb-dominated Banja Luka. It teaches business skills to women of all ethnicities.

**In Croatia:**

**Amnesty International**
Amnesty International has an excellent human rights manual for children and teenagers which was used by CRS Croatia. Exercises cover human rights issues, conflict resolution, stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination. The material facilitates a detailed examination of topics relevant to war and oppression, all of which are tied to either the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child or the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

**Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Croatia**
CRS staff organized a conflict resolution skills training workshop for staff based on the material of consultant Dudley Weeks. The material deals with issues of identity, discrimination and facing history, as factors in successful conflict resolution. It encourages examination of social and identity-related structures that lead to chauvinism.
Department of Education, University of Zagreb
The Education for Development course is based on the work of Susan Fountain. Fountain was a consultant for Unicef Croatia and provided training in this area to NGO workers and professionals in Croatia. The course covers global interdependence, social justice (primarily children’s rights), images and perceptions (stereotyping and prejudice), conflict resolution and political and social change.

Medvescak Children’s Library
The children’s library offers diversity appreciation, human rights and conflict resolution education and training for children, parents and children’s librarians both within the library and across the war-affected regions of Croatia. Librarians work co-operatively with Unicef Croatia and education professors at the University of Zagreb.

Centre for Peace Studies
The Centre for Peace Studies offers courses and workshops for NGO workers and the general public in concepts related to peace and democracy. These include gender issues, human rights, conflict management and civil society. Courses encourage critical examination of these concepts and their adaptation for Croatian and Bosnian contexts.

School-based Health and Peace Initiative (Unicef Croatia, CARE, and McMaster University)
The school-based peace initiative provides education in trauma healing, bias and prejudice, conflict resolution, communication and peaceful living for primary school students in war-affected regions of Croatia. The programme manual, Za Damire I Nemire: Opening the Door to Non-violence, has been evaluated and a second, updated edition was created. This provides an excellent opportunity to see teacher and student responses to it.
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