

Geneva, 19 November-7 December 2001

**BACKGROUND DOCUMENT ON COMPLIANCE BY STATES PARTIES  
WITH ALL THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION ON  
THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND  
STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND  
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

**Prepared by the Secretariat**

1. In paragraph 22 of its report (BWC/CONF.V/PC/1), the Preparatory Committee for the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction decided to request the Secretariat to compile a background document on compliance by States Parties with all their obligations under the Convention. The Preparatory Committee, furthermore, decided that for the purpose of preparing this document, the Secretariat would request States Parties to provide information regarding compliance with all the provisions of the Convention
2. The present document contains the information provided by States Parties to the Secretariat, as of 13 September 2001, pursuant to paragraph 22 of the report of the Preparatory Committee.

**Belarus**

The Republic of Belarus regularly presents the annual information concerning the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.

The problem of the bacteriological weapon is strictly theoretical in Belarus. Within the system of the Ministry of Health of Belarus there is the Research Institute for Epidemiology and Microbiology, which scientific developments have received the international recognition. The program of protection of the population from infectious and parasitical diseases, including such dangerous fevers as Lassa fever virus, Ebola virus, Marburg virus, is carried out in this Institute. Belarus emphasized repeatedly its complete openness in all issues connected to microbiological research.

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## **Bulgaria**

### *Article I*

In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (Art.5, para. 4) the BWC is a constitutive part of the country's domestic legislation. The Convention has a priority over any domestic legal norms, which could contradict it.

### *Article II*

The Republic of Bulgaria complies with the provisions of Article II. In 2001 upon instruction from the World Health Organization the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences destroyed virulent strains of the virus of poliomyelitis.

### *Article III*

The Republic of Bulgaria observes Article III of the BWC. It does not support, nor incites or encourages any states to produce or acquire biological agents, toxins and weapons related to them.

Bulgaria has adopted the necessary export control legislative measures blocking any possibility of direct or indirect trafficking in biological agents, toxins, equipment and technologies leading to their development. Bulgaria has introduced a strict regime of licensing on foreign trade activities with dual-use goods and technologies, in conformity with the Law on Control of Foreign Trade activity with Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, and the Regulations for its application.

### *Article IV*

The legislation of the Republic of Bulgaria prohibits natural and legal persons from performing activities, which contradict Article I of the BWC. Bulgaria fulfils its obligations under Article IV of the BWC.

The domestic legislation of Bulgaria is permanently being complemented and improved in line with the United Nations Security Council resolutions and the decisions of the European Union and of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Since 1998 Bulgarian has adopted specific legislative restrictions on foreign trade activity with biological agents and toxins.

*Article V*

The Republic of Bulgaria has no issues of dispute with other states with regards to the implementation of the BWC. It fully supports the confidence building measures adopted by the Second and Third Review Conferences of the States Parties and fully endorses the international procedures adopted in this field. In conformity with Article 5 of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, the Republic of Bulgaria annually submits to the United Nations a yearly report on the implementation of the confidence building measures.

*Article VI*

No complaints have been addressed to the Republic of Bulgaria, neither has Bulgaria lodged complaints to other states on any violation of the assumed obligations deriving from the provisions of the BWC.

The Republic of Bulgaria has expressed its willingness to co-operate when needed with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, the World Health Organization, as well as with other international organizations in investigations on eventual BWC violation.

*Article VII*

No request for support under Article VII to the BWC has been addressed to Bulgaria.

*Article VIII*

In 1932 Bulgaria ratified the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed on 17 June 1925.

In 1991 the Republic of Bulgaria withdrew its reservations concerning its application.

*Article IX*

In 1994 the Republic of Bulgaria ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

Pursuant to Article VII of the Convention, a special Law was adopted to ban chemical weapons and control toxic chemicals and their precursors; it regulates the production, use and trade in toxic chemicals and precursors, as included in the Convention's Lists.

*Article X*

The Republic of Bulgaria co-operates bilaterally and multilaterally with the other States Parties to the BWC in order to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technical information concerning the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

Bulgaria exercises strict control on the export of dual-use goods and technologies, in order to bar illegal production and trade in biological agents and toxins in the framework of the existing national control system.

## **Finland**

### *Article X*

Under the Article X the State Parties undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the convention shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

Finland has observed her commitments under Article X through the development cooperation. The most important Finnish collaboration projects are following:

(1) World Health Organization - Global Programme for Vaccination and Immunization

Finland gives multilateral development assistance through the WHO Global Programme for Vaccination and Immunization, a total sum of 5.500.000,00 FIM during the years 1996-2000. The assistance includes laboratory activities, field evaluation of conjugate vaccines against pneumococcal pneumonia, development of TB-vaccines and the project on development of international reference preparations for virological safety testing of blood and blood products.

(2) Capacity-building for health services research at Gonoshasthaya Kendra in Bangladesh

A project collaboration between a Finnish NGO (Physicians for Social Responsibility - Finland), a Bangladeshi NGO (Gonoshasthaya Kendra, GK) and the National Public Health Institute (KTL) in Finland. The general aim of the project is capacity-building for research relevant to health. The project builds on the microbiological laboratory GVRL established at GK in 1987-1996. In 1997-2000 the focus has been on establishment of health research capability based on cooperation of the Medical Programme of GK, of GVRL and of the GK-associated People's University.

The present phase of the project aims on strengthening the research capabilities at GK with a view to sustainability. The work focuses on research training according to the internationally accepted principles of Good Clinical Practice (GCP), quality assurance,

upgrading of tuberculosis diagnostic functions to a high quality National Reference Laboratory capable of antibiotic resistance determination and research on vaccine-preventable pneumonia of young children. The project has been funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the years 1996-2001 with a total sum of about 3 million FIM.

- (3) ARIVAC: Field Studies with pneumococcal conjugate vaccines to prevent acute respiratory diseases in children in South-East Asia

The ARIVAC consortium runs a collaboration project between research institutes in Finland (National Public Health Institute), the Philippines (Research Institute on Tropical Medicine, PHO, BRH), Australia (University of Queensland), United Kingdom (Imperial College) and France (Aventis Pasteur). This ongoing project started in 1996. The aim of the project is testing the effectiveness of an 11-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine in Bohol, the Philippines. The trial site fulfils the internationally agreed Good Clinical and Laboratory Practice standards. The trial will run for five years. The site and trial setting are also ideal training grounds for advanced medical students and young, qualified physicians pursuing their careers in health intervention research and ARI and EPI programme development. The ARIVAC consortium have since the beginning of the project in 1996 been funded mainly by the European Commission, DG Research, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Finland and the Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation.

- (4) Research project on development of a new vaccine against *Chlamydia pneumoniae*

The project is collaboration with research institutes in Finland, Sweden and Germany and aims on developing a new vaccine against *Chlamydia pneumoniae*. The project has been funded by the European Commission, DG Research, for the years 1996-1999.

### **Other measures**

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the National Public Health Institute of Finland established in 1999 a project to develop national expertise on the Convention and to prepare the possible establishment of a national authority to be required by the verification protocol to the BWC.

The project (*Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention National Authority Project, BIOFIN*) has participated in the international cooperation in the field of prevention of biological warfare. BIOFIN has also taken part in the work of the Ad Hoc Group in Geneva.

The five Nordic countries Finland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Sweden jointly carried out a trial random visit in May 1998. The trial visit was carried out to a biopharmaceutical production facility in Norway. The main purpose of the exercise was to evaluate the procedures for random visits, both as regards presentations and on-site activities, in cooperation with the facility visited, and to obtain sufficient information concerning the consistency of declarations, while taking due consideration of the need to protect Commercial Property Information (CPI). The findings of the trial visit was shared with other State Parties in the Ad Hoc Group.

## **Greece**

Greece does not possess and does not intend to proceed to any kind of research or production of bacteriological (biological) or Toxin Weapons.

## **Japan**

### *Article I*

Japan ratified the Convention on the Prohibition on the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”) in 1982. Since its ratification, Japan has never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained:

- (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
- (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

### *Article II*

Since Japan did not possess any agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention at the time of its ratification, this article does not apply to it.

### *Article III*

Japan has been in full compliance with Article III of the Convention and thus has never transferred to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, nor in any way assisted, encouraged or induced any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

### *Article IV*

To implement Article IV of the Convention, the Law for the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition on the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction was enacted in 1982.

*Articles V and VI*

Japan has not invoked Articles V and VI, and these articles have not been invoked against it.

*Article VII*

Japan has not been requested to provide assistance under Article VII.

*Article X*

In light of the objective and purpose of Article X of the Convention, Japan has promoted international cooperation bilaterally or together with international organizations, to further the development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. Japan's international cooperation includes the following programmes:

(1) Biotechnology

(a) Promotion of the Human Frontier Science Program (HFSP)

In order to promote basic research to elucidate functions of the human body, Japan has been the leading contributor to the Organization of Human Frontier Science Program (HFSP) by assisting international research team and young researchers while also promoting international workshops in this field.

(b) In 2001, Japan will hold a seminar for Asian researchers in Thailand on the biotechnological improvement of breed and its assessment. Japan also has projects to invite young Asian researchers and promote joint research in the field of biotechnology.

(c) Since 1988, Japan has contributed to genome sequence research through the Human Genome Project. The basic mapping of human genome could further enhance the study of life science. The entire mapping of the human genome is expected to be completed by 2003.

(d) Attempts to human cloning can cause a serious challenge to human dignity. In November 2000, Japan has set up a domestic law to prohibit human cloning and also is calling upon the international community to collaborate on such prohibition.

(e) Cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

Japan provided support to FAO activities in establishing an international regime for the preservation and utilization of plant genetic resources, and has cooperated in various international seminars for the Asian countries.

Japan accordingly provides financial and technical support for capacity-building for establishing regimes that will enable risk assessment of LMOs (agricultural products) in Asian countries.

(f) To support capacity-building and understanding the most advanced biotechnology, Japan has provided the “Bio-industries Training Course” for developing countries.

(2) Japan’s Cooperation through ODA (Promotion of research activities)

Japan has extended its support to research and development activities in the area related to biotechnology consistent with Article X of the Convention. Examples are shown below.

(a) In Zambia

A new project started in March 2000 to further contribute to effective control of the most deadly diseases in Zambia, HIV/AIDS and TB, by standardization and quality assurance of peripheral frontline laboratories and more laboratory services use by clinicians, etc.

(b) In Thailand

Cooperation projects with National Institute of Health in Thailand have been conducted to improve capacity of this country on research and development on HIV/AIDS and other emerging infectious diseases

(c) Training

Japan has supported human resources development in the area of health and disease control in a number of countries.

## **Latvia**

Latvia as a responsible State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (hereinafter - the Convention) is not developing, producing, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

At the moment when the Convention entered into force Latvia did not have any stockpiles of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

In 1995 the Government of Latvia introduced an export, import and transit control system in keeping with Latvia’s commitments under number of agreements, conventions and initiatives and in compliance with the standards set by international export control regimes. Latvia is updating its export control system constantly in accordance with new commitments undertaken

by Latvia. Latvia's export control enforcement capacities are ensuring that there are no transfers of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention to any of recipient.

The development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons are illegal. The Criminal Code of Latvia provides the penalty of life imprisonment or imprisonment from 3 to 20 years for developing, producing, stockpiling or otherwise acquire or retain any of nuclear, chemical, biological, bacteriological, toxic or any other weapons of mass destruction.

## **Lebanon**

The Lebanese army does not possess any biological weapon.

## **Netherlands**

The Netherlands would like to provide the following background information document regarding its compliance with all the provisions of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

### 1. Implementation of the Convention

The Netherlands signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention on 10 April 1972 and ratified the Convention on 22 June 1981. The domestic Biological and Toxin Weapons Act was enacted on 25 March 1981. This legislation provides for the necessary measures to be taken under domestic law to enable the Netherlands to fulfil its obligations under the Convention.

The Netherlands is in full compliance with all its obligations under the Convention.

### 2. Implementation of specific articles of the Convention

#### *Articles I and II*

The Netherlands has never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types or in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes nor has it ever developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

#### *Article III*

Export of dual use items is regulated in the Netherlands under EU legislation on the basis of the *Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology*. This regulation entered into force on 28 September 2000, replacing an earlier regulation dating from 1994. The regulation stipulates that national export licenses are

required for certain types of items and technology, lists of which are regularly updated in accordance with the development of science and technology. In case of certain items, a generic communal license is required. The new regulation also requires export licenses for immaterial transfers.

*Article IV*

The implementation of Article IV of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is covered by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Act of 25 March 1981.

*Article V*

The Netherlands has not invoked Article V, nor has any other State Party invoked Article V in order to engage the Netherlands in consultations. The Netherlands fully supports the Confidence Building Measures developed at previous BWC Review Conferences and has consistently participated in all rounds (on an annual basis) of information exchange in the framework of the Confidence Building Measures.

*Article VI*

The Netherlands has not invoked the provisions of Article VI, nor has any other State Party invoked these provisions against the Netherlands.

*Article VII*

The Netherlands has not been requested to provide assistance under Article VII, nor has it invoked the provision of Article VII to receive assistance.

*Article IX*

The Netherlands has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction on 13 January 1993 and ratified it on 30 June 1995. As host country to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Netherlands is strongly committed to the effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

*Article X*

The Netherlands has a strong tradition in international cooperation and belongs to the world most important donors - in the form of all kinds of bilateral and multilateral aid to developing countries. An important part of this relates to biotechnology and health. The following categories of projects can be distinguished:

- (1) Human health care, comprising vaccine production, malaria control, human nutrition and microbiology and improvement of bio-safety;

- (2) Agriculture, including plant breeding and animal and plant health;
- (3) Educational and training programs in crop science, biotechnology, applied microbial fermentation biology and other subjects.

In a speech on the occasion of the presentation of the UNDP Human Development Report 2001, the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation stressed once again the need to share knowledge in biotechnology with developing countries.

Since 1992, there is a “Special Program” for biotechnology and development cooperation, aimed at fully using the potential of biotechnology for poverty alleviation. There also exist large-scale Biotechnology Country Programs, focused on a limited number of countries. These programs address the needs of small-scale farmers by trying to maximise the potential contribution of biotechnology for solving small-scale production constraints. Finally, there are programs on bio-safety specifically targeted to countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the fall of 2000, the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation announced that in the next five years, the Netherlands will contribute one hundred million dollars to a global vaccination project. Through the organisation “Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation” this project aims at enlarging the “standard package” of vaccination with relatively expensive vaccines, like the ones against yellow fever, hepatitis B and other diseases. Also, research is planned on new vaccines against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.

On a smaller scale, the Netherlands supported the setting up of a better system for monitoring infectious diseases by providing a small start-up capital to the “Alliance against infectious diseases”. Such a system, to be implemented by the WHO, the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology and other organisations as part of this alliance, would aim at establishing regional self-sufficiency for controlling infectious diseases. The alliance seeks to provide technical assistance, through arrangements with international organisations like the WHO, particularly to developing countries parties to the BWC.

## **Republic of Korea**

### *Article I*

The Republic of Korea has never developed, produced, stockpiled, or otherwise acquired or retained:

- (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
- (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

The Republic of Korea fully supports the principles and objectives of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) and has complied with all the provisions under the Convention.

Furthermore, pursuant to the 1991 adoption of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, the Republic of Korea has submitted annually since 1992 all relevant information to the United Nations.

### *Article III*

The Republic of Korea is in full compliance with Article III. In fulfillment of its obligations under Article III, the Republic of Korea has implemented the following regulations which require relevant exporters to obtain a license for the export of specified biological agents, toxins and equipment that would be used in a biological weapons programme:

#### Foreign Trade Act

- General regulations related to export control of strategic goods
- Sanction against fraudulent or unlawful export

#### Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act

- Export license of strategic goods, issuance of import certificate, etc.

#### Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Goods

- Controlled list, controlled area, licensing procedures, etc.

### *Article IX*

The Republic of Korea has signed and ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, on 14 January 1993 and on 28 April 1997 respectively.

### *Article X*

All research and development in the Republic of Korea involving the use of microorganisms and toxins is conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, and the results of such R&D have been published.

In addition, in view of the importance of the regular exchange of information with States Parties including background information on outbreaks of infectious diseases within its territory, the Government of the Republic of Korea has been engaged in information exchange on

epidemiological disease by publishing the “Communicable Disease Monthly Report” since 1990, and participating in the surveillance programmes of relevant international organizations.

In accordance with Article X, the Republic of Korea has actively participated in international exchanges of scientific and technological information relating to the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, and provided assistance to countries in need of health and disease control and education.

In particular, the International Vaccine Institute (IVI) was established in Korea in 1997 at the initiative of UNDP with a view to saving some 9 million children (among which 8.2 million are from developing countries) each year, whose deaths could be prevented with timely and appropriate vaccination. The IVI is a humanitarian organization and an international development cooperation institute devoted to the cause of strengthening the capacity of developing countries in the development, production and use of vaccines in immunization programmes. As such, one of the IVI’s most important works is to provide training and technical assistance for developing and producing vaccines. To this end, the IVI maintains close cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO), Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) and many other vaccine research institutes of both developed and developing countries.

It is stipulated that the IVI shall be financed by the voluntary contributions of member states, international organizations and other public institutions. The Republic of Korea has contributed 1.2 million dollars in 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively, and a total amount of 6.39 million dollars since 1995, in line with its efforts to promote cooperation with developing countries. Currently, the Republic of Korea is constructing the Institute headquarters building, costing over 4 million dollars, and will also fully equip the center, costing an estimated 6 million dollars. This facility, which is due to be completed by 2002, will be a state-of-the-art research center with research laboratories, an animal facility, a pilot plant for producing many experimental vaccines, and training facilities. The Korean Government will continue to provide all possible support to the IVI so that the IVI can firmly establish itself as a competitive and prestigious international organization dedicated to vaccine-related R&D and capacity-building in developing countries.

### **Russian Federation**

1. The Russian Federation reaffirms its commitment to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological and Toxin Weapons) and on their Destruction. Russia regards compliance with its international obligations relating to biological weapons as one of the priorities of its State policy.

2. The Russian Federation has withdrawn its reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The depositary Government has been informed of the withdrawal of these reservations.

3. The Russian Federation has created and set in operation a legislative and regulatory framework to ensure compliance with international obligations on the prohibition of biological and toxic weapons. Since the Fourth Review Conference of the States parties, a federal act has been adopted on export controls.

By means of this act and the corresponding decisions the Government of the Russian Federation has set in place a system for the licensing of activities involving the use of infectious disease agents and for the State registration of genetic engineering activities. Adjustments have been made to the Criminal Code, stipulating penalties for activities in breach of the Biological Weapons Convention.

4. In 1997, the Russian Federation ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction and is taking steps to ensure compliance with the Convention. The Russian Federation is participating actively in the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Hague.

The Russian Government has ratified a special federal programme for the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles in the Russian Federation, with a view to ensuring full compliance with the provisions of the Convention. Russia has already commenced destruction of its stockpiles of category 1 and category 2 chemical weapons.

5. The Russian Federation considers peaceful scientific and technical international cooperation in the fields of biology and biotechnology to be of importance for strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention. Many Russian institutions are involved in work to elaborate and implement joint biological research programmes in the fields of health-care, veterinary services and agriculture, together with a large number of firms, centres and institutes of various other States.

A number of Russian institutions are engaged in cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Office of Epizootics (OIE) and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and are operating as reference centres for these international organizations.

Data on human, animal and plant morbidity are reported to the relevant United Nations bodies.

To promote scientific exchange, every year Russia holds a number of international conferences, symposiums and seminars on aspects of biology and biotechnology, at which work related to pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins is also discussed.

6. In compliance with the decision of the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (1991), Russia submits, as a confidence-building measure, annual reports

to the United Nations on its biological and biotechnological activities, using the prescribed formats. The submission of such information by all States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention is considered an essential confidence-building measure.

7. At the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, the Russian Federation has campaigned for an early conclusion of the work to elaborate a protocol, making constructive suggestions conducive to the creation of a mechanism for monitoring compliance with the Convention's provisions which is sound, efficient, carefully defined, cost-effective, egalitarian, non-discriminatory and respectful of the national interests of the States parties. We believe that the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism will be largely contingent on the inclusion in the protocol of objective criteria.

The Russian Federation attaches utmost priority to the signing by all States parties of the protocol for the strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention, as a vital means of safeguarding international military and political stability and security.

8. The Russian Federation welcomes those States which have acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention since the Fourth Review Conference and appeals to those States which have not yet done so to emulate their example. Universal accession to the Biological Weapons Convention will serve as a guarantee of the further strengthening of peace in our planet.

9. The Russian Federation is complying with its obligations as depositary Government in accordance with the procedure established by the Biological Weapons Convention.

### **United States of America**

Under the heading "Background Documentation," paragraph 22 of the Report of the Preparatory Committee (BWC/CONF.V/PC/1) for the Fifth Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, the Preparatory Committee decided to request the Secretariat to compile a background information document on compliance by States Parties with all their obligations under the Convention.

In cooperation with this request, the United States wishes to confirm to States Parties, through the Secretariat, that the United States is in full compliance with its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention. In 1969, in an action separate from the then on-going negotiations, the United States unilaterally renounced all methods of biological warfare and directed complete destruction of its stocks of biological agents, toxins and weapons connected in any way with its offensive programme. Since that time the United States has conducted activities consistent with Article I of the Convention and has included relevant activities in its annual compliance report to the United States Congress. Further, in support of its obligations, the United States submits annually to the United Nations Secretariat data declarations under the Confidence Building Measures adopted at the Third Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference.

## **Yugoslavia**

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as an active advocate of disarmament and resolution of international conflicts by non-use of force, has abided by all provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons;

It does not possess, store or produce bacteriological and toxin weapons, nor does it possess, store or produce chemical or nuclear weapons;

It possesses certain toxic chemicals, but not toxins, as declared (under Schedules 1,2, and 3) in the quantities and for the purposes not prohibited under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction;

There are no new technological advances in the Yugoslav Army related to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons;

It stands ready to extend, within the bounds of its research, technological and other possibilities, appropriate assistance to its next-door neighbours and further afield in the region, in compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons.

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