Philosophy Seminar Organisers: Roger Fellows & Friedel Weinert
Email: r.fellows@bradford.ac.uk, f.weinert@bradford.ac.uk
Tel: (01274) 233992 / 235191
All Philosophy Seminars start at 4:00pm, in the Richmond Building on E-Floor. This year most Talks in Semester I/II are held in E1 .
Everyone welcome!
| Date | Title | Seminar Speaker | Room |
| 02 November 2011 | "Guardians for future generations: a modest Platonic proposal?
" Synopsis: Plato said that, if we are to have a just society, we should be ruled by guardians. Habermas and other deliberative-democratic philosophers abhor such autocracy. -But what if the guardians were selected democratically (e.g. by sortition)? And what if their deliberations became in turn a high-profile model of what deliberation in a democratic society could be? …Still, there seems little case for substituting guardians for normal elected representatives, for decisions which can be made about us, by us ourselves or by people who represent us. -But what about cases where the people who ought to be heard in / making the decisions have no voice -- even over matters which are life-or-death matters for them? …Future people are the most obvious case. This article argues for powerful guardians for future people. This would give future people not just a proxy voice, but the closest approximation we can give them to a casting vote. And this is surely appropriate, in a democracy; for, so long as we tip Earth’s climate back from the brink -- as the guardians would, it is suggested, ensure happens -- there will over time be a lot more of them than there are of us… |
Rupert Read (UEA) | E1 |
| 16 November 2011 | "Models and Fiction" Synopsis: Most scientific models are not physical objects, and this raises important questions. What sort of entity are models, what is truth in a model, and how do we learn about models? In this paper I argue that models share important aspects in common with literary fiction, and that therefore theories of fiction can be brought to bear on these questions. In particular, I argue that the pretence theory as developed by Walton (1990, Mimesis as make-believe: on the foundations of the representational arts. Harvard University Press, Cambridge/MA) has the resources to answer these questions. I introduce this account, outline the answers that it offers, and develop a general picture of scientific modelling based on it. |
Roman Frigg (London School of Economics) | E1 |
| 29 November 2011 | " Not a matter of life and death"
Synopsis: As the Olympic year approaches, a critical examination of the place of sport in the rest of life. |
Anthony O'Hear (Buckingham University and Royal Institute of Philosophy) | E1, NOTE Change of Date |
| 7 December 2011 | " tba
" Synopsis: tba |
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| 01 February 2012 | "The very idea of a history of philosophy " Abstract: The methods of historical inquiry have been transformed over the past century – not only in social and political histories but also specialised discipline histories (histories of music, histories of art, and histories of literature for example). With one exception: histories of philosophy are still following recipes that have not changed since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In this talk I will explore the history and function of histories of philosophy, and argue that they have a vast and damaging influence on contemporary philosophy. Philosophy may not have much of a future unless it can get itself a new past. | Jonathan Ree (University of Middlesex) | E1 |
| 15 February 2012 | "Francis Bacon's Science of Magic
" Abstract: In this paper I argue that Francis Bacon (1561-1626) proposed a science of magic as the very core of his whole programme for a great instauration. I first address the question why Bacon should want to designate his science as ‘magic’, despite the cultural freight of suspicion and opprobrium it bore. I then consider his concept of magic as an operative science. It was a ‘science’, not just in the classical sense of an organised body of knowledge suitably arranged for the exposition of some field of interest, but in the modern sense of knowledge derived from an understanding of physical process aimed at the reliable production of novel effects. It attempted an analysis in terms of motion, and the laws governing the causal enchainment of those motions, throughout the whole realm of cosmic activity from the bowels of the earth to the heights of the starry heavens. We are all familiar with the Baconian maxim ‘knowledge is power’, yet the nature of the connection, as Bacon conceived it, is not well understood. I explain Bacon’s claim that knowledge of the laws of nature (properly understood) was the means to produce ‘all things possible.’ |
Sophie Weeks (University of Leeds) | E1 |
| 07 March 2012 | " The Gene: A Concept in Flux" Abstract: Despite recent criticisms, there is hardly any doubt, that “the gene” played an exorbitant role in the history of twentieth century life sciences. As many have observed, it has functioned as a central organizing theme for twentieth-century biology. It is also clear from the history of genetics and molecular biology, however, that there never existed a universally accepted, stable definition of the gene. In the course of its history, this concept has variously been defined as a unit of transmission, recombination, mutation and function. The concept of the gene was in continual flux throughout its history, and it seems that this is a typical feature of historically influential and productive scientific concepts, as Yehuda Elkana has argued more than 30 years ago. In my talk, I will argue that the gene owed its position as a central organizing theme in twentieth-century biology to its being a concept in flux. Moreover, I will to explore the foundations of classical genetics, focussing on Mendel in a first step, and then on crucial achievements of early twentieth century geneticists, to understand what it was that turned the gene into such a scientifically fruitful concept. |
Stephan Mueller-Wille (University of Exeter) | E1 |
| 21 March 2012 | "tba
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| | 18 April 2012 | " Philosophy and Film: The case of "Blade Runner" Abstract: This paper examines one pivotal scene in 'Blade Runner' in which Deckard analyses a photograph retrieved from one of the replicants, with a view to defending and taking further the argument of a chapter in my book 'On Film' - namely that this film exemplifies the way in which films might not only illustrate philosophical arguments and ideas but philosophize in their own right'. |
Stephen Mulhall (University of Oxford) | L30 (Richmond) |